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There are those who see things as they are, and ask: ‘WHY?’ 
But I dream things that never were, and ask: ‘WHY NOT?’ 
 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, 
Paraphrasing George Bernard Shaw 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This volume is dedicated to the memory of 
 
Pier Mario Vello 
 
who singularly combined a passionate commitment 
to the unique potentials of charitable foundations 
with rare leadership and administrative skills to 
produce in Milan’s Cariplo Foundation one of 
the world’s pre-eminent charitable institutions, 
demonstrating in the process the enormous promise 
of the concept that this volume introduces. 
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In these times of financial crises, growing public debt, and deepening poverty in various 
parts of the world, it seems particularly important not to fall into the trap of short-term 
thinking and panicked responses. Instead we should take the time for a thorough review of 
the path dependencies and interconnected reasons for the miseries we find ourselves in, 
and for careful consideration of new perspectives for building a more sustainable future for 
mankind. 
It will take many building blocks to ultimately surmount the enormous challenges ahead of 
us. One of the most interesting, if so far largely ignored, of these possible building blocks is 
outlined in the present report: namely, the potential for channeling some or all of the pro-
ceeds from privatization transactions into permanent charitable endowments devoted to the 
common good.  
It is against this background that Lester Salamon and his colleagues deserve to be thanked 
most cordially for taking on the enormous effort of providing us with the first comprehensive 
study of numerous already-existing cases of such “philanthropication through privatization.” 
This process of channeling into effective and efficient philanthropic institutions some or all of 
the proceeds of the sale or transfer of various state-owned businesses or other assets has 
already achieved much and holds great promise for bringing additional resources and 
energies into efforts to solve pressing human problems. Compared to the still prevailing 
practice of dumping such proceeds into regular state budgets, this option has the advantage 
of permanently preserving such assets for priority common-good purposes on a long-term 
basis. As such, it is a practical and workable part of the solution to many of the problems we 
face and deserves the attention that this report will give it. In several respects this option 
seems to follow the advice of the German poet Friedrich Schiller who once wrote: “If what we 
are doing does not speak for itself, then words won’t be of any help either.” 
Let’s hope that the considerations and recommendations presented in this report will not 
only find many readers but also many leaders and decision-makers capable of implementing 
them in the most sustainable way by turning the results of safe and sound privatizations into 
trustworthy and endowed institutions that are able and willing to make a difference. The 
Members of the Advisory Committee to this project, which I am privileged to chair, are deeply 
committed to advancing this process in every possible way. 
Wilhelm Krull 
Hanover, 28 April 2014
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The Philanthropication thru Privatization (PtP) Initiative is designed to explore the poten-
tials for creating permanent charitable endowments in countries throughout the world by tap-
ping into the proceeds of privatization transactions of various sorts. Numerous such “philan-
thropication thru privatization” transactions have already occurred, but they have never been 
systematically identified and analyzed, nor seen as a possible strategy for seeding charitable 
foundations in countries where such institutions are sorely lacking. Yet such a strategy could 
yield “win-win” benefits for citizens, for civil society, for governments, and for investors. To un-
derstand this potential, the Project has set about to identify the previous cases of this PtP 
phenomenon, to subject a group of them to intensive examination, and to assess the poten-
tials and desirability of implementing the PtP concept in other settings where privatization is 
planned or under way. This report summarizes the results of this inquiry. 
The PtP Initiative is housed administratively at the East-West Management Institute (EWMI), 
an independent, not-for-profit organization that has played an instrumental role in building 
sustainable civil society institutions in countries throughout the world. And it has received im-
portant institutional support as well from the Maecenata Institute in Berlin, Germany, directed 
by Dr. Rupert Strachwitz. 
Assisting me on this project has been an experienced team of Associates that includes: Dr. 
Gian Paolo Barbetta in Italy, Attorney Chuck Bell in the United States, Peter McKinlay in New 
Zealand, Dr. Lucas Meijs in the Netherlands, Amélie Mernier in Belgium, Dr. Bartek Pielinski in 
Poland, Nigel Siederer in the U.K., Dr. Rupert Strachwitz in Germany, and Boris Strecansky in 
Slovakia. Along with a number of other associates noted in Attachment C to this report, these 
individuals have assisted in the identification of past cases of PtP around the world and have 
produced a series of case studies that form the raw material on which this report largely de-
pends. Unless otherwise noted, information on the PtP cases cited in this report derives from 
Field Guide Reports produced by these respective Associates. Brief summaries of these case 
studies will be posted at the project website, p-t-p.org. 
Special assistance in the preparation of this report was provided by four of these Associates 
(Bell, McKinlay, Siederer, and Strachwitz) who prepared summary overviews of the 22 case 
studies carried out as part of the fact-finding portion of this initiative. In addition, the Project 
has benefited from the research and administrative assistance of Emmanuel Opati, William 
Burckart, Alexander Morse, and Naomi Hansen, and the production assistance of Chelsea 
Newhouse.  
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Support for the PtP Project has been provided by eight Italian foundations of banking origin 
(Fondazione Cariplo, Compagnia di San Paolo, Fondazione Banca del Monte di Lucca, 
Fondazione del Monte di Bologna e Ravenna, Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano, 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Cuneo, Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Fossano, 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio Salernitana) through the Associazione di Fondazioni e di Casse 
di Risparmio, by the ASB Community Trust in New Zealand, by the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation in the United States, by the King Baudouin Foundation in Belgium, and by the 
Volkswagen Foundation in Germany through a grant to the Maecenata Institute in Berlin. An 
Advisory Committee chaired by Dr. Wilhelm Krull, Secretary General of the Volkswagen Foun-
dation, is providing guidance and advice to the initiative. 
I am deeply grateful to all of the organizations and individuals for their crucial interest and 
support. None of them bears responsibility for the interpretations reported here, however. 
That responsibility lies with me alone as project director and principal author. 
Finally, this book is dedicated to the memory of Pier Mario Vello, whose untimely death just as 
this book neared completion robs Italy and the entire global philanthropic community of a truly 
extraordinary leader and moral guide.  Pier Mario was an unusually effective manager and 
leader of one of the more remarkable PtP foundations, Fondazione Cariplo, located in Milano. 
But he was also more than this: he was a moral philosopher who, in his recent book, Generosi-
ty, essentially took his place as the contemporary heir to an earlier moral philosopher, Adam 
Smith, whose major work was not The Wealth of Nations, but The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and 
whose long-forgotten major message was not about the "hidden hand" of the market, but 
about the sentiment of "mutual sympathy" without which he felt the hidden hand could not 
function. In Generosity, Vello gives  modern expression to a similar theme, identifying what he 
terms "inclusive generosity" as the antidote to the contemporary failures of the state and the 
market, and urging us to "render generosity a public affair," and to "give more public space and 
voice" to its "private and public expressions." It was this deep philosophical perspective that 
made Pier Mario such a creative force in the philanthropic community of the world and that 
made it such a great privilege for me, as for so many others, to earn his interest and support 
and to know him as a valued colleague and friend. Hopefully, this volume, which he en-
couraged and supported, will help carry his message forward.  
 
Lester M. Salamon 
Annapolis, MD 
31 July 2014
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BACKGROUND 
With the resources and capabilities of governments barely growing or in decline 
around the world, yet the problems of poverty, ill-health and environmental degra-
dation ballooning daily, it is increasingly clear that new efforts, and new financial re-
sources, are urgently needed to address the world ‘s pressing  social, economic, and 
environmental challenges.  
In response, governments in many parts of the world are looking to the privatization 
of state-owned enterprises or the sale of other public assets, such as mineral rights, 
air rights, or electric power, to generate the capital needed to meet these challenges. 
However, these efforts are increasingly encountering citizen resistance because they 
tend to produce “upside-down" effects, imposing significant short-term burdens on 
relatively narrow groups of affected citizens while delivering their potential benefits 
only over the long run to widely dispersed groups or having them disappear without 
a trace into government budgets.   
Meanwhile, in many of these same areas energetic efforts are under way to promote 
the development of community-based philanthropic institutions that can generate 
private resources to help deal with community problems. But these efforts are 
confronting a crucial barrier due to the general lack of capital to underwrite their 
operations.  
Fortunately, there is a potential "win-win" way out of both of these dilemmas: 
by channeling all or a portion of the proceeds of  privatization transactions 
into charitable foundations, a process we are calling Philanthropication thru 
Privatization, or PtP.   
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PtP offers a way to reverse the upside-down effects of privatization by placing per-
manent assets in private charitable institutions dedicated to improving the quality of 
life of citizens, particularly those most directly affected by privatization. In the pro-
cess, it can reduce opposition to legitimate privatization transactions by ensuring citi-
zens they will share in the benefits that can flow from the sale of assets that are their 
birthright or the product of their sweat and toil. Properly designed and executed, PtP 
can revolutionize the charitable landscape of countries while transforming privatiza-
tion into a win-win process for citizens, governments, and investors alike.   
 
Philanthropication thru Privatization is not just an abstract idea, moreover. It is al-
ready in operation. Indeed, some of the largest and most reputable foundations in 
the world—such as Germany’s Volkswagen Foundation, Italy’s foundations of banking 
origin, New Zealand’s network of “community trusts," Belgium’s King Baudouin Foun-
dation, and close to 200 health conversion foundations in the U.S.—have all resulted 
from, or been enlarged through, a PtP process. 
 
Yet these developments have all proceeded in virtual isolation. No one has thought 
to draw a circle around them and call attention to their striking commonalities. More 
importantly, no one has thought to highlight the important lessons they might hold 
for a new approach to privatization that can yield win-win payoffs for citizens and civ-
il society, as well as for governments and investors.  
 
Until now. 
 
 
THE PRESENT REPORT 
The present report seeks to fill this gap. It offers the first systematic look at what 
turns out to be a sizeable global process of social wealth creation that has already 
contributed to the establishment or enlargement of significant philanthropic institu-
tions endowed with billions of dollars of assets and dedicated to a variety of social, 
economic, developmental, and environmental objectives.  
 
With a new wave of privatization activity now under way, and efforts to generate 
charitable resources to support civil society and social purposes going starved for 
funds, it is imperative that this option be better appreciated and understood. And 
that is precisely what this report seeks to accomplish. 
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SIX KEY QUESTIONS  
More specifically, drawing on a global network of associates who surveyed the phil-
anthropic landscape of the world and then conducted a series of in-depth case stud-
ies of existing PtP institutions, the report seeks to answer six key questions: 
1) What is PtP? 
2) What is the scope of the existing PtP universe? 
3) What factors have given rise to PtP transactions? 
4) How are PtP transactions best structured and carried out? 
5) How have PtP foundations operated and performed? and 
6) Does PtP have a future? 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS  
Eight key findings have emerged from this investigation as detailed in this report. 
 
1) A Powerful New Concept 
PtP is a powerful concept, providing a new analytical lens that brings into coherent 
view for the first time a long-overlooked but important set of transactions that hold 
the promise of changing the global philanthropic landscape and ushering in a new 
citizen-focused mode of privatization. These transactions share three key features: 
a) An initial governmental or quasi-governmental asset; 
b) A process of divestiture that transfers ownership or control of this asset 
into the hands of one or more private institutions; and 
c) A meaningfully autonomous private charitable institution that secures 
ownership or control of all or a portion of the proceeds of this transfer 
in the form of a permanent endowment or an endowment-like flow of 
resources. 
At least five types of such PtP transactions have been identified based on whether 
the initial asset is:  
i) A state-owned enterprise;  
ii) Some other government-owned asset (e.g., a building); 
iii) A stream of income from some government-controlled resource 
(e.g., a lottery, mineral deposits, air rights licenses);  
iv) A debt swap; or  
v) A quasi-governmental entity or resource (e.g. a nonprofit organiza-
tion that has benefited from government tax or other subsidy). 
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2) An Enormous Engine of Social Wealth Creation  
Once brought into focus with the help of the PtP concept, the universe of PtP 
transactions, institutions, and resources turns out to be huge. Our preliminary 
exploration of this universe of institutions reveals that: 
 Well over 500 PtP foundations exist around the world, located in 21 
countries, and holding at least US$135 billion (€100 billion) in assets. 
 The most common type of PtP transactions are those involving the 
privatization of quasi-public institutions, but significant examples of 
all five types are evident. 
 Like foundations generally, most PtP foundations (54 percent) are 
small, with assets of less than US$100 million each, however 13 per-
cent have assets in excess of $3 billion each, placing them among the 
largest foundations in the world. In fact, compared to the foundation 
universe in general, PtP foundations are more heavily weighted to-
ward larger institutions, reflecting the enormous scale of the privati-
zation transactions that have fueled their growth. 
 
 
3) Facilitating Factors 
Philanthropication accompanies privatization where it is necessary, or useful, to 
do so. More specifically, this outcome seems to be most likely: 
 Where privatization is proposed or under way; 
 Where the assets involved have some unusual characteristic (e.g., 
contested or unclear ownership, unusual legal structure, history of 
prior governmental subsidization); 
 Where the legal environment facilitates philanthropication or discour-
ages alternative uses of privatization proceeds; 
 Where opposition to privatization has surfaced or is feared; and/or 
 Where policy entrepreneurs or other advocates, including civil society, 
push for this outcome. 
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4) The Specific Structures of PtP Deals and Institutions Matter 
 PtP deals that create endowments generally yield better financial results 
than ones that establish a stream of revenue, even when the stream of rev-
enue is secured over a period of time contractually or by law. 
 PtP foundations can receive the proceeds of privatization transactions either 
in the form of cash (one-step deals) or in the form of shares of stock in a pri-
vatized company or other asset that they can later sell (two-step deals). Gen-
erally speaking, two-step deals yield larger charitable endowments than one-
step deals.   
 PtP deals can be structured in ways that avoid any conflict between the es-
tablishment of PtP foundations and privatization’s contribution to the re-
duction of government debt.  
 
 
5) Generally Impressive Operational Performance  
With some notable exceptions, PtP foundations have adopted leading-edge techniques 
of foundation operations. Thus, they have generally established: 
 Governance arrangements that provide meaningful autonomy from govern-
mental authorities and privatized companies; 
 Coherent mission statements and programmatic objectives; 
 Transparent reporting procedures that publicize programs, sources, and uses 
of funds, governance arrangements, and conflict of interest policies; 
 Professionalized operations, featuring skilled experts in the fields in which the 
foundations work and in the management of foundation assets; and 
 Rationalized investment management. 
 
 
6) Effective Programmatic Performance 
Programmatically, PtP foundations have made significant contributions to their com-
munities. Thus they have: 
 Generated substantial charitable contributions; 
 Strengthened civil society organizations; 
 Promoted regional development; 
 Supported a wide variety of objectives, though generally within an increas-
ingly strategic sense of mission; 
 Generated important innovations; and 
 Modeled creative multi-stakeholder decision processes. 
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7) A Promising Future  
The future of Philanthropication thru Privatization seems bright, for a number of reasons. 
 Significant assets are still available for privatization. 
 Governments are under pressure to reduce debt and attract private invest-
ment. 
 Because of its upside-down effects, privatization faces continued community 
hostility that PtP can help to resolve. 
 PtP thus brings win-win benefits to investors, governments, communities, 
and civil society: 
 Benefits for investors include:  
 Assurance of community support; 
 Consequent avoidance of costly delays in securing closure on deals; 
 Resulting advantages in the bidding process; 
 Early good will with employees, potential customers, and  suppliers; and 
 Positive international reputation.  
 
 Benefits for governments include: 
 Attracting investors wary of uncertain investment climates; 
 Avoidance of community resistance; 
 Consequent avoidance of failed sales; 
 Guaranteed support for long-term priorities; 
 New partners to share the burdens of addressing enduring problems; and 
 Improved international reputation for probity and social accountability.  
 
 Benefits for communities include: 
 Securing tangible, long-term benefits from privatization; 
 Opportunities to participate in community problem-solving; 
 New resources for addressing community problems; and 
 Improved, health, education, environment, infrastructure. 
 
 Benefits for civil society:  
 Liberation from sole dependence on external support; 
 Improved public image; 
 Broader promotion of charitable giving and philanthropy; 
 Improved channels for participation in governmental decision-making; and 
 Expanded resources with which to address community needs.  
 
 The dissemination of the PtP concept through the present report will boost aware-
ness of these win-win benefits and help propel adoption of the PtP option. 
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8) The Need for Standards and Guidelines 
For PtP to deliver the benefits of which it is capable, great care must be taken in the 
design and operation of PtP foundations, as well as in the selection of privatization 
transactions to which it can appropriately be attached.  
Features of privatization transactions that would make them potentially suitable for 
PtP applications include:  
i) Coherent and explicit legal and organizational structures for 
managing the transactions; 
ii) Open and transparent procedures; 
iii) Attention to market conditions likely to restrain competition and 
therefore create a need for regulation or other intervention; and 
iv) Inclusion of a “social package,” a set of provisions committing 
investors to assist in mitigating any negative effects of privatization 
and to operate in an environmentally and socially responsible 
fashion. 
 
Key features required in PtP foundations:  
i) Independent governance; 
ii) Professional management; 
iii) Transparency; 
iv) Accountability and conflict of interest provisions; 
v) Representativeness; and 
vi) Grantmaking activity. 
 
Even with these features in place, the benefits of PtP will not be achieved automati-
cally. Active dissemination of the concept and technical assistance for potential im-
plementers are needed, and both are now available. To learn more an to contact the 
project team, please visit p-t-p.org. 
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On July 30, 1990, the Italian Parliament passed a law with monumental 
implications for the country’s economic development and social progress. In 
one deft stroke, Italian lawmakers set in motion two remarkable 
developments that would make ancient practitioners of alchemy envious: first, 
the transformation of Italy’s somewhat shaky banking system into a financial 
powerhouse whose tentacles now stretch into the farthest reaches of Europe; 
and second, the even more remarkable transformation of a charitable sector 
that lagged badly behind its European counterparts into the most well-
endowed, well-heeled, and generous such sector on a per capita basis in all of 
Europe, and nearly the entire world.  
To be sure, the legislators who passed this momentous piece of legislation 
may not have fully understood what they were setting in motion. For, Law No. 
218 of 1990, the Amato-Carli law, was a fairly arcane piece of legislation. Its 
stated purpose was to comply with European Union strictures to modernize a 
banking system dominated by two sets of institutions: first, a handful of 
public-law banks, some with origins stretching back to the fifteenth century  
Franciscan tradition of pawnshop institutions;
1 
and second, a network of 84 
relatively small, regional savings banks, many with origins in the late 18
th
 and 
early 19
th
 century efforts to encourage habits of thrift among low and middle-
income people as exemplified by the Ersparniskasse created in 1778 in 
Hamburg, Germany, and the 1810 "trustee savings bank" first established in 
Dumfriesshire, Scotland, by minister Henry Duncan and later spread through 
Great Britain and through the British Empire. 
During the 1930s, however, both types of institutions had been swept up in 
the waves of nationalizations and government control unleashed by the 
Mussolini era and subsequent governments so that, by the 1980s, they found 
themselves caught in a difficult legal no-man’s land—functioning partly as 
banks and partly as charitable institutions—and with their status a confusing 
mixture of public and private. 
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Under pressure to transform these institutions into regular joint stock com-
panies capable of raising capital in the international money markets, the 
Italian Parliament chose a novel course. First, it established powerful incen-
tives for this collection of public-law and savings banks to transfer their 
banking functions to separate joint stock companies. But instead of termi-
nating the old savings banks and allowing outsiders to gain control of the 
new joint stock banks, it left ownership of the new entities in the old institu-
tions, which were still in possession of their traditional subsidiary charitable 
activities but now were in control as well of a new set of joint-stock banking 
companies. 
The rest, as they say, is history. The old banks, now awkwardly renamed 
"conferring entities," began operating fundamentally as foundations, but 
foundations in control of local banks. In this latter function, they proved—in 
most cases—to be very good stewards of their new joint-stock banking off-
spring. In rapid order, many of them agreed to merge these offspring in or-
der to achieve needed efficiencies. Thus, thirteen of them came together to 
form what ultimately became Unicredit, now one of the largest Italian bank-
ing groups. Nineteen other of these new "foundations of banking origin" 
(neé "conferring entities") decided to sell their newly formed, for-profit banks 
to existing for-profit banking companies. Thus, for example, the Cariplo 
Foundation, the "conferring entity" that resulted from the transformation of 
the Cassa di Risparmio delle Province Lombarde into a for-profit bank, sold 
the resulting bank to Banco Ambrosiano Veneto, an existing, for-profit bank, 
for cash and stock. In the process it became the single largest owner of the 
resulting merged institution, renamed Banca Intesa. Later, the Compagnia 
di San Paolo, the conferring entity emerging from the transformation of one 
of the privatized public banks, the Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, fol-
lowed a similar course, selling its bank into the same Banca Intesa group, 
forming, along with some additional acquisitions, the Intesa San Paolo S.p.A., 
now the largest banking group in Italy.
2 
Through these mergers and resulting efficiencies, the new bank offspring 
more than repaid their old savings-bank parents, boosting the value of their 
shares and generating sizable dividends to boot. Along the way, a series of 
laws and regulations began to cut the umbilical cords linking the new banks 
to the old conferring entities—first, by banning the joint appointment of 
members to the boards of both entities; and second, by encouraging the 
conferring entities to divest themselves of their ownership positions in the 
new banks by selling portions of their bank stock and diversifying their 
holdings. Finally, two days before Christmas in 1998, the legislature passed a 
subsequent law, the Ciampi Law, which seemed to celebrate an earlier 
The Italian  
Parliament  
chose a  
novel course.
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"immaculate conception" by completing the transformation of the confer-
ring entities into full-fledged, endowed, private foundations, separated 
from their banks (except as minority shareholders), and fully empowered to 
act on their own authority to pursue public-benefit and economic develop-
ment objectives with their much enhanced assets and earnings.
3
 Thus was 
completed a process we have termed "philanthropication thru privatiza-
tion," or PtP—the creation of significant endowed charitable foundations 
out of the proceeds of the privatization of state-owned, or state-controlled, 
assets.  
Ten years out from passage of the Amato-Carli Law, therefore, Italy found 
itself not only with a substantially modernized private banking system but 
also with a strong, new, private foundation community created almost 
magically out of a process of privatization, and pumping 1.7 billion euros a 
year (US $2.2 billion) into charitable endeavors. By 2010 these "foundations 
of banking origin" (FBOs) boasted assets topping 50 billion euros (US$65 bil-
lion). Even more amazingly, a number have taken their place among the 
largest such institutions in the world. Thus, the Cariplo Foundation, cre-
ated out of the transformation of the Lombardy region savings bank, ended 
up in 2012, even after the 2008 financial crash, with US$9.8 billion in assets, 
putting its endowment on a par with that of the Ford Foundation, the sec-
ond largest foundation in the United States. Compagnia di San Paolo, with 
assets of US$ 8.6 billion as of 2011, ranks even with America’s third and 
fourth largest foundations, the J.P. Getty Trust and the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation. The Rockefeller Foundation, one of the best known of 
the American institutions, is only a third the size of these two new Italian in-
stitutions and lags behind two others—Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di 
Torino (Fondazione CRT) and  Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Verona 
Vicenza Belluno e Ancona, each of which boasts assets well above The 
Rockefeller Foundation’s $3.5 billion.4  
These are not only huge philanthropic institutions, moreover. As we will see 
more fully below, many of them have established reputations as trend-set-
ters in the philanthropic arena globally. They have developed coherent mis-
sion statements and strategy documents, adopted strong transparency 
practices, formed partnerships with institutions in Italy and elsewhere, pio-
neered new approaches to leveraging their resources to maximize impact, 
and become fundamentally important supporters of the civil society sector 
in their country. Thus the Cariplo Foundation has launched an ambitious 
social housing initiative, promoted community arts, invested resources into 
a fund for technology start-ups, and started some of the first Italian   
Italy found itself 
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4  |  SALAMON | Philanthropication thru Privatization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
experiments in the field of "evidence based" policies. Fondazione CRT in 
Torino created a separate entity to promote growth and development in its 
region. And four of the foundations have joined forces in Foundation4Africa to 
resettle displaced persons and pursue economic development activities in 
Uganda and Senegal. 
To be sure, not all of the Italian PtP foundations have been equally successful. 
Some of them did not diversify their endowments and neglected to separate 
themselves fully enough from their banks. When the 2008 financial crisis hit, 
these institutions encountered deep trouble.
5
 Nevertheless, the overall out-
come is nothing less than eye-opening. 
And with our eyes so opened, it becomes clear that the Italian experience 
does not stand alone. Indeed, what is most unusual about it is that it turns out 
not to be so unusual at all. To the contrary, even casual observation, informed 
by the Italian experience, reveals that this  experience has counterparts in 
places far and wide—some of them virtual replicas of the transformation of 
the Italian savings banks and others more distant cousins, but with enough 
family resemblance to be recognizable as products of the same gene pool.  
For example: 
 In New Zealand in the 1980s a story virtually identical to that of the 
Italian foundations unfolded, with the transformation of another 
network of nonprofit savings banks into stock companies and the 
vesting of ownership of the stock of the resulting banks in a network 
of twelve "community trusts," which now form the backbone of New 
Zealand’s philanthropic community. 
 Two decades earlier, in 1961, the Government of Germany privat-
ized the former Nazi Party-owned Volkswagen Company, sold 60 
percent of the shares of the company to German citizens and dedi-
cated the proceeds to a new foundation designed to promote Ger-
man science. Called the Volkswagen Foundation, (though it has no 
relation to the Volkswagen Corporation), this Foundation now 
boasts €2.6 billion (US$3 billion) in assets and a long history of sub-
stantial grant-making.
6
  
 In the early 1990s, the Czech Republic set aside one percent of the 
shares of its sizable privatization sales of major state-owned enter-
prises in a Czech Foundation Investment Fund, which ultimately 
distributed the resulting funds as endowments to 73 Czech 
foundations. 
The Italian  
experience does 
not stand alone. 
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 In the late 1980s, the King Baudouin Foundation became the 
recipient of another type of "privatization"—a contractually set 
stream of revenue generated by the Belgian National Lottery, 
an enterprise of the Belgian national government. 
 More recently, the conversion of a number of nonprofit hospi-
tals and health insurers in the United States into for-profit 
companies led almost overnight to the creation of nearly 200 
so-called "conversion foundations."
7
   
 And more recently still, Austria’s network of Sparkasse, or sav-
ing banks, was converted into stock companies in a pattern vir-
tually identical to the development in Italy, yielding the ERSTE 
Foundation and over 30 other foundations of banking origin in 
that country. 
 
In short, it appears that, in a variety of circumstances, the privatization of 
state-owned or quasi-public assets has led to the establishment of often-
substantial charitable endowments. A kind of philanthropic alchemy has 
thus been under way in a significant number of areas through which the 
privatization of public or quasi-public assets has left behind not only a 
string of for-profit businesses, but also substantial deposits of charitable 
gold that have been used, in addition to other purposes, to help foster 
and support the civil-society institutions without which democratic politi-
cal systems and market-based economies cannot function. 
What is striking about these developments, however, is that they have all 
proceeded in virtual isolation from one another. Each is therefore known 
in its local setting but largely invisible to a broader public. Each is there-
fore considered sui generis. No one has thought to draw a circle around 
them and recognize not only their commonalities but also the lessons 
they might hold as a new strategy for promoting the development of 
charitable foundations, particularly in regions where such institutions are 
lagging but where privatization activity is still very much under way. Yet 
these lessons could be transformative. If steps could be taken to channel 
into foundations even a small portion of the proceeds of the privatization 
transactions under way in developing and transition areas, not to mention 
more developed countries where philanthropic assets are also frequently 
scarce, a fundamental transformation could be achieved in the philan-
thropic map of the world.  
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For example: 
 If just 10 percent of the proceeds of Ukraine’s sale of its 
Kryvorizhstal steel mill to Mittal Steel in 2005 could have been 
devoted to the strengthening of the country’s embryonic com-
munity foundations or the creation of a Ukrainian National 
Foundation, the result would have been €400 million (US$520 
million) in charitable assets to help offset any ill effects of the 
privatization on workers and the surrounding communities, as 
well as to create a permanent source of resources to grow the 
country’s nascent civil society sector. 
 Similarly, if 10 percent of 2007’s sale of 40 percent of the stock 
in Kenya’s Safaricom mobile phone network to the U.K.’s 
Vodaphone Corporation had been dedicated to buttressing the 
endowment of the Kenya Community Development Founda-
tion, the result would have been a charitable institution with 
over €50 million ($65 million) in assets, 20 times larger than this 
institution’s existing endowment. With just 5 percent of its as-
sets, the resulting institution would be capable of generating 
€2.5 million in grants annually, more than 5 times larger than 
the €0.37 million in grants that Vodaphone currently contrib-
utes to its Safaricom Foundation.
8 
 
 If 10 percent of the $5.5 billion proceeds of the U.S. Govern-
ment's 2012 sale of a portion of its stake in the General Motors 
Corporation could have been reserved to finance a foundation 
dedicated to helping revitalize the City of Detroit, that city might 
be facing a far brighter future than it now does in the wake of 
its recent bankruptcy. 
 
Such privatization deals are not just a thing of the past, moreover. Rumours 
about the death of privatization deserve the same reaction that 19th century 
American humourist Mark Twain gave to reports that reached him of his un-
timely death: "The reports of my death," Twain told reporters, "have been 
greatly exaggerated." For better or worse, contrary to reports of its demise, 
privatization remains very much alive and well across the globe. Despite the 
economic crisis of 2008, for example, the two highest years of privatization 
transactions ever recorded occurred as recently as 2009 and 2010—and this 
using an extremely narrow definition of "privatization."
9
 Furthermore, de-
spite a partial cooling of such transactions as economic growth faltered in 
2011, privatization activity seems to have picked up again in 2012, yielding 
the third highest year of privatization transactions in history.
10
 A sampling of    
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articles on privatization in the Financial Times in just the last quarter of 2012 
includes headlines such as the following: "Brazil plans to privatise Rio air-
port" (20 December 2012); "Turkey privatisation plan boosted by sale" (16 
December 2012); "Osaka airports open gate to privatisation" (4 December 
2012); "Russian Railways approves the $1.6 bn sale of its remaining 25 per 
cent share in Freight One [and] Completes privatisation of its biggest freight 
subsidiary" (29 November 2012); "Albania: €850m state oil company sale" (26 
November 2012); "Turkey raises $2.5bn from Halk Bank sale" (19 November 
2012); "Privatisation: Sberbank sets example for further state sales" (18 
October 2012).  
 
Philanthropication thru Privatization is thus not just an interesting historical 
artifact; it is also a potential route to foundation development as the privati-
zation process continues to unfold.
 
 
THE PtP PROJECT 
It was to explore this significant and largely unexamined route to foundation 
formation and the lessons it might hold for future privatization transactions 
that the project that forms the basis of this report was launched. More spe-
cifically, this project has proceeded in six steps: 
 First, a "working definition" of the project’s core “philanthropi-
cation thru privatization” concept was formulated. 
 Second, a global effort was launched to examine the past history 
of this phenomenon and its potential future prospects. For this 
purpose, a global network of twelve “Discovery Associates” was 
assembled to perform three tasks: (a) to identify all known cases 
of PtP-type transactions in various regions of the world; (b) to 
identify any cases of failed PtP experiments; and (c) to gather in-
formation about the status of on-going or planned privatization 
activity in the respective regions these Associates were asked to 
examine. In order to ensure consistency across regions, a Field 
Guide was prepared and used to structure the work of these Dis-
covery Associates. (See Appendix B for a list of these Discovery 
Associates and the regions they covered). 
 Third, the working definition of the PtP phenomenon was revised 
and broadened based on the reports that came back from this 
discovery process. Fundamentally, we discovered more ways in 
Philanthropication 
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which publicly controlled assets can reach charitable endowments 
than our initial working definition acknowledged, including some 
that touch on important assets in regions particularly lacking in 
charitable endowments and are therefore in a position to benefit 
considerably from the PtP process. 
 Fourth, we identified 22 of these PtP transactions for more in-depth 
analysis, taking pains to include examples of different types of 
transactions, in disparate settings, and including some less than 
successful cases as well as some generally successful ones. To 
prepare these case studies, as Project Director, I prepared a 
detailed case study field guide and recruited nine analysts to 
prepare the resulting case studies (See Chapter 3 for a fuller 
description of these PtP case study institutions and transactions 
and the Case Study Associates who prepared them).  
 Fifth, the insights provided by the Discovery Associates on the 
continuing pattern of privatization activity globally we 
supplemented with data drawn from a variety of other sources, 
including particularly the records compiled by the Privatization 
Barometer, a Milan-based project of the Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei, and analyzed by Professor William Megginson.  
 Finally, we assembled the Case Study Associates for a preliminary 
workshop to review the results of their work and identify 
implications of our findings for the PtP concept going forward. 
The present document reports on the results of this work. To do so, the dis-
cussion falls into six chapters in addition to this Introduction.  
We begin in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the PtP concept itself, since it has 
not been previously articulated. Like all concepts, this one is intended to 
bring into better focus a component of reality that has long been present but 
that has gone largely unnoticed in the absence of a coherent concept to 
identify its commonalities and thereby attract useful attention to it. 
In Chapter 3 we then examine the scope of the PtP phenomenon as revealed 
by the still-preliminary survey of the global philanthropic landscape carried 
out with the aid of informed observers by our team of Discovery Associates. 
What has emerged from this preliminary inquiry is a set of more than 500 
charitable foundations that have been formed or substantially expanded as a 
result of one or another of our five types of privatization transactions. (See 
Appendix A; this list will be regularly updated at p-t-p.org.) 
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Chapters 4 thru 6 then look in more depth at some of the central features of 
the PtP transactions and the operations and performance of the resulting 
institutions as reflected in the experiences of the 21 foundations, and the 22 
PtP transactions, on which we have done in-depth case studies.
11 
These 
chapters seek to identify meaningful lessons that these cases seem to hold, 
first, for the political or legal circumstances that seem to lead to PtP-type 
outcomes; second, for the kinds of deals through which such transactions 
can best be implemented; third, for the governance and operational struc-
tures most conducive to the successful operation of the resulting institu-
tions; and finally, for the performance that these institutions seem to have 
achieved. 
Chapter 7 then looks to the future by examining what we know about cur-
rent trends in privatization and identifying the advantages that the PtP op-
tion can bring both to those affected by privatization and those promoting 
its further development.  
 
 
A CRUCIAL CAVEAT 
Before proceeding into the heart of this discussion it is important to empha-
size that this project is well aware that privatization is a complicated and 
controversial topic. The project takes no position for or against privatization. 
Its one concern is to make sure that the interesting option of capturing in 
philanthropic endowments at least a portion of the proceeds of any privati-
zation transactions that go forward is more seriously and explicitly consid-
ered whenever such transactions are under discussion. The rationale for 
making this option more explicit is quite basic:  
 The assets involved in privatization transactions are not ultimately 
"the government’s" assets, but "the people’s" assets, built up 
through the sweat, toil, and resources of a country’s citizens or 
belonging to the people as a birthright by virtue of their presence 
in the territory that they collectively occupy. 
 A country’s people, and particularly those living or working in 
close proximity to the assets in line for privatization, therefore 
deserve to receive some tangible benefit from any such 
transactions. 
 For a variety of reasons, this can often best be achieved by 
vesting these proceeds into charitable endowments instead of 
having all of them absorbed into state budgets. 
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 Properly done, this option has the advantage of usefully 
contributing to pluralism in the search for solutions to public 
problems; of bringing permanent sources of new resources 
and energies to the solution of public problems; and of helping 
to promote the independence and viability of civil society or-
ganizations, which have been found to be crucial for building 
the trust that is necessary for the operation of democratic gov-
ernments and prosperous market economies. 
 At the same time, the project is keenly aware of the need to 
specify the transparency, governance, and operational provi-
sions required for philanthropication to be considered 
"properly done" and therefore likely to achieve these socially 
desirable objectives. What is more, it is also keenly aware of 
the danger that philanthropication could be used as a cover for 
improper privatizations—ones that are carried out without 
transparency and that enrich a small group of elites without 
delivering meaningful benefits to society at large—and it will 
vigorously discourage such uses of the PtP concept. Between 
these two extremes of improper philanthropication and im-
proper privatization, however, lies a potentially broad area of 
win-win transactions capable of yielding desirable improve-
ments in long-run economic performance along with new, or 
newly expanded, endowed charitable institutions delivering 
important benefits to disadvantaged citizens and long-term 
contributions to pluralism, democracy, and social and envi-
ronmental progress. In the process, PtP can produce a new 
people-oriented form of privatization that overcomes what we 
will term the “upside-down effects” of privatization—the ten-
dency of privatization to impose significant early costs on the 
narrow groups of citizens directly affected by it while delivering 
whatever positive benefits it generates only over the long run 
and to widely dispersed populations.  
These, at any rate, are the premises on the basis of which this work has pro-
ceeded. Against this backdrop we can now turn to a closer look at what the 
PtP concept really entails, at what forms it can take, at what it has so far 
achieved, and at what more it might achieve in the future. 
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1 Including, for example, the Monte dei Paschi di Siena and the Compagnia di San Paolo di 
Torino. 
2 In addition to the banks named here, the other institutions that came together to form 
the Intesa San Paolo S.p.A banking group included the Banca Commerciale Italiana and the 
Banco di Napoli. 
3 Some of the smaller foundations, operating in small communities, were permitted to 
retain majority stakes in their “conferred” banks. 
4 U.S. foundation assets drawn from foundation websites accessed 29 July 2013. Asset 
figures are as of 2011. These figures confirmed at foundationcenter.org (accessed 2 August 
2013). Unless otherwise noted, throughout this report monetary values will be expressed in 
U.S. dollars at exchange rates in effect as of July 31, 2013. 
5 The Monte dei Paschi di Siena is probably the most striking example: the bank raised 
new capital to finance what later became apparent to be an ill-advised acquisition. To avoid 
diluting its control of the resulting merged institution, the foundation took out a substantial 
loan to participate in the capital increase. But, then, with the bank teetering on the edge of 
bankruptcy and its stock price radically devalued, the foundation found its endowment 
virtually disappear. For further detail, see, for example: Elisabetta Povoledo and Jack Ewing, 
“Italian Bank  Caught in the Vortex of Election Politics,” New York Times (28 January  2013). 
6 Data on Volkswagen Foundation assets as of 2013 available at volkswagenstiftung.de 
(accessed  28, July 2013). As will be discussed below, the actual transaction involved was a bit 
more complicated than this. In the initial transaction, 60 percent of the shares of the new 
company were sold to the public and 20 percent each were given to the Federal Republic of 
Germany and to the state of Lower Saxony where the Volkswagen plants were located. While 
the proceeds of the publicly sold shares were dedicated to it, the new Volkswagen 
Foundation had to wait 20 years to receive them. Instead the proceeds went to the Federal 
Republic in the form of a loan and the Federal Republic paid interest to the Foundation for 
the use of these funds. In addition, the Federal Republic ultimately sold its own shares and 
transferred most of these proceeds to the Foundation as well. 
7 Grantmakers in Health, A Profile of Foundations Created from Health Care Conversions, 
(Grantmakers in Health, 2009), accessed February 6, 2010. 
8 Vodaphone contributions to Safaricom Foundation based on UK Vodaphone Foundation 
accounts available from the U.K. Charity Commission. These records show that Vodaphone 
contributed 43.8 million Kenyan shillings to Safaricom Foundation in the calendar year 
ended 31 March 2012. 
9 William Megginson, “Privatization Trends and Major Deals in 2012,” in The PB Report 2012, 
(Milan: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2013), 3. Megginson defines privatization narrowly as 
the sale of state-owned enterprises or assets. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, this project 
has identified three other forms of privatization as well, while other authors extend the 
definition well beyond this. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Although we focus on 21 foundations, one of these institutions, the Foundation for 
Polish Science, actually was the beneficiary of two separate types of  PtP transactions.  In 
two other cases, individual transactions benefited multiple foundations. Thus, the proceeds 
flowing into the Czech Foundation Investment Fund ultimately benefited 73 Czech foun-
dations. And, to avoid capital gains taxes,  most of the resources ultimately deposited in the 
California Endowment as a result of the conversion of the California Blue Cross to for-profit 
status were initially placed in another new entity, the California HealthCare Foundation, for 
liquidation. In both cases, we focus solely on the main actor rather than the subsidiary 
institutions. 
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Philanthropication thru Privatization, PtP, is, to say the least, an awkward con-
struct. It links together two fields rarely thought of together and uses two 
words that are inherently unclear—one because it was invented for this project 
and has no certain meaning beyond it, and the other because it has widely di-
vergent meanings in the hands of different observers. To understand the dis-
cussion that follows, therefore, it will be important to clarify from the outset 
the defining features of the phenomenon under investigation.  
 
DEFINING PRIVATIZATION  
So far as the privatization part of the concept is concerned, one reliable ob-
server recently cautioned that "[t]he term 'privatization' has been, and contin-
ues to be, loosely applied to a broad range of transactions, only some of which 
involve the complete transfer of ownership to private parties." More specifi-
cally, this author notes that: 
The contracting out to private operators of a firm’s non-core activities 
(e.g., office cleaning, vehicle maintenance), management contracts, 
leases, and concessions—none of these necessarily involve (sic) trans-
ferring permanently a firm’s productive property to private hands, 
but all are generally referred to as forms of privatization.
1
 
For the purposes of this project, we reject this broad conceptualization and 
focus more narrowly on transactions that involve the transfer of ownership or ef-
fective control of assets from government or quasi-government entities to private 
hands. The term widely used for this more narrow conception of privatization 
is "divestiture," which signals circumstances "where partial or full ownership 
of assets is legally removed from government and transferred to new private 
operators."
2
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Even this definition has problems from the perspective of the PtP Project, 
however. This is so for two major reasons. In the first place, in most of the 
literature on privatization—and certainly in most of the data sets purporting 
to cover "privatization"—the focus has been almost exclusively on the 
divestiture of state-owned "enterprises," i.e., on businesses producing 
products or services.
3
 However, privatization can also involve the divestiture 
of other state-owned, state-controlled, or heavily state-influenced assets 
beyond businesses. Included here are state-owned facilities, such as cultural 
institutions, schools, or, in recent years, ports and airports. Also included, 
however, can be streams of income that reach state coffers through 
extraordinary activities or events. Included here can be lottery receipts, 
mineral rights fees, airwave fees, proceeds from court settlements, so-called 
"stranded assets" left in bank accounts of citizens who die without a will, and 
debt swaps that allow a country to be relieved of foreign debt in return for 
committing an equivalent amount of local currency to some public purpose, 
such as preserving a rain forest or promoting environmental objectives.   
In addition, privatization can also involve assets that are only quasi-govern-
mental, i.e., that are arguably only partly owned or created by government. 
This is the case, for example, with nonprofit institutions that have built up 
their assets at least in part thanks to exemptions from governmental taxes 
provided in view of the public benefits they are thought to create. When 
such institutions are privatized in the sense of being sold to, or transformed 
into, for-profit companies, it is often considered inappropriate, and in some 
cases illegal, for the proceeds to be claimed by the directors of the former 
nonprofits. Rather, arrangements have to be made to preserve those assets 
for the same charitable purpose that justified the tax benefits that helped 
create them. Placement into a charitable foundation mandated to pursue 
those purposes is one convenient way to achieve this. 
In the second place, most of the focus in privatization discussions takes as a 
given that the recipients of the assets transferred through privatization are 
exclusively private, for-profit firms. While such transfers are certainly included 
within the PtP Project’s conception of privatization, it does not exhaust the 
range of transfers that are possible. In addition to private, for-profit firms, 
the private sector also includes a wide array of private, nonprofit entities that 
are also potential recipients of the privatization of government-owned or -
controlled assets. This can occur either directly, or as a by-product of sales of 
government-owned assets to for-profits. Such nonprofit recipients can be 
nonprofit schools, hospitals, social service institutions, cultural facilities, or, 
of special interest in the present project, private, nonprofit charitable  
foundations.
4
 
Privatization  
can involve the  
divestiture of  
other state-owned 
assets beyond  
businesses. 
The private sector 
also includes a wide 
array of private, 
nonprofit entities 
that are also 
potential recipients 
of the privatization 
of government-
owned or -controlled  
assets. 
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DEFINING PHILANTHROPICATION  
So far as the philanthropication part of this project’s central concept is 
concerned, our approach is more narrow than some renderings of this 
term might suggest, but also more nuanced. By philanthropication, 
therefore, we do not mean the simple generation of charitable gifts. Ra-
ther, philanthropication, as we conceive it, involves the creation or expan-
sion of a charitable or philanthropic endowment—a more or less perma-
nent pool of assets dedicated to charitable or public-benefit purposes 
and under the control of a legal entity with a meaningful degree of au-
tonomy from state authorities and from any for-profit company that 
may have acquired the state asset before its transfer to a nonprofit 
entity.
 
At the same time, as noted earlier, an asset can take the form of a 
stream of revenue rather than a lump-sum transfer, so long as the 
stream of revenue is in some fundamental sense semi-permanent and 
fixed by contract or law. The asset-equivalent value of such a stream of 
revenue can be easily estimated by calculating what size of asset would 
be needed to generate such a stream of annual revenue given current 
estimates of returns on investments.
5
 As noted below, a variety of such 
streams of revenue can be made available to support charitable, or 
public-benefit, organizations, and a number of them already are. 
Prominently included in the latter category are revenues from state-run 
or state-controlled lotteries, but other examples can easily be imagined, 
including proceeds from mineral rights or air rights payments. 
Given this definition, a privatization transaction in which the govern-
ment sells a state-owned enterprise to a private company that creates a 
corporate foundation funded through annual donations from the par-
ent company is therefore not a case of philanthropication thru privatiza-
tion since no permanent asset, or steady stream of revenue that is the 
equivalent of an asset, is created and no meaningfully autonomous in-
stitution is given the power to determine its use. Rather, the company 
would remain in control of the foundation and the size of the donations 
would be determined by the size of corporate profits or other internal 
corporate decision processes. Similarly, a state-regulated lottery that 
sets its decisions about whether and how much to share its proceeds 
with local foundations or charities annually and autonomously has not 
created a true asset in our sense of the term: only if the distribution is 
set by law or contract over an extended period is an asset created. 
A corporate  
foundation funded 
through annual  
donations from the  
parent company  
is not a case of  
philanthropication  
thru privatization. 
BOX 2.1  
Definition of  
Philanthropication
--------------------------- 
Philanthropication involves the 
creation or expansion of a 
charitable or philanthropic 
endowment, a more or less 
permanent pool of assets 
dedicated to charitable or 
public-benefit purposes and  
under the control of a legal 
entity with a meaningful degree 
of autonomy from state 
authorities and from any for-
profit company. 
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PtP: A Working Definition 
Three key features thus form the core of our working definition of the PtP 
concept: 
1) A public or quasi-public asset; 
2) A transaction that transfers ownership or control over all or a 
portion of this asset either directly from government to a 
charitable institution, or indirectly through a sale or trans-
formation of this public or quasi-public asset into a for-profit 
business in the course of which all or a portion of the proceeds 
end up in the control of a charitable institution; and  
3) A charitable endowment or endowment-like stream of revenue in 
the hands of a meaningfully autonomous charitable institution. 
 
 
A TYPOLOGY OF PtP VARIANTS  
While all PtP cases adhere to these three defining features, the way in which 
they do so can vary depending on two key factors: first, the nature of the 
original asset; and second, the type of transaction involved. 
Nature of the asset. So far as the first of these factors is concerned, the 
public or quasi-public asset can take any of at least five different forms:  
 
i) A state-owned enterprise;  
ii) Some other state-owned asset;  
iii) A stream of revenue resulting from a state-owned or state-
controlled activity; 
iv) A debt swap; or 
v) A quasi-public entity.  
 
Type of transaction. So far as the type of transaction is concerned, two 
broad possibilities are available. In the classical privatization transaction, the 
asset reaches the philanthropic entity indirectly through a transaction in-
volving a for-profit firm that becomes the owner of the asset either through 
an outright purchase or the acquisition of shares. But governments can also 
transfer an asset, or a stream of revenue, directly to a philanthropic institu-
tion, either newly formed or pre-existing. In either case, moreover, the 
transaction can occur in either one step or two depending on whether the 
BOX 2.2  
Definition  
of PtP 
------------------------ 
 
"Philanthropication  
thru Privatization" 
can be defined as a 
transaction in which 
essentially public (i.e., 
government-owned or  
-controlled) or quasi-public 
assets are transformed in 
whole or in part into charitable 
endowments under the control 
of meaningfully autonomous 
charitable institutions, either 
directly or in the course of the 
transfer of their ownership into 
for-profit hands. 
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PtP foundation receives cash (one-step) or some form of ownership shares in the 
privatized asset that it can subsequently sell (two-step). In the case of the Volkswagen 
Foundation, for example, the foundation received 60 percent of the proceeds of the sale 
of shares in the Volkswagen Company to German citizens. In the case of the Italian 
foundations of banking origin described in Chapter 1, however, the foundations became 
the owners of 100 percent of the shares of the new joint-stock, privatized banks, and only 
later were authorized and encouraged to sell these shares. 
Not all of these possibilities are equally likely, of course, but we have been able to identify 
five more or less distinct types of PtP cases, and we have found actual instances of all five 
types in the record of charitable developments in countries around the world. More spe-
cifically, these five types include:   
 Type I: A state-owned business that is sold to an investor or transformed into a for-
profit enterprise with the ownership of the assets or the proceeds of their sale 
transferred in whole or in part to a new or existing foundation (e.g., the sale of 
shares in the formerly state-owned Volkswagen auto and munitions firm and the 
transfer of 60 percent of the proceeds into the newly formed Volkswagen 
Foundation in Germany). 
 Type II: Some other publicly-owned asset, such as a building, a cultural institution, 
or a public utility such as an airport, that is given to a nonprofit foundation to 
manage (e.g. the conversion of Italy’s public opera companies into foundations 
with rights in perpetuity to use their existing opera houses free of charge). 
 Type III: A stream of income resulting from government control of some asset that 
generates special-purpose income that the government commits to share with a 
charitable foundation (e.g. the legal commitment of the Belgian National Lottery to 
devote a portion of its proceeds to the King Baudouin Foundation annually). 
 Type IV: A debt swap, i.e., a foreign debt forgiveness transaction that requires the 
beneficiary government to place an equivalent amount of local currency into a 
charitable institution dedicated to some charitable or public-benefit purpose (e.g., 
the German Government’s forgiveness of repayment of the unpaid balance of a 
"jumbo" loan it made to the government of Poland on condition that Poland pay 
the equivalent amount in Polish currency into a Foundation for Polish-German 
Cooperation). 
 Type V: A quasi-public or quasi-private organization, i.e.,  a nonprofit organization or 
mutual association that is converted into, or sold to, a for-profit firm with the assets 
resulting from the sale placed in whole or in part into a charitable endowment (e.g., 
the Italian bank conversions outlined earlier).    
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While these key features are easy to specify, however, they are often diffi-
cult to verify in actual practice. For one thing, governments are often reluc-
tant to surrender complete control over assets that have long been under 
governmental ownership. Complex governance structures are therefore 
frequently put in place to preserve some degree of continued state in-
volvement (e.g., government involvement in selecting board members or 
legal requirements for direct government representation on the boards). 
Establishing when such provisions violate the definitional requirement for 
having a "meaningfully autonomous institution" in control of the resulting 
asset thus inevitably involves some degree of subjective assessment.  
What is more, these governance arrangements frequently evolve over 
time. Tight government control in the early years of a PtP foundation can 
thus give way to more autonomous operation as the new institution ma-
tures and gains stature, and as clarifications are sought on its legal status. 
As we will see, this turns out to be a common dynamic in many of the PtP 
cases we examined. 
If uncertainties can arise over whether a charitable institution resulting 
from a privatization transaction fully enough meets the "autonomy" crite-
rion of our working definition, similar uncertainties can exist about how 
"public" the asset involved in the transaction is. To what extent, for in-
stance, does a transaction involving the sale to a for-profit business of a 
nonprofit or mutual organization that has benefited from significant gov-
ernment subsidies constitute a privatization transaction? What about the 
legally mandated distribution to a foundation of the proceeds of a privately 
owned lottery operating under a governmentally-issued license? 
Perfect answers to these questions are impossible to formulate, of course, 
and much depends on the actual circumstances and the surrounding con-
text of law and practice. Suffice it to say that our research sought reasona-
ble and defensible answers to these questions and, in turn, derived from 
the range of practice insights into how such matters can most usefully be 
addressed in PtP transactions going forward. It is therefore to the results 
of this work that we now turn. 
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 John Nellis, “The International Experience with Privatization: Its Rapid Rise, Partial Fall 
and Uncertain Future,” SPP Research Papers, Vol. 5, Issue 3 (Calgary, Canada: University of 
Calgary School of Public Policy, January 2012), n.2, 1. For an example of this broad and 
undifferentiated use of the term “privatization,” see: E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better 
Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987). 
2 Nellis, “International Experience,” 2012, n. 2 
3 The clearest illustration of the focus on “businesses” producing market-oriented 
products and services is the World Bank’s extensive data on privatization activity in the 
1970s and 1980s. See, for example: World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and 
Politics of Government Ownership. World Bank Policy Research Report, ISSN 1020-0851 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Also in this same tradition is the data assembled by the 
Privatization Barometer, though this source includes the sales of state-owned public 
facilities, such as ports, airports, and roadways. 
4 The legal definition of what constitutes a “foundation” is quite elastic around the world, 
however, with the result that many nonprofit schools, hospitals, and cultural institutions can 
be legally registered as foundations. See, for example: Lester M. Salamon, ed., The 
International Guide to Nonprofit Law (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998). 
5 In the present report, as noted more fully below, we assume a conservative rate of 
return of 4 percent on invested assets. To achieve an annual return of US$100 million given 
a rate of return of 4 percent per year would thus require an asset of US$2.5 billion 
($100,000,000/.04). 
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INTRODUCTION:  
Bringing the PtP Phenomenon into View 
 
Analytical concepts provide the lenses through which we view the world. 
When the lenses are blurred, or if no appropriate lens is available, key aspects 
of reality remain out of focus or, worse yet, completely out of sight even 
though they may be physically present in the world around us. Scientists are 
well aware of this phenomenon and the history of scientific progress has 
consisted of positing, through scientific reasoning and understanding, the 
existence of certain components of natural life—bacteria, molecules, 
electrons, atoms, DNA—and then working to formulate measurement in-
struments that can validate their existence and bring them into view.  
The PtP concept is such a lens. The reality to which it applies has long been 
present in our world. But lacking a clear enough lens to pick it out of the sur-
rounding organizational terrain, it has long been invisible and largely ignored. 
Not surprisingly as a consequence, no comprehensive data on the scope of 
this phenomenon has ever been assembled, let alone any analysis of why it 
emerges or what consequences it has. 
Having formulated the PtP concept, therefore, our first task was to determine 
what the application of this new conceptual lens would turn up in the way of 
tangible evidence of PtP transactions around the world. As noted in Chapter 1, 
our approach to implementing this measurement task was to assemble a 
team of knowledgeable "Discovery Associates" familiar with the third sector in  
Analytical  
concepts  
provide  
the lenses  
through  
which  
we view  
the world. 
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different parts of the world; to construct a Field Guide to introduce them to 
the PtP concept; to structure a process for investigating whether any entities 
that fit our definition existed in their assigned regions; and to set them to 
work contacting people familiar with the foundation landscapes in their ar-
eas to determine whether anything resembling the PtP phenomenon was in 
existence or known to have existed in the recent past. We then convened 
these Associates midway through their work to review their preliminary re-
sults and make any needed adjustments to our basic definition. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the results of this effort and then to 
introduce the 22 examples of the PtP phenomenon on which we undertook 
detailed case studies.
1
 We have no illusions that this will be the final list of 
PtP cases, however. For one thing, we have not been able to examine all the 
cases in sufficient depth to determine whether they truly meet our defini-
tion. For another, we have observed a regular pattern of turning up addi-
tional examples beyond those already on our list every time we describe the 
PtP concept to knowledgeable observers from different parts of the world, 
leading us to believe that there are many more cases out there than we have 
yet captured. As just one example of what promises to be a rich area for 
harvesting more valid examples, we have yet to explore in depth the many 
cases of "debt-for-nature-swaps" to determine which of these, if any, re-
sulted in endowments in meaningfully autonomous foundations or non-
profit organizations as opposed to funds housed within, or otherwise con-
trolled by, governments. Preliminary research has identified 160 such debt 
swaps.
2
 Far from the end of the road in identifying PtP transactions, there-
fore, the present chapter should mark only the end of the beginning of the 
search, and we look forward to hearing from readers about other cases 
known to them.
3
 
 
THE PtP UNIVERSE: A FIRST GLIMPSE 
 
An Enormous Process of Social-Purpose Wealth Creation
Even at this early point in the search for cases of the PtP phenomenon, how-
ever, it is clear that we are dealing with an enormous process of social-pur-
pose wealth creation. As reflected in detail in APPENDIX A, and summarized 
in TABLE 3.1, we have identified close to 540 foundations that have resulted 
from, or been enhanced through, a transaction that fits our PtP definition. 
Taken together, these foundations hold nearly US$ 135 billion (€102 billion) 
in charitable assets traceable to these PtP-type transactions. This is over 
It is clear that  
we are dealing  
with an enormous  
process of  
social-purpose 
wealth creation. 
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 3: A SIZABLE SUBCONTINENT  |  23 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
three times more than the world’s largest foundation, the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, and 13 times larger than America’s sec-
ond largest foundation, the Ford Foundation—enough to make many 
of these foundations major players in the international philanthropic 
community, and enormously significant players in the philanthropic 
and civil society communities of their respective countries and re-
gions.
4 
This is particularly true, as we will see, when account is taken 
of the fact that many of these institutions have a local or regional fo-
cus, which concentrates their impact. 
TABLE 3.1  
Preliminary tally of PtP foundations, by country 
 
COUNTRY 
FOUNDATIONS ASSETS* 
NUMBER % 
AMOUNT (US$ 
MILLIONS) % 
Austria 33 6.1% $4,882.9  3.6% 
Belgium 1 0.2% $408.2  0.3% 
Brazil 3 0.6% $2,542.8  1.9% 
Canada 1 0.2% $53.0  0.0% 
Czech Republic 73 13.5% $206.7  0.2% 
Germany 29 5.4% $15,672.1  11.6% 
Hungary 1 0.2% N/A N/A 
Italy 103 19.1% $72,021.9  53.4% 
Netherlands 1 0.2% $497.8  0.4% 
New Zealand 36 6.7% $7,073.7  5.2% 
Norway 4 0.7% $6,227.7  4.6% 
Poland 4 0.7% $511.3  0.4% 
Slovakia 2 0.4% $24.7  0.0% 
Sweden 35 6.5% $1,478.8  1.1% 
United Kingdom 9 1.7% $3,170.7  2.4% 
United States 199 36.9% $19,988.5  14.8% 
Other** 5 0.9% N/A N/A 
TOTAL 539 100% $134,760.8 100% 
 
 
*Assets not  
available for  
some foundations. 
 
**Includes  
Bolivia, Chile,  
Morocco, Peru,  
& Uruguay. 
 
Source:  
PtP Foundation  
Master List,  
Appendix A. 
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A Widespread Phenomenon with Notable "Hot Spots"  
As Table 3.1 also shows, the PtP phenomenon is fairly widespread across the 
world, with examples identified to date in 21 countries stretching from North and 
South America, through Western Europe, into Central Europe, and beyond into the 
Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, there appear to be some definite PtP "hot 
spots." In particular, just three countries (the United States, Italy, and the Czech 
Republic) account for 70% of the cases, with just two of them (Italy and the United 
States) accounting for nearly 60 percent of the cases themselves. In Italy, this is a 
product of two multiple PtP transactions—one involving the transformation of the 
banks noted above and the other the privatization of Italy’s lyric opera companies, 
including the renowned La Scala. In the U.S., it reflects the preservation for chari-
table purposes of the assets of the country’s numerous nonprofit health insurance 
organizations and hospitals as they have undergone conversions into for-profit 
status. In terms of assets, the concentration is equally pronounced, with Italy alone 
accounting for 53 percent of the identified PtP assets, though eight other countries 
contain PtP foundations with assets in excess of $1 billion. 
Variations by Transaction Type 
Not all the different types of PtP transactions are equally well represented in these 
data. Rather, as TABLE 3.2 shows, 76 percent of the foundations and 84 percent of 
the assets are Type V cases, i.e. privatization of essentially quasi-public assets. An 
additional 16 percent of the foundations and about 12 percent of the assets re-
sulted from Type I transactions involving the privatization of a state-owned enter-
prise. By contrast, considerably less numerous were the Types II, III, and IV identi-
fied to date, involving, respectively, the transfer of state-owned property other 
than an enterprise, the direction to a foundation of a stream of revenue coming 
from some asset under state control (e.g. a lottery), or debt swaps. 
*Excludes  
foundations with 
unavailable type. 
 
**Excludes  
foundations with 
unavailable  
asset amounts. 
 
Source:  
PtP Foundation Master 
List, Appendix A. 
TABLE 3.2  
Distribution of PtP foundations and assets, by PtP type 
 
TYPE 
SHARE OF TOTAL 
Foundations (N=535)* Assets (N=US$130 billion)** 
I 16.3% 12.4% 
II 6.0% 2.1% 
III 1.7% 1.3% 
IV 0.4% 0.2% 
V 75.7% 84.0% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
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For a variety of reasons, however, this allocation of cases among the 
transaction types may reasonably be treated as only a tentative conclu-
sion. First, as already noted, we have not yet seriously explored the nu-
merous cases of debt swaps around the world to assess whether more of 
them than we have yet captured really represent valid PtP cases. Second, a 
similar statement can be made about the Type III cases involving the tap-
ping of lottery proceeds, penalty fees, airwave fees, and mineral rights 
payments. In each of these areas, and doubtless others, there may be con-
siderably more examples of PtP-type transactions than we have identified. 
Finally, the assignment of at least some of the current examples to the 
Type V, quasi-public organization category, is open to question. The Italian 
savings banks, for example, had come under significant government regu-
lation and control during the Fascist period in Italy and thereafter, so much 
so that their nonprofit character was open to serious questioning prior to 
the privatization. In the case of the New Zealand savings banks, as we will 
see, ownership was at best unclear, though the government asserted that 
its claim to ownership was the strongest of all contenders and therefore 
justified taking action to transform these institutions. Under this interpre-
tation, the New Zealand savings bank privatization could be considered a 
Type I set of transactions.  
Similarly, in the U.K., the multitude of "trustee savings banks" that were ul-
timately privatized were consolidated over the years by acts of Parliament, 
leading finally to the Central Trustee Savings Banks Act of 1985 that 
merged them into a single holding company that was declared a govern-
ment body. This gave the government the power to determine their fate, 
which it did by establishing a series of banking stock companies but with 5 
percent of the shares of the resulting banks vested in a network of four 
"trustee savings bank foundations," which also absorbed the earlier chari-
table activities of the former savings banks.
5
 Here again, therefore, these 
Type V transactions could as readily be classified as Type I cases. Under 
any circumstances, as will become clearer in Chapter 4, this discussion 
makes clear that the nature of the pre-existing asset—in these cases sav-
ings banks with a particular charitable character—seems to have affected 
the likelihood of a PtP outcome. 
Sources of PtP Assets  
This factor is even more clearly evident when we examine the sources of 
the assets that went into our PtP foundations. As FIGURE 3.1 reveals, the 
two most numerous types of PtP transactions, accounting for 38 percent 
and 35 percent respectively, resulted from transactions involving health 
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FIGURE 3.1 
Distribution of PtP foundations and assets, by source of asset 
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providers (health insurers and hospitals) and fi-
nancial institutions. The former of these were 
essentially nonprofit institutions and the latter 
public banks with ancient private origins or 
"trustee" savings banks inspired by a model that 
had its origins in Hamburg, Germany, in 1778 
(the Ersparniskasse), and in early 19
th
-century 
Scotland. A significant 15 percent of the cases 
resulted from the more classic form of privatiza-
tion—the privatization of a state-owned enter-
prise—with smaller, but still significant, num-
bers arising from the privatization of various 
public utilities, such as energy distribution sys-
tems, and cultural institutions.  
Size of PtP Foundations  
As is common in the foundation world gener-
ally, there is considerable variation in the size of 
PtP foundations, with most of the institutions 
having assets of less than US$100 million, while 
most of the resources reside in the few institu-
tions with assets of US$1 billion or more. Thus, 
as shown in FIGURE 3.2, 57 percent of all PtP 
foundations have assets of under $100 million, 
but these institutions control only 7 percent of 
all PtP resources. At the other end of the spec-
trum, 12 percent of the PtP institutions have as-
sets of over US$3 billion each, and these 
foundations account for 38 percent of the PtP 
assets. These large foundations are large even 
by global standards, moreover, comparable in 
size to that of the largest U.S. foundations. 
Thus, the three largest PtP foundations by asset 
size would rank among the five largest founda-
tions in the United States.
6
 But in the U.S., the 
foundations in the over $3 billion range com-
prise less than 1/10 of 1 percent of the founda-
tion universe while among PtP foundations they 
account for 12 percent, and another nearly 4 
percent fall into the $1 billion to $3 billion 
range. This means that the PtP institutions are 
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FIGURE 3.2  
Share of PtP foundations and assets, by foundation size  
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skewed toward the upper range of global founda-
tions by asset size, underlining the significance for 
foundation development that the PtP process po-
tentially represents. 
 
Timing of PtP Transactions 
Given their close connection to the process of pri-
vatization, it is not surprising that PtP transactions 
follow the rhythms of the privatization process 
itself, which began in earnest only in the mid- to 
late 1980s and peaked, at least temporarily, in the 
1990s and early 2000s before petering out 
following the 2008 financial crisis. Also likely at 
work was the growing visibility of the civil society, 
or non-profit, sector, including foundations, 
beginning in the 1960s, a product of the "global as-
sociational revolution" that accompanied the 
emergence of "liberation theology," expanded 
communications, popular independence and hu-
man rights movements, and the growing question-
ing of the capabilities of states typified by the 
Thatcher and Reagan regimes in the U.K. and the 
U.S. in the 1980s.
7
 Most PtP foundations are there-
fore fairly young institutions, which makes their 
scale all the more remarkable. As FIGURE 3.3 
shows, fully three-fourths of these transactions 
took place in the latter 1980s and during the 
1990s—the heyday of the privatization process in-
ternationally. But another 19 percent took place in 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century. The senior fig-
ure among our PtP foundations, however, is the 
Volkswagen Foundation, which was founded in 
the early 1960s and has served as a role model for 
other German PtP cases.  
 
Activities of PtP Foundations 
A final important characteristic of the PtP founda-
tions concerns their activities. Not surprisingly, 
given their considerable scale, most PtP resources 
are in the hands of institutions that pursue a 
general public-interest orientation embracing  
PtP institutions are 
skewed toward the  
upper range of global 
foundations by asset 
size, underlining the  
significance for  
foundation development 
that the PtP process  
potentially represents. 
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FIGURE 3.3  
Distribution of PtP foundations, by year of PtP  
transaction (N=492) 
 
 
Source:  PtP Foundation Master List, Appendix A. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
Distribution of PtP foundations and assets, by primary focus 
of activity 
 
 
 
activities as diverse as social welfare, educa-
tion, economic development, and cultural 
promotion.  
This includes most of the Italian founda-
tions of banking origin, which, as will be dis-
cussed in more detail later, have the option 
to focus on any five of 21 topics specified in 
their governing law and can change their 
lists of five on a regular three-year cycle. As 
shown in FIGURE 3.4, in terms of numbers 
of foundations, the most numerous are 
foundations focusing on health, which ac-
count for 38 percent of the institutions, 
though a much-smaller 14 percent of the 
assets. This reflects the large number of 
health conversion foundations in the United 
States. A sizeable proportion of the PtP 
foundations are also spread among a wide 
variety of other purposes, from cultural ad-
vancement to economic development, fur-
ther reflecting the responsiveness of the PtP 
mechanism to a wide assortment of com-
munity priorities and needs. 
Summary 
In short, the PtP foundations are a robust 
group of institutions, in command of sub-
stantial philanthropic resources, created 
through one of several forms of privatiza-
tion of state-owned or state-controlled as-
sets, and dedicated to a wide variety of 
public-benefit purposes. As a group, a 
higher proportion of these institutions tend 
to be clustered toward the upper end of 
the size distribution than is the case of 
foundations globally, which likely reflects 
the large scale of many of the privatization 
transactions. This bodes well for the prom-
ise that the PtP concept holds for future 
foundation development as the privatiza-
tion process proceeds, as it seems very 
likely to do. 
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THE PtP CASE STUDY FOUNDATIONS 
 
To learn more about the PtP process, about the institutions that it has yielded to date, and about 
the lessons this past experience holds for possible future PtP transactions, it was necessary to dig 
a bit more deeply than this broad overview made possible. Accordingly, we conducted case 
studies on a sub-set of these institutions and transactions to examine their operations and their 
histories more closely. The balance of this report draws largely on this more detailed case-study 
material. In this section, we set the stage for this discussion by briefly introducing these case-study 
organizations.  
As shown in TABLE 3.3, we chose 21 PtP foundations for intensive scrutiny, though one of them, 
the Foundation for Polish Science, actually experienced two different privatizations, giving us 22 
transactions in all. Care was taken in the selection process to include cases in each of the five cate-
gories of PtP types while taking account of the overall distribution of PtP foundations among these 
types as well as the need for sufficient geographic coverage. 
  
Type I Cases 
Seven of the case study institutions involved sales of state-owned enterprises (Type I). Included 
here were:  
a) Germany’s Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung), which resulted from the 
privatization of the Volkswagen Company in the early 1960s. 
b) The sale of Germany’s huge Salzgitter steel complex, the proceeds of which went into the 
creation of the US$2.9 billion German Environmental Foundation (Deutsche Bundesstif-
tung Umwelt), which claims to be the largest environmental foundation in the world. 
c) Two other sales of government-owned German enterprises were owned by state, or 
Lander, governments and the proceeds were used to fund two Land-based foundations—
the Baden-Württemberg Foundation (Baden-Württemberg Stiftung) and the Rheinland-
Pfalz Foundation for Innovation (Stiftung Rheinland-Pfalz für Innovation)—that have sup-
ported extra-budgetary initiatives in the areas of technology and economic development. 
d) The important case of the Czech Foundation Investment Fund, which served as the 
repository for one percent of the shares of all major enterprises privatized through the 
Czech Republic’s massive, post-Communist privatization process in the early 1990s, and 
which then distributed these assets as endowments to 73 existing, but relatively new, 
Czech foundations, significantly expanding the capabilities of the Czech Republic’s embry-
onic foundation and civil society sectors.  
e) The Foundation for Polish Science (Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej), which, for a brief 
period received two percent of the shares of companies privatized under the early Polish 
post-communist privatization process in the early 1990s. 
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TABLE 3.3  
PtP foundations chosen for case studies 
 
CASE COUNTRY 
SOURCE  
OF ASSET 
YEAR 
FORMED 
CURRENT 
ASSETS (US$)* 
RESPONSIBLE 
ASSOCIATE 
TYPE I 
Volkswagen Foundation Germany Industrial company 1961 $3,451,084,000 Strachwitz 
German Environmental Foundation Germany Industrial company 1991 $2,891,849,111 Strachwitz 
Baden-Württemberg Foundation Germany Multiple companies 2000 $3,304,970,413 Strachwitz 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation Germany Multiple companies 1991 $141,612,965 Strachwitz 
Czech Foundation Investment Fund Czech Republic Multiple companies 1997 $206,748,270 Strečanský 
Foundation for Polish Science** Poland Multiple companies 2004 $118,421,344 Pieliński 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation Slovakia Public bank 2004 $10,260,848 Strečanský  
TYPE II 
La Scala Foundation Italy Opera house 1997 $266,395,050 Barbetta 
Slovak Youth Foundation Slovakia Real estate 2002 $14,457,738 Strečanský 
Lombardy Foundation for the Environment  Italy Disaster payment 1986 N.A Barbetta 
TYPE III 
Oranje Foundation*** Netherlands Lottery 2002 $497,752,500 Meijs 
King Baudouin Foundation*** Belgium Lottery 1976 $408,157,050 Mernier 
TYPE IV 
Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation Poland German loan 1991 $131,612,535 Pieliński 
TYPE V 
Cariplo Foundation Italy Savings bank 1991 $9,749,756,798 Barbetta 
Compagnia di San Paolo  Italy Savings bank 1991 $8,625,533,324 Barbetta 
Fondazione CRT Italy Savings bank 1991 $3,717,127,537 Barbetta 
ERSTE Foundation Austria Savings bank 2003 $4,699,314,536 Strachwitz 
ASB Community Trust New Zealand Savings bank 1988 $1,568,035,800 McKinlay 
Community Trust of Southland New Zealand Savings bank 1988 $255,190,140 McKinlay 
California Endowment U.S.A Health insurer 1996 $3,660,548,295 Bell 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for England & Wales*** U.K. Savings bank 1986 $1,025,872,049 Bell 
TOTAL (US$)*       $44,744,700,303 
 
TOTAL (EUROS)*    €33,710,209,762  
* Based on exchange rates of July 30, 2013. Assets as of 2011 or 2012. 
**Part of the asset came from a Type II transaction 
***Estimated asset equivalent of resources from annual lottery or covenanted proceeds. 
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f) The Slovak Savings Bank Foundation (Nadácia Slovenskej sporiteľne), which re-
sulted from the sale of the state-owned Slovak Savings Bank to Austria’s Erste 
banking group, itself the product of a PtP transaction that led to the creation of a 
network of foundations of banking origin in Austria. 
Type II Cases  
Three of our cases involved transfers of other state-owned assets (type II). Included here 
were: 
 
a) The famed Italian opera company, La Scala, which, along with twelve other Italian 
lyric operas, was converted into a foundation—The La Scala Foundation 
(Fondazione Teatro alla Scala)—and given possession of the assets of the former 
government-run opera company along with free use of the famed Milan opera 
house in perpetuity. 
b) The Slovak Youth Foundation, set up to receive the remaining real estate and 
other assets of the former Slovak Socialist Union of Youth following an initial 
disastrous management of these assets by the early, post-Communist Slovak 
government. 
c) The transfer of the proceeds of a damage award that the government of Italy’s 
Lombardy region received as compensation for an environmental disaster in one of 
its towns into the Lombardy Foundation for the Environment (Fondazione 
Lombardia per l’ambiente).  
 
Type III Cases 
Two cases were examples of the allocation to foundations of semi-permanent streams of 
revenue generated by an asset owned by, or substantially controlled by, governmental 
authorities. Included here were:  
a) The stream of revenue generated by Belgium’s state-owned National Lottery, part of 
the proceeds of which are distributed to the King Baudouin Foundation through a 
series of 5-year agreements. 
b) A similar stream of revenue generated by a state-licensed private lottery in the 
Netherlands and channelled into support of the Oranje Foundation (Oranje Fonds). 
 
Type IV Cases  
Representing the fourth type of PtP transaction, debt swaps, was the Foundation for 
Polish-German Cooperation (Fundacja Współpracy Polsko-Niemieckiej), which resulted 
from the German government’s forgiveness of the remaining 57 percent balance due from 
Poland on a jumbo loan made to the Polish Government in 1975 on condition that the Polish 
Government pay an equivalent amount in Polish Zlotys into this newly formed foundation. 
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Type V Cases 
The remaining 8 cases represent Type V PtP transactions, which involve the conversion 
into for-profit companies of quasi-public organizations, i.e., private organizations that 
have acquired a significant public character either by virtue of being essentially absorbed 
into the state apparatus or having benefited materially from governmental subsidies or 
tax forgiveness. PtP arrangements in these cases provide a way to preserve for public-
purpose activities assets of public-purpose organizations that have benefited from public 
subsidies when these organizations are sold or transformed into for-profit entities. 
Included here were: 
a) Three examples of the 88 important Italian foundations of banking origin 
(FBOs) described in the introductory chapter above, Cariplo Foundation 
(Fondazione Cariplo), Compagnia di San Paolo, and Fondazione CRT 
(Fondazione Casa di Risparmio di Torino).  
b) Four other similar transformations of quasi-public savings banks into joint 
stock companies—two of the 12 established in New Zealand (ASB Community 
Trust and Community Trust of Southland), one out of the 33 established in 
Austria (ERSTE Foundation),  and one out of the four created in the UK (Lloyds 
TSB Foundation for England and Wales).  
c) The creation of the huge California Endowment (and the related California 
Health Care Foundation) out of the conversion of the nonprofit health insurer, 
Blue Cross of California, into a for-profit company, establishing a template that 
has led to the creation of some 200 other so-called "conversion foundations" 
throughout the United States.  
In addition to representing the full range of PtP types, an attempt was also made in the 
selection of these cases to achieve a reasonably broad representation of countries in 
which PtP transactions have taken place while keeping the scope of the work within 
reasonable bounds. Thus, case studies were undertaken in 11 of the 21 countries in which 
PtP cases have been identified, including all of the countries in which substantial PtP 
activity has been verified. The case study distribution also paralleled the population of 
known PtP cases in terms of the timing and scale of the transactions, with some of the 
largest foundations included, but also some of the smallest.  
In the next three chapters we examine the lessons these cases seem to provide about how 
and why PtP processes occur, about the deals that led to these results, and about the 
structure, governance, and performance of the resulting institutions. We begin, not 
surprisingly, with the intriguing questions of how? And why? 
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 3: A SIZABLE SUBCONTINENT  |  33 
 
  
 
 
 
1
 As noted earlier, the case studies actually focused on 21 foundations. However, one of 
these, the Foundation for Polish Science, actually experienced two very different forms of 
"philanthropication." Hence we have 22 transactions but 21 organizations. 
2 See, for example: Jürgen Kaiser and Alain Lambert, Debt swaps for sustainable 
development. (Gland, Switzerland, and Cambridge, UK: International Union for Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources/ EURODAD, 1996); and Ross P. Buckeley, "Debt-For-
Development Exchanges: An Innovative Response to the Global Financial Crisis," University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, 32 (2009): 620 -645. 
3 Readers who are aware of such cases are invited to contact Project Director Lester 
Salamon at lsalamon@jhu.edu with a copy to Ms. Naomi Hansen at nhansen@ewmi.org. The 
list provided in Appendix A will be regularly updated at p-t-p.org. 
4 For the handful of foundations that receive the proceeds of privatization transactions in 
the form of a mandated stream of annual payments, we estimated the scale of assets that 
would be required to generate such a stream of revenue assuming an average annual rate 
of return of 4 percent. 
5 Unlike the Italian foundations of banking origin, the ownership shares secured by the 
foundations of banking origin in the U.K. were not full voting rights shares and did not 
entitle the foundations to a share of the profits of the banks. Rather, the U.K. foundations 
gained access to a stream of revenue initially set at one percent of the pre-tax profits of the 
banks. 
6 Based on data from Foundation Center's "Key Facts on U.S. Foundations." 
7 See: Lester M. Salamon, "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector," Foreign Affairs, 73:4, 
(July/August, 1994), 109-122. 
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If the message of the previous chapter is that the creation of charitable 
endowments out of the proceeds of various privatization transactions is far 
more widespread than previously recognized, the message of this chapter is 
that this outcome has still been far less common than might be hoped, and 
certainly far less common than it could have been, and still could be.  
To put the 500-plus cases of PtP transactions into perspective, it is well to re-
member that the modern history of active privatization has been variously 
estimated to have involved 3,535 transactions and/or 75,000 medium and 
large enterprises, and these numbers almost certainly reflect only the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and not the wider array of asset 
divestitures that this project includes within the ambit of "privatization."
1
 At 
most, therefore, philanthropication transactions took place 10 percent of the 
time, and, perhaps, using the higher estimate of cases, in only one-half of 1 
percent of the cases.  
A first task in assessing this route to foundation formation, therefore, is to 
understand what factors made it possible where it did occur. This is no simple 
task, however. After all, as one set of authors has reminded us, privatization is 
"a very varied process in different parts of the world, seldom decided upon 
autonomously, more often forced by external factors and carried out 
reluctantly in the absence of suitable legal, political, and economic 
institutions."
2
 This is so because privatization is a complex process, with 
multiple interests at stake, making it intensely political. As a component of 
privatization, we cannot realistically expect PtP to be any simpler, or to have a 
single explanation or even many common factors at work in all, or even most, 
locales. PtP arrangements have thus emerged to establish alternative 
structures through which to pursue public purposes and to avoid such 
alternatives; to facilitate the spin-off of state-owned enterprises and to thwart 
or avert such spin-offs in whole or in part; and for a variety of other con-
tradictory considerations.  
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The only thing that seems clear is that philanthropication accompanies pri-
vatization where it seems necessary to do so, where it is advantageous for 
some key actors, or where it solves some problem that privatization faces and 
that philanthropication is able, if not to solve, at least to resolve. Put differ-
ently, privatization rarely takes place to accomplish philanthropication, but 
philanthropication often takes place to accomplish privatization. This is not an 
argument to oppose philanthropication in order to scuttle privatization, how-
ever, since there are typically other ways for the privatization juggernaut to 
overcome its obstacles and the philanthropication option is at least capable of 
delivering important side benefits. But it does give us a clue about where to 
look for explanations of how PtP happens. What, then, are the circumstances 
under which philanthropication can perform this function? Based on our 22 
case studies, we can identify five major ones: (1) an ongoing or planned pri-
vatization process; (2) an asset with some peculiar characteristic; (3) a facilita-
tive legal structure; (4) actual or anticipated opposition to privatization; and (5) 
the presence of PtP entrepreneurs and advocates. Let us examine each of 
these five factors in turn. 
 
5 KEY CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCIVE TO PtP  
1) Privatization under Way 
In the first place, it is important to recognize that PtP is only possible where 
privatization is either under way or clearly in prospect. This may seem an ob-
vious point, but only if one assumes that privatization is universal. In fact, 
however, it is not. Writing in the mid-1990s, in the midst of what was consid-
ered the heyday of privatization, World Bank researchers reported that: 
"Bureaucrats are still in business. Despite more than a decade of di-
vestiture efforts and the growing consensus that government performs 
less well than the private sector in a host of activities, state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) account for nearly as large a share of developing 
economies today as twenty years ago. Indeed…the size of the state-
owned enterprise sector has significantly diminished only in the for-
mer socialist economies and a few middle-income countries. In most 
developing countries, particularly the poorest, bureaucrats run as 
large a share of the economy as ever."
3
 
A primary reason for this, the World Bank report noted, is political: govern-
ments lack the incentives, the support, and the credibility to pull off needed 
changes. A decade later, Bortolotti and Siniscalo reached a similar conclusion, 
noting that "[t]he privatization process has been partial and incomplete…. 
Philanthropication 
accompanies  
privatization  
where it is  
necessary, or  
advantageous  
to some key  
stakeholders,   
for it to do so.
Philanthropication 
thru privatization  
is only possible  
where privatization 
is either under way 
or clearly in  
prospect. 
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[D]espite proclamations and programmes only a small minority of countries 
have carried out a genuine privatization process—completely transferring 
ownership and control of SOEs to the private sector."
4
 
 
Why privatization has been uneven. There are many reasons for this une-
venness. Some are philosophical: direct government provision of certain key 
services is a way to ensure universal access to all citizens and achieve goals 
of equity and a level playing field for all citizens. If all highways and bridges 
become toll roads, and all schools fee-based, only the wealthy will be able to 
travel freely and educate their children. Other reasons are economic: some 
crucial services or commodities have the character of being so-called "public 
goods"—once they are produced everyone benefits from them.5 If the pro-
duction of such goods is left to the free market, everyone will suffer since 
"free rider" behavior will result as each consumer chooses to forego paying 
for the goods knowing that he or she can benefit even if his or her neighbor 
pays the cost. Finally, there are cruder political reasons for resisting privatiza-
tion: state-owned enterprises provide jobs and subsidized services for citi-
zens and thereby deliver followers and power to politicians.  
Why privatization occurs where and when it does. Reflecting this, the cases 
of PtP we examined in depth occurred in settings where unusual events 
were unfolding—strong external pressures from the European Commission 
and IMF to reform financial systems in the cases of Italy, Austria, the U.K., 
and Germany; economy-wide transformations in the wake of regime change 
in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the eastern part of Germany; a 
new government committed to Thatcherite reforms of the economy in New 
Zealand; and a desire to pay homage to respected royals without tapping 
into over-drawn public budgets in the Netherlands and Belgium.  
The restructuring of the savings banks in New Zealand, for example, was 
part of a much wider restructuring of the New Zealand public sector and 
economy undertaken by a new Labour government that came to power in 
1984. The scope of this restructuring, as described in one summary account, 
was nothing short of sweeping: 
Between 1984 and 1990 New Zealand's public sector underwent mas-
sive structural, organisational, and management changes. At the cen-
tral government level these included the corporatisation and subse-
quent privatisation of state trading activities, the introduction of a new 
financial management regime, major changes to the machinery of 
government, a new system of appointing and remunerating senior 
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public servants, substantial cuts in various government programs, sig-
nificant changes to public sector industrial relations practices, a 
growing emphasis upon biculturalism and employment equity, and a 
much greater concern with accountability and performance assess-
ment. At the local government level, too, major reforms were initiated, 
many of them paralleling those in the core public sector (e.g. commer-
cialisation, corporatisation, the contracting-out of services, the decou-
pling of advisory, regulatory and delivery functions, and new account-
ability mechanisms).
6
 
A central part of this restructuring was reform of the New Zealand banking 
sector, which, at the time, was dominated by a range of government-owned 
and/or guaranteed institutions subject to very extensive and intrusive 
regulation. With regard to the savings banks that are the subject of our PtP 
case study, the substantive charges leading the government to propose a 
change in ownership were considerable:  
 The relatively poor commercial expertise of many of the trus-
tees of the country’s twelve savings banks; 
 The weak financial position of a number of the savings banks 
in part as a consequence of the requirement to hold a very 
substantial proportion of their assets in government stock 
which, at the time of the restructuring, was worth significantly 
less than book value; 
 The potential vulnerability of these banks in the deregulated fi-
nancial environment being created; 
 The desirability of exiting from the open-ended guarantee with 
which the government was saddled on all of the deposits held 
by the savings banks; and 
 The mixed incentives of the savings bank trustees stemming 
from their dual roles as overseers of a banking business, and 
distributors of funds (when available) for good works within 
the community. 
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2) Assets with Special Features 
On-going privatization activity may have been an obvious necessary condi-
tion for the PtP outcome in our 21 case studies, but it was hardly a sufficient 
one. A second key ingredient in the stew, at least in a number of the cases, 
was the nature of the asset being privatized. In a word, many of these assets 
had some peculiarity about them that made a PtP outcome useful and de-
sirable, though the nature of that peculiarity varied. 
Jurisdictional disputes I: The Volkswagen case. In the case of the 
Volkswagen Foundation, one of the earliest examples of the PtP phenome-
non, a decisive determinant of the PtP outcome was the conflict that existed 
between the German Federal Republic (GFR) and one of its provincial gov-
ernments, the State of Lower Saxony, over the ownership of the Volkswagen 
Company (Volkswagenwerk), which was physically located in this state. This 
conflict arose because the British Military Government, which had responsi-
bility for the portion of post-war Germany where the Volkswagen plant was 
located, split the difference in deciding which authority should control this 
enterprise after postwar military occupation ended, placing it under the 
trusteeship of the GFR but under the control and administration of the State 
of Lower Saxony.  
 
For some, ownership of this company was an embarrassment for the coun-
try since the company had been created by the Nazi Party, operated as a 
party-owned enterprise, and turned into an armaments factory staffed by 
20,000 forced laborers and prisoners during the war. Others felt ownership 
of a car factory was inappropriate for a government and saw the privatiza-
tion of this company as a convenient instrument through which to pursue a 
bold "wealth for all" strategy that would usher in a new era in the develop-
ment of a social market economy, distributing economic wealth broadly to 
the populace by selling them people’s shares (Volksaktien) in a privatized 
Volkswagen Company. The fact that funding for the company originally 
came from resources that the Nazi Party confiscated from trade unions only 
added further impetus for this outcome. GFR officials in particular therefore 
began hatching plans to "privatize" the company.  
 
The Sputnik incentive. With increasing concerns provoked in 1957 by the  
Soviet Sputnik launch that the Soviet Union might be gaining a scientific and 
engineering advantage over Germany, moreover, a new element entered 
the equation: the need to find resources to invest in German science and 
scientists. It was not long, therefore, before this new need was married to 
the idea of issuing people’s shares in the Volkswagen Company, a marriage 
Many of these  
assets had some  
peculiarity about 
them that made a  
PtP outcome useful 
and desirable. 
A decisive  
determinant of the 
PtP outcome  
in the Volkswagen 
case was the 
conflict that  
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the German  
Federal Republic 
(GFR) and one of  
its provincial  
governments. 
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that was consummated in a campaign launched by a well-known journalist 
and Christian magazine editor, Giselher Wirsing, and transformed into a call 
to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the proposed Volkswagen people’s 
shares into a new "National Foundation Volkswagenwerk" dedicated to 
strengthening German science. 
Resolving the jurisdictional tug-of-war. There was only one problem with all 
these bold ideas: no one bothered to consult the State of Lower Saxony, 
which was convinced that the company being considered for sale by officials 
of the GFR actually belonged to Lower Saxony instead. This issue came to a 
head in 1959 when the federal government rejected the ownership claims of 
Lower Saxony and introduced legislation in the national Parliament to trans-
form the Volkswagenwerk into a stock company and privatize it via the sale 
of people’s shares, with the proceeds going into a fund to be controlled by 
the national government. This provoked the newly elected government of 
Lower Saxony to respond with its own proposal to transfer ownership of the 
Volkswagenwerk to a foundation controlled by the Government of Lower 
Saxony. With a foundation on the table on both sides, however, it became 
possible to work out a compromise. That compromise involved selling 60 
percent of the shares of a privatized Volkswagenwerk to the German people, 
with the proceeds vested in a Volkswagen Foundation to be situated in 
Lower Saxony and dedicated to promoting German science, with particular 
emphasis on scientific development in its home State; and splitting the re-
maining 40 percent of the shares evenly between the GFR and the State.
7
 In a 
sense, the foundation structure provided a convenient way to split the pro-
ceeds between the state and federal government while establishing a vehicle 
and set of resources to re-jump-start German science in the wake of the 
Sputnik embarrassment. 
Jurisdictional disputes II: The Baden-Württemberg Stiftung. Jurisdictional 
squabbles also significantly influenced the choice of a PtP option in another 
German transaction—the case of the Baden-Württemberg Foundation. 
Under German tax law, the State of Baden-Württemberg was potentially lia-
ble for tax payments to the federal government on the capital gains involved 
in its proposed €2.4 billion sale of the state-owned energy company, EnBW, 
to French electric power company EDF. By transferring ownership of EnBW 
to a foundation before the sale, the Government of Baden-Württemberg was 
able to avoid some €200 million of tax payments to the Federal budget and 
retain this money in its own budget instead. The one downside was that the 
state had to make clear in its founding documents that the resulting founda-
tion would abide by prevailing laws stipulating that it would not use the 
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resources secured to support the core functions of the state. But its pledge 
to use them to make "useful and good investments in the future of Baden-
Württemberg" probably amounted to much the same thing. 
Government or private? The savings banks. Jurisdictional disputes over 
ownership or revenue-sharing turn out to be only one feature of privatized 
assets that seem to advantage PtP outcomes, however. Even more pervasive 
are other features that cloud the state’s claim to ownership of assets, and 
therefore prompt a search for alternative arrangements, such as formation 
of a foundation, to assume ownership and thereby facilitate privatization. 
This was true, for example, of several of our most sizable cases, all of them 
banks. As it turns out, all of these banks claimed a similar lineage, utilized a 
similar structure, performed a similar dual role, and ultimately posed a 
common problem for would-be privatizers pressured to modernize their 
countries’ banking systems. That problem consisted of two parts: first, these 
banks had no owners; and second, they were not only banks but also chari-
table institutions with strong philanthropic traditions. 
Early origins. Some of these banks had origins in the fifteenth or sixteenth 
centuries as outgrowths of Catholic social doctrine. Others originated in late 
eighteenth century Germany, with the creation of the Ersparniskasse in 
Hamburg. Another example can be found in early nineteenth century 
Dumfriesshire, Scotland, where a church minister with banking experience, 
Dr. Henry Duncan, established a small-scale savings institution to encourage 
thriftiness among his parishioners. Where the formal banks required sub-
stantial sums to start an account, Duncan encouraged micro deposits, in-
vested the pooled money in a local bank at 5 percent interest, paid deposi-
tors 4 percent, and used the rest for charitable assistance to those in need. 
Duncan's bank did not have shareholders or owners in any conventional 
sense but were controlled by unpaid "trustees"—hence the term "trustee 
savings banks" to refer to them. As word of this development spread 
through the UK, other communities followed suit; by 1817, a mere 7 years af-
ter the formation of the first trustee savings bank, the UK Parliament passed 
the Trustee Savings Bank Law that extended a Bank of England guarantee to 
all trustee savings bank deposits. By 1861, 645 such trustee savings banks 
were operating in what is now the U.K. 
More than this, much like micro-credit in our day, word of this experiment 
soon spread to other countries. By 1819, Viennese business leaders had cre-
ated the Erste Osterreichische Spar-Casse in Wien, the First Austrian Savings 
Bank in Vienna, to enable common people to save for the future. Like its 
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Scottish counterpart, the bank was run by engaged volunteers, who formed 
an informal savings association and functioned as trustees of the savings in-
stitution, but did not truly own the institution. Indeed, the bank had no true 
"owner," just a group of well-meaning citizens who, in addition to attending to 
the bank, carried out a variety of philanthropic activities with whatever profit 
the savings organization generated. Soon, 33 such institutions were operating 
in Austria and many more elsewhere in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When 
Austrian administrators entered what became Northern Italy following Aus-
tria’s victory over Napoleon, they naturally carried the trustee bank concept 
with them. By 1823, a group of capable Milanese aristocrats had been re-
cruited to start an Italian version of the Austrian version of the Scottish trus-
tee savings bank, the Cassa de Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde. By 1827, 
Torino had its own Cassa di Risparmio, and eventually 196 such entities were 
operating in Italy, forming in the process, the backbone of the Italian banking 
system. By the 1840s, the idea had spread to New Zealand, giving rise in 1847 
to the Auckland Savings Bank, which, by the turn of the century, was trans-
acting more than £1 million of business per year. 
The rise of government involvement. From here, the evolution of these institu-
tions began to diverge. By 1890, the Italian government began the process of 
bringing the Casse di Risparmio into the public sector. This process went into 
high gear in the 1920s with the emergence of the fascist government, which 
led to a radical consolidation of the savings banks and their placement under 
strict government control. The Czechoslovakian branch of the trustee savings 
bank family retained its independence somewhat longer but was swept un-
der government ownership and control with the Communist takeover fol-
lowing World War II. In the UK, these banks retained their autonomy longer 
still, but in 1975 were obliged by the Parliament to consolidate. Then, in 1985, 
with bank modernization on the government’s agenda, they were put under a 
common body, the Central Trustee Savings Bank, Ltd., and prepared for even-
tual privatization by being designated as state-owned entities rather than en-
tities owned by their depositors. In each case, however, while the banks 
ended up being technically government-owned bodies, they also remained 
nonprofit institutions with strong philanthropic traditions and functions, their 
trustee boards still intact and operating both their banking and philanthropic 
activities. 
Resolving the ownership dispute. When governments began the process of 
transforming these institutions into joint stock companies, therefore, they 
encountered push-back from the bank boards, who challenged their respec-
tive governments’ claim of ownership. From all accounts, these battles were 
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fought out separately in each locale, with little known communication, ex-
cept between the New Zealand trusts and those in the U.K. Try as they 
might, however, the governments could not find solid ground on which to 
stake a claim to the proceeds of a sale of the banks for the government’s cof-
fers. The debate in New Zealand was particularly telling, with one Reserve 
Bank memo to the Prime Minister conceding that on the question of 
ownership: 
"It would seem that no one has yet come up with a definitive response - 
the trustee banks eschew the question in their letter to you; officials are 
equally uncertain even after some legal opinion that the trustee banks 
may belong to 'the community' rather than to the Government, which 
has not invested any funds in the trustee banks at any stage (although 
the guarantee is effectively a form of equity), or to the trustee banks' 
depositors." 
In the end, therefore, all of the countries ended up choosing some version of 
the Italian solution—i.e. splitting off the charitable activities of the savings 
banks from the banking activities, converting the banks into joint stock com-
panies, transforming the boards of the banks and their charitable activities 
into foundations, and placing (or leaving) all or, in the U.K. case, some of the 
stock of the new banking companies into the foundations, which ended up 
still owning all, or part, of the banks. The same process of immaculate con-
ception that led to the emergence of 88 foundations of banking origin in 
Italy, thus also left behind 12 newly formed community trusts in New 
Zealand, 33 Sparkasse foundations in Austria, including the very large ERSTE 
Foundation, what became Lloyds TSB (Trustee Savings Bank) Foundation 
for England and Wales, the Slovak Savings Bank Foundation, the Czech 
Savings Bank Foundation, and doubtless others elsewhere.
8
  
Other ownership issues. The nature of the privatized asset also seems to have 
played a role in some of the other PtP cases that we examined in depth, 
though each in slightly different ways. Thus: 
 It was easy to conceive of a foundation as the recipient of the 
privatized La Scala opera company in Italy since the opera 
house and company were originally built and owned by 
"palchettisti," private investors who bought theater boxes 
(palchi in Italian), paid for the construction of the theater, and 
remained in control of the operation as recently as the 1920s. 
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 What became the Slovak Youth Foundation could trace at least 
part of its origin to a rich array of youth-serving nonprofit org-
anizations and charitable endowments that thrived in 
Czechoslovakia during the inter-war years before being swept 
up by successive waves of state confiscation, first of Jewish-led 
organizations during the Nazi era, then of German and 
Hungarian organizations in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II, and finally of all remaining such organizations by the 
Communist rulers who came to power in 1948.  
 A similar story lay behind the decision to set aside one percent 
of the shares of all privatization sales in the Czech Republic in a 
special Foundation Investment Fund as partial restitution for 
the post-World War II Communist regime’s confiscation of the 
assets and resources of the rich array of associations and 
foundations that operated during the inter-war years in the 
Czech portion of the former Czechoslovakia.  
 Clearer still was the link between the formation of a foundation 
and the absorption of Blue Cross of California, California’s major 
private nonprofit health insurance organization, by a private, 
for-profit insurer. This is so because these assets resulted in 
substantial part from exemptions the nonprofit had enjoyed 
from federal and state taxes and the tax deductions provided to 
the organization’s charitable donors from the founding of the 
organization in 1937 up to its conversion into a for-profit 
company in 1996. Having the proceeds of this sale go into the 
pockets of the organization’s Board members or the coffers of 
the acquiring for-profit therefore seemed inappropriate. 
Indeed, there were laws on the books requiring that any assets 
built up by a nonprofit continue to be used for the purpose 
pursued by that nonprofit if the nonprofit ceases to operate or 
converts to for-profit status. 
Implications for future privatizations. Lest it be thought that this factor con-
tributing to PtP outcomes restricts the PtP phenomenon to isolated historical 
curios, it is well to remember that many other types of assets now in the 
process of being privatized share a similar contested character. This is the 
case, for example, of the minerals lying beneath the surface of much of 
Africa. Such land has long been held in communal hands with power vested 
in traditional chiefs to allocate it among tribal members. But ownership of 
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the land and ownership of the minerals lying beneath the surface turn out to 
be two different things and governments have been laying claim to the 
mineral rights and leasing these to mineral companies to prospect and 
develop. "Zambia: Land and mineral rights in conflict" is how the news outlet 
of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has described 
the resulting dispute this has provoked in just one such country.
9
 
Conceivably, the original nature of this asset could support citizen claims to 
tap a portion of the streams of revenue such mineral rights leases are 
generating to support charitable foundations in the region, much as the 
national lottery in Belgium has been tapped to support the King Baudouin 
Foundation and other charities in Belgium. 
 
3) Facilitative Legal Framework 
While the nature of a privatized asset seems to play a significant role in 
allowing privatizations to end up creating new, or newly expanded, founda-
tion endowments, other factors also play a role. One of these factors is the 
legal framework governing both privatization and foundations or other chari-
table institutions. The impact of law is complex, however, because it operates 
at many different levels. There is, first of all, the general legal framework, 
which affects the treatment of state-owned enterprises and thereby facili-
tates or discourages their existence. Then there is foundation law, which can 
affect the ease or difficulty of forming foundations and, through stipulations 
concerning transparency and conflicts of interest, the confidence that citi-
zens have in such institutions. Finally, there are provisions of tax law that can 
incentivize or disincentivize transactions that involve foundations. What is 
more, in federal systems such as those in the U.S., Germany, and many other 
countries, these dimensions of law can vary significantly between the 
national level and the various subnational jurisdictions.  
Given these complexities, we cannot expect any single uniform statement 
about the impact that legal provisions have on the likelihood that privatiza-
tion activity will lead to PtP outcomes. Nevertheless, it seems clear from our 
case studies that those impacts can be substantial, and that they can oper-
ate in a number of different directions. 
Laws advantaging philanthropication: The Blue Cross of California case.  
Perhaps the clearest example of the impact legal provisions can have in en-
couraging PtP outcomes is provided by the case of the absorption of the 
nonprofit Blue Cross of California (BCC) health insurer into the for-profit 
WellPoint Health Networks, Inc., in the United States. As already noted, that 
the conversion of BCC from a nonprofit organization into a for-profit 
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company was accompanied by the formation of a new charitable foundation 
receiving all of BCC’s assets was foreshadowed by the provisions of nonprofit 
law in the United States, as it is in many other countries.
10
 Such law falls un-
der state jurisdiction in the U.S., but virtually every state includes provisions 
stipulating that nonprofit public benefit corporations hold their assets in 
charitable trust and, as such, are bound to use their assets only for the par-
ticular charitable purposes they were established to pursue. California’s law, 
for example, stipulated that nonprofits are required to include in their 
Articles of Incorporation a promise that the organization’s assets will be "ir-
revocably dedicated" to specific enumerated charitable purposes. Under 
California law, if a private, charitable, nonprofit organization chooses to con-
vert to for-profit status, it must transfer an amount equal to the total value of 
its assets to an organization that will devote them to charitable purposes 
fundamentally similar to those for which the original organization was cre-
ated. Supporting this concept is the fact that the assets such organizations 
accumulate are due in part to various tax exemptions provided by govern-
ment and to contributions made by the public. When BCC sought to transfer 
the majority of its assets to a for-profit entity in 1993, therefore, opponents 
had a strong legal basis for resisting this proposal, though, as we will see, it 
took more than that to prevail.  
Common law vs. civil law considerations. While the privileged position of pri-
vate nonprofit organizations in the U.S. helped encourage a PtP outcome in 
the California Blue Cross case and served as the template for the formation 
of what is now nearly 200 similar "health conversion foundations," other fea-
tures of U.S. law paradoxically work in the opposite direction. They do this 
not by discouraging private foundations, but by failing to encourage state-
owned enterprises, thus opening far fewer "windows" forPtP by limiting 
opportunities for privatization.
12
 This is, in fact, a widespread feature of 
common law countries—countries with Anglo-Saxon legal traditions 
characterized by an emphasis on individualism and citizens’ natural rights. By 
contrast, so-called civil law countries—influenced by the Napoleonic Code 
and Rousseauian notions of the common good, as well as Catholic concepts 
of solidarity—are much more supportive of state-owned enterprises. The 
1946 French Constitution thus states that: "all property and enterprises of 
which the running has, or acquires, the character of national public service or 
of an actual monopoly are to become public property."
13 
The Italian 
Constitution similarly grants the state "by means of expropriation and pay-
ment of compensation…categories of undertakings operating essential pub-
lic services…or invested primarily with a character of general interest."14 
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Empirical research has confirmed that civil law countries, particularly those in 
the German civil law tradition—such as Austria, Germany, Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan—tend to have more interventionist governments and 
larger, state-owned enterprise sectors as a result.
15
 When the wave of 
enthusiasm for privatization swept over the world in the 1990s, therefore, 
these civil law countries had many more potential candidates to privatize. 
Whether PtP outcomes resulted, however, depended also on the laws on 
foundations these countries had adopted. The fact that we discovered no 
cases of PtP in France, for example, may have something to do with the long-
standing legal obstacles to the establishment of foundations in that 
country—a residue of the French Revolution’s general hostility to nonprofit 
institutions, and particularly foundations, seeing them as undemocratic ex-
pressions of the particular will of groups rather than the general will of the 
entire citizenry. Until 1901, therefore, not only foundations, but all 
associations were officially outlawed in France. And long after that foun-
dations have had to secure individual decrees from the Council of State to 
gain legal status.
16 
 
The "public law foundation" and related options in Germany. The situation 
in Germany is quite similar, but with one very important difference. As in 
France, foundations cannot gain legal status without a special act of a state 
government. But Germany has a category of "public law foundations," i.e., 
foundations established and operated by Lander, or state, governments. It 
is thus easier for German authorities to accept the transfer of formerly 
state-owned enterprises to the care of foundations. Indeed, such transfers 
to public law foundations can give the appearance of privatizing an asset 
while still retaining state control. 
The Volkswagen case. This consideration seems to have influenced the 
Volkswagen privatization process through the influence of Fritz Nordhoff, 
the managing director of the Volkswagen Company at the time of privat-
ization, and Georg Strickrodt, who served between 1946 and 1950 as 
Minister of Finance in the State of Lower Saxony. Strickrodt was the chief 
exponent of a concept he called "The Foundation as a new form of 
incorporated enterprise," about which he wrote two books. The idea here 
was to combine the benefits of public sector oversight with the advantages 
of a certain arms-length separation between partly "privatized" public 
enterprises and their ultimate political masters. Nordhoff understandably 
found this concept appealing since it promised to leave him free to manage 
the Volkswagen Company while avoiding the splintering of ownership that 
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might result from a stock sale on the open market or a takeover by an 
outside owner. It thus helped swing him over to supporting the foundation 
option in the Volkswagen privatization case.
17
 
 
The Baden-Württemberg case. These features of German law permitting 
governmental ownership or control of foundations was also evident in the 
cases of two other German PtP transactions. First, in the case of the Baden-
Württemberg Foundation, in addition to avoiding the threat of being taxed 
by the federal government on the capital gains from the sale of its state-
owned energy company, Baden-Wüttemberg government leaders were 
motivated by a desire to build extra-governmental vehicles through which 
to promote development in their state. This concept of state-sponsored 
foundations was widely debated in the political arena and in the media 
during the period leading up to the PtP transaction. Over the objections of 
critics who charged that they were creating a nonprofit entity to play "Santa 
Claus" in the country without any parliamentary control, key politicians 
essentially created a foundation to serve as a holding company for a range 
of state-owned enterprises, the major one of which was the huge EnBW 
energy company, the shares of which were ultimately sold to EDF, the 
French electricity company. As part of the privatization process, the founda-
tion was established as a nonprofit limited company under commercial law 
with a single shareholder, the State of Baden-Württemberg. Interestingly, as 
a sop to the opposition, the 18 governing board seats were split evenly be-
tween state government officials and members of the Baden-Württemberg 
Parliament from a wide array of political parties, giving the opposition par-
ties a stake in the foundation’s future. This political compromise was further 
solidified in 2005 when the new Christian Democratic Party Ministerpresi-
dent of Baden-Württemberg assumed the role of President of the founda-
tion’s Supervisory Board and named as the new Managing Director of the 
foundation a leading figure in the main opposition party in the state. 
The Rheinland-Pfalz case. This notion of a foundation as a vehicle to serve 
public purposes being promoted by political elites was also clearly present in 
the creation and funding through privatization transactions of the 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation, as well as its sister entities, the 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Culture and the Villa Musica. This was not 
simply a case of political leaders using their governmental positions to 
feather their own nests or throw valuable assets to supportive cronies, 
however, as happened with privatization processes in Russia and, for a time, 
in Slovakia.
18
 Rather, political leaders from many parts of the political 
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spectrum in the German State of Rheinland-Pfalz saw a need to modernize 
the state administration and found in the "new public management" 
concepts circulating in the late 1970s and early 1980s a set of ideas worth 
trying. Those ideas emphasized the need to introduce market-type principles 
of competition, incentive pay, and performance measurement into the work 
of government agencies. This could be achieved through the creation of 
"quasi-market" arrangements such as outsourcing and hiving off parts of the 
administrative machinery of the state into quasi-governmental entities.
19
 In 
pursuit of these ideas, the government of the State of Rheinland-Pfalz 
created fourteen different foundations between 1979 and 2000, all with an eye 
to modernizing the state bureaucracy. These foundations actually pre-dated 
the major privatization sales in this state. The Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation 
for Innovation, for example, was created in 1991. But when the state found 
a buyer for its 50 percent ownership of the state’s major bank, the 
Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz, it was an easy decision to use the proceeds to 
support the work of the Foundation rather than leave it dependent on 
subventions from the state budget.  
Other facilitative features of law: The perpetuity requirement. In several of 
the other cases we examined as well, key features of foundation law 
smoothed the way for a PtP outcome. Especially attractive to some advocates 
of this option were features in foundation law that guaranteed that assets 
placed in a foundation would be dedicated in perpetuity to the purposes set 
in the founding documents rather than left to the whims of changing political 
fortunes if dumped into government budgets. Such provisions exist in 
German laws governing private, but not public, foundations and figured 
prominently in the decision to place the proceeds of the sale of the 
Volkswagen Company into a private-law foundation explicitly dedicated to 
the promotion of Germany science, an issue, as we have seen, of great public 
concern following the Sputnik launch in 1957.  
 
This was a crucial incentive as well for a PtP outcome in the establishment of 
the German Environmental Foundation with the €1.3 billion proceeds 
from the sale of the state-owned steel group, Salzgitter AG, to another 
former state-owned company, Preussag Stahl. A key feature of this decision 
was the desire on the part of the then-Finance Minister, Dr. Theo Waigel, to 
secure these resources in perpetuity for the promotion of environmental 
improvements in Germany, an impulse that was apparently encouraged by 
his desire to appeal to environmentally oriented voters in advance of 
forthcoming German elections.  
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This argument was even more powerfully present in the decision to transfer 
the assets of the former Socialist Union of Youth to a new private-law Slovak 
Youth Foundation. What gave special force to this argument was the 
stunning record of mismanagement of the assets of this Union during the 
early post-Communist period, when they were placed under the 
management of the Ministry of Education in a Fund for Children and Youth 
overseen by a Board selected by the Slovak Parliament. By 2000, thanks to 
the use of this fund to provide private income to the relatives and friends of 
the board members or to offer advantages to friendly companies doing 
business with the Fund, the $40 million in net assets originally placed in this 
fund had dwindled to something closer to US$5 million. The idea to transfer 
these funds to a private foundation was heavily influenced by the fact that 
prevailing laws stipulated that this would protect the assets and ensure their 
use for the support of children and youth in perpetuity.  
These examples underline the dangers of too-close-an-embrace of PtP foun-
dations by government authorities and the importance of provisions that 
shelter such entities from governmental control, an issue to which this 
report returns in Chapter 7 below.  
 
Legal deterrents to PtP outcomes. Not all features of prevailing law worked 
to encourage PtP outcomes, however. In some locales, prevailing law fails to 
require the kind of transparency on the part of foundations that citizens con-
sider desirable. This issue featured prominently in several of the PtP transac-
tions in Germany. Both the Green Party and the Social Democrats, for exam-
ple, resisted the initial plans for the German Environmental Foundation on 
this ground, portraying German private law foundations as completely 
uncontrolled and undemocratic institutions because of an almost total lack 
of transparency requirements for them.
20
 The federal Audit Office also 
opposed this legal form and Court officials recommended the formation of 
the proposed foundation under public law in order to ensure parliamentary 
and public control of the use of the assets. Critics also pointed to a legal case 
filed by the Volkswagen Foundation to free itself from intrusive regulation 
by both the Federal and Lower Saxony audit offices as evidence of the drive 
by private law foundations to avoid external review.
21
 Reflecting the strength 
of this line of argument, the Government and the political majority in the 
Parliament agreed to incorporate into the law creating the DBU as a private-
law foundation the stipulation that its budget management would be subject 
to review by the Federal Audit Office, as is the case with public law 
foundations. 
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PtP as a lever to improve prevailing law: The Czech case. In the case of the 
Czech Foundation Investment Fund, rather than prevailing law facilitating a 
PtP outcome, the promise of a PtP outcome was used as a lever to improve 
prevailing foundation law. Prime Minister Václav Klaus in particular insisted 
that the transfer of the accumulated assets resulting from the dedication of 
one percent of the shares of all privatization sales to the support of Czech 
foundations could not occur until a new, post-Communist law on 
foundations was passed. This law prepared the ground for the distribution of 
the contributions from the Czech Foundation Investment Fund to a set of 
Czech foundations by distinguishing foundations more clearly from 
associations and businesses. It did so by identifying an endowment as a key 
constituting feature of a foundation; by making clear that such endowments 
had to be dedicated in perpetuity to publicly beneficial purpose; and by 
specifying that the earnings generated by such endowments had to be used 
at least in part to support other public-benefit organizations. This provided 
the needed assurances that foundation resources would be protected and 
dedicated to their legally defined appropriate uses. The Czech case thus 
provides an object lesson in the importance of getting foundation law "right" 
in order to ensure that the foundations created through PtP transactions 
forge the reliable and transparent institutions that are needed for PtP to 
serve its avowed purposes.  
 
4) The Need to Defuse Opposition to Privatization 
A fourth factor that facilitated the choice of a PtP solution in a number of the 
cases we examined was the need to defuse opposition to privatization. To be 
sure, most of the PtP foundations we examined for this project were formed 
during the heyday period of recent privatization, from the mid-1980s 
through 1999. During this period, the economic disaster of Soviet-style, 
state-run economies had become visible for all to see and served to fuel a 
powerful consensus in favor of privatization. This view gained important 
institutional support, moreover, from what has come to be called "the 
Washington consensus," the view among a number of the large multi-
national development agencies—such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)—that state-owned enterprises were a drag on social 
and economic progress because, as a World Bank document put it, they: 
"absorb a large amount of funds that could be better spent on basic social 
services…capture a disproportionate share of credit…pollute more than 
privately owned factories…contribute significantly to public-sector deficits, 
and therefore significantly impede economic development."
22 
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But it must not be thought that this consensus was universal. Even amidst 
the rah-rah, pro-privatization climate of the 1970s and 1980s, significant 
opposition to privatization was widespread. Thus, for example, 94 percent  
of the employees of the Saltzgitter firm voted against the sale of the firm in 
1989, and 27,000 signed a petition denouncing the plan. Broad swaths of the 
Social Democratic parties in Europe opposed privatization. In Poland, a 
substantial portion of public opinion was against any kind or privatization of 
state-owned companies and it took the announcement that 2 percent of the 
stock of state-owned companies would be placed in a foundation dedicated 
to improving Polish science to calm opposition (even though that pledge was 
reversed two years after it was made).  
This same tactic won tacit support for privatization among Czech civil society 
leaders, who saw in the pledge of one percent of the shares of all 
privatization sales in the Czech Republic for Czech foundations one of the 
only hopes for creating a true, endowed foundation sector in the country 
within a reasonable timespan. This view was inspired by early leaders of the 
Velvet Revolution such as Václav Havel. As Havel put it in explaining the 
rationale for the one percent provision: 
"The state should not be based on the idea that it, and it alone, knows 
best what society needs and that it alone should finance that area 
from centrally levied taxes. Centralized financing leads inevitably to 
centralized management. In this area, too, we should trust the citizens 
more and enable them to take on more responsibility. This means 
nothing less than delegating to other subjects, in a properly thought-
out way, part of the function of redistributing resources."
23
 
 
This view was vigorously opposed by Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus, who 
argued that "Publicly beneficial services should be provided primarily by the 
state (or local authority) because they are a civic matter and only public 
institutions represent us, the citizens, on the basis of the authority they have 
from democratic elections."
24
 
Ultimately, Havel’s view prevailed thanks to the support of Mr. Tomáš Ježek, 
the Minister for Privatization. In justifying the provision for setting aside this 
one percent of all privatization sales for foundations proposed in a 1992 
amendment to the Czech privatization law, Ježek put the matter this way: 
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and it alone, knows 
best what society 
needs."   
 
~Václav Havel 
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 4: HOW DID IT HAPPEN?   |  53 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"We are the society at the beginning of the emergence of market 
structures, we are without rich individuals, without individual donors, 
those, who would support foundations from voluntary gifts. Therefore 
we believe that it would be good and useful to "nurture" the 
foundations in the process of privatization, to entrust them with part 
of the property so they could take care of it. By this step a useful, 
parallel financial structure would be established that exists in all 
market economies, which besides the public budget, takes care of 
publicly beneficial purposes as social, humanitarian, health, cultural 
and others." (Tomáš Ježek, May 5, 1992).25 
In the case of the Blue Cross of California conversion as well, public concern 
about the private, for-profit takeover of the state’s principal health insurance 
organization led to widespread concerns about possible increases in rates 
and restrictions on coverage. Unable to stop the corporatization, public con-
cerns were at least partially addressed upon word that the privatization 
would result in the formation of two large state-wide foundations with mis-
sions to promote access to health care. Even in Baden-Württemberg, a state 
with a particularly robust state-owned enterprise sector whose government 
used foundations as mechanisms to stay in control of privatized enterprises, 
the government felt compelled to use the foundation to help make the case 
for the privatization, pointing out that the new Stiftung could be counted on 
to make "useful and good investments" in the State of Baden-Württemberg 
and arguing that the opportunity it created to support 80 million euros-worth 
of projects each year in the state in perpetuity constituted a form of "social 
compensation" for the sale of the state’s energy company. 
 
5) The Presence of PtP Entrepreneurs and Advocates 
Despite the importance of the preceding four factors in explaining how 
privatization led to the creation or expansion of charitable endowments in 
the 22 cases we examined, ultimately it was the fifth factor that was decisive. 
This fifth factor was the presence of some person or group of persons who 
embraced the concept of using privatization proceeds to promote the 
creation or expansion of foundations, and who were in a position to push 
this concept forward.  
 
That such persons came forward is somewhat remarkable in view of the fact 
that something called PtP had never truly been articulated in a coherent way. 
It is well to remember, moreover, that the concept of privatization itself was 
hardly a wholly indigenous idea. Rather, it had become a central component 
Ultimately 
decisive in PtP  
outcomes was the 
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person or group of  
persons who  
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of the official policy consensus of some powerful international organizations, 
which dispatched teams of experts from country to country to promote this 
idea, and which often made the provision of needed financial resources con-
tingent on government willingness to swallow the privatization medicine.
26 
From the evidence available, however, there is no indication that these 
teams of privatization consultants had anything remotely resembling the PtP 
concept in their toolbox of recommended privatization procedures. Nor is it 
the case that there was an independent set of PtP consultants traveling from 
country to country pushing this idea. To be sure, the Volkswagen case was 
well known within Germany. Supporters of the PtP option in New Zealand 
seem to have been aware of the trustee savings bank privatization process in 
the U.K. but not of the parallel, and much larger, process under way in Italy. 
And Austrian privatizers of the Sparkasse were somewhat aware of the 
Italian foundations of banking origin. But these were still fragments of insight 
and most of the more than 500 cases identified to date seem to have been 
driven by truly indigenous actors acting pretty much on their own with a va-
riety of objectives in mind—suggesting the remarkable utility and 
adaptability of the PtP concept for resolving some of the conflicts that 
inevitably arise in a process as complicated and disruptive as privatization. 
 
PtP as an "inside job." One common theme that emerges from the case 
studies is that the PtP idea was typically an "inside job," pushed by promi-
nent insiders who saw in it a way to advance their own agendas in the pri-
vatization process. 
The Volkswagen case. In the case of the Volkswagen Foundation, a strange 
set of bedfellows came together to accomplish Germany’s first known case 
of PtP. On the one side, as noted earlier, was Fritz Nordhoff, the managing 
director of the Volkswagen Company, who saw in the foundation idea a way 
to short-circuit a plan being pushed by the popular German Minister of 
Economy, Ludwig Erhard, to privatize the Volkswagen Company through the 
issuance of "peoples’ shares,", which Nordhoff feared would splinter 
ownership of the company and put his position as managing director at risk. 
Instead, he bought into a concept originally advanced by the former Minister 
of Finance of the State of Lower Saxony, Georg Strickrodt, whose books on 
"the Foundation as a new form of incorporated enterprise" gave Nordhoff a 
way to head off this splintering of control by making a foundation the owner 
of the company, but without the right to manage what it owned. A third key 
player was the correspondent Giselher Wirsing, editor of "Christ and World," 
whose cause was the improvement of German science and engineering, 
The PtP idea  
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which was thought to have fallen behind that in the socialist countries, and 
who saw in the resources that might be thrown off by the privatization of 
the Volkswagen Company a source of revenue for a "National Foundation 
Volkswagenwerk" devoted to science and the training of engineers—a 
position that Nordhoff was only too willing to help promote. To this combo 
was added another key actor in the person of the newly elected Social 
Democratic head of the Government of Lower Saxony, who saw in the idea 
of vesting ownership of the Volkswagen Company in a foundation a way to 
keep control of the company in Lower Saxony and a mechanism through 
which to "split the difference" with the federal government over ownership 
and control of the privatized firm.  
The Foundation for Polish Science case. In the case of the Foundation for 
Polish Science, a key actor was Jan Janowski, the Vice Prime Minister in the 
first post-communist government and the head of the Office for Scientific 
and Technological Development. Not incidentally, Janowski was also the 
Rector of the AGH University of Science and Technology in Kraków, a 
position that made him keenly aware of the need for expanded funding for 
Polish science. Janowski was therefore an early supporter of the idea to 
transfer the resources that the Communist government had determined 
should be placed in a government-controlled Central Fund for Development 
of Science and Technology (CFD) into a private foundation free of govern-
ment control. He therefore moved quickly to have the Parliament disband 
the CFD and just as quickly established a Foundation for Polish Science to 
receive the funds freed up as a consequence—a bonanza estimated to total 
the equivalent of US$90 million.
27
  
This turned out to be only the first of two PtP transactions of which the 
Foundation for Polish Science was a beneficiary, however. At the suggestion 
of Leszek Balcerowicz, the influential Finance Minister of this same early 
post-Communist government, a decision was then made to double-down on 
this Foundation by making it one of two beneficiaries of two percent of all 
Polish privatization transactions—a commitment that the government 
decided to promote at least partly in order to win popular support for its 
bold privatization initiatives, though other factors also seem to have been 
involved.
28
 As it turned out, however, this proved to be a costly decision 
because, by concentrating the proceeds of this PtP transaction in only one 
organization, Polish privatizers robbed the PtP concept in Poland of broader 
civil society support—a problem that advocates of the similar concept in the 
Czech Republic were wise enough to avoid. 
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Other PtP "angels."  Other PtP "angels" included: 
 
 Mr. Theo Waigel, the GFR Finance Minister, who was the 
principal champion of the idea of creating a German 
Foundation for the Environment out of the proceeds of the 
sale of the Salzgitter company. 
 Thomas Ježek, Minister of Privatization in the first Czech post-
Communist Government, who, as noted above, successfully 
pushed for the Czech Foundation Investment Fund as a way 
to build up resources for a robust foun-dation and civil society 
sector. 
 Senator and Professor Giuliano Amato, who came up with the 
scheme to encourage the existing Italian savings banks to 
create separate joint stock banking companies and to retain in 
the "conferring entities" ownership of the bank stock and the 
philanthropic activities of the former banks. 
 Erste Banking Group CEO Andreas Treichl, who created the ERSTE 
Foundation as a belated byproduct of the transformation of 
the Erste Sparkasse into a joint stock com-pany, and who, as a 
purchaser of privatized state savings banks elsewhere in 
Central Europe, had the foresight to honor their charitable 
histories by pledging to include the establishment of charitable 
funds or actual foundations as part of the bids he made on 
these banks during the privatization process. Partly as a result 
of this, the Erste Group was successful in winning the bids for 
several of these banks. The Czech Savings Bank Foundation 
and the Slovak Savings Bank Foundation stand as testimony 
to the foresight of this perceptive businessman.  
 
The potential role of civil society. Interestingly, with one crucial exception, 
the voice of civil society was generally fairly muted in these debates, though 
that exception is revealing. To be sure, the trustee savings banks in New 
Zealand took the initiative in the face of government plans to restructure the 
country’s banking system to start the process on their own initiative. They 
thus agreed in June 1986, well in advance of the government’s action, to form 
a private holding company called the Trust Banks Holding, Ltd., and ulti-
mately convert themselves into limited liability companies whose shares 
would be vested in corresponding community trusts.
29
 The New Zealand 
government did not contest this plan, in part because it had bigger fish to fry 
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in the transformation of the New Zealand banking system and could not, as 
noted earlier, find a compelling argument with which to object to the savings 
banks’ argument that they were fundamentally community institutions and 
should remain community owned. There was thus no reason to rally the 
New Zealand voluntary and community sector to defend these institutions 
against a government takeover or threat to community control. 
More overtly, youth-serving organizations played a significant role in con-
vincing a newly elected Slovak government to transform its Fund for Youth 
and Children, which had been corruptly managed under the previous gov-
ernment, into a full-fledged Slovak Youth Foundation before all of its 
assets were dissipated; and their compatriots in the Czech foundation 
community certainly cheered the decision of the Czech Parliament to set 
aside one percent of the shares of all privatized companies in a Czech 
Foundation Investment Fund and resisted a proposal to place these 
proceeds into a single, new Czech National Foundation instead of into the 
newly formed, but still fledgling, existing Czech foundations. So, too, 
complaints by Dutch nonprofit organizations about the narrow band of 
beneficiaries supported by the Nationale Postcode Lotteryj, the private 
company licensed to operate the charity lotteries in the Netherlands, led to a 
government investigation and ultimately to the willingness of this lottery 
company to open the doors to a flow of funds to the Oranje Foundation.  
But these were relatively minor parts in the larger drama of privatization 
unfolding, and the civil society groups were hardly main actors. Indeed, 
when the new Social Democratic government in Poland canceled the PtP law 
a prior Parliament had enacted two years earlier and transferred the flow of 
privatization resources from the Foundation for Polish Science to the State 
Committee for Scientific Research, Polish civil society organizations barely 
took the stage to protest. One apparent reason for this, as noted earlier, was 
that the initial flow of funds had been directed to a single nonprofit organ-
ization so that the rest of the civil society sector felt little apparent stake in 
the outcome, and no concept of a "philanthropication thru privatization" 
strategy was yet in existence to crystallize their thinking. 
The one major exception to this relatively muted civil society engagement in 
the process of establishing a PtP outcome occurred, perhaps surprisingly, in 
the United States, where a robust foundation community was already in ex-
istence, and where the laws governing the privatization of quasi-public enti-
ties, as outlined earlier, were among the strongest and clearest anywhere. 
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Even here, however, the alarm that ultimately led to the PtP outcome, and in 
turn to a cascading sequence of them, was not sounded by one of the main-
line nonprofit or foundation trade associations in the United States, but by 
the Consumers Union, an organization best known for its Consumer Reports 
magazine that reports on the organization’s rigorous testing of all-manner of 
consumer products, from air conditioners to wrinkle creams. But what the 
Blue Cross of California case illustrates is that even strong, pro-PtP laws are 
not self-executing, and that civil society organizations can have a major im-
pact in shaping privatization processes in ways that deliver benefits to the 
civil society sector and the causes they serve. 
As noted previously, Blue Cross of California (BCC) was part of a large net-
work of originally nonprofit health insurance companies in the United States 
created in the 1930s to offer low-cost health insurance to people throughout 
the country. Unlike most traditional insurance, Blue Cross established the 
concept of "community rating," under which everyone in a community was 
offered the same price for health insurance regardless of their age, health 
status, occupation, sex, or other characteristics. Key to this concept was cov-
erage of all or most residents in a community by the Blue Cross Plans. Over 
the past 30-50 years, however, private, for-profit health insurers have en-
tered the market, targeted the residents with the least health risks, and of-
fered them insurance at rates lower than Blue Cross plans could offer. Over 
time, more and more healthier residents were attracted away from Blue 
Cross, leaving Blue Cross affiliates with the most costly participants and re-
quiring them to raise their rates. At the same time, new "managed care 
plans" emerged on the market requiring costly data processing systems and 
development of networks of provider organizations to serve patients effec-
tively. This put pressure on the Blue Cross plans to raise capital, a difficult 
proposition for nonprofits because of their inability to issue ownership 
shares or pay dividends to investors. 
Blue Cross of California, like many other "Blues," consequently began ex-
ploring possible partnerships or outright sales to private, for-profit insurers. 
By July 1991 it had settled on a strategy that involved transferring 90 percent 
of its assets plus its entire managed care business to a new for-profit sub-
sidiary called Wellpoint Health Networks. In documents submitted to the 
California Department of Corporations, the entity responsible for enforce-
ment of the nonprofit law in California, BCC argued that this transaction did 
not constitute a privatization since BCC would still own a majority stake in the 
for-profit subsidiary.  
Civil society  
organizations 
can have a  
major impact  
in shaping  
privatization  
processes. 
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 4: HOW DID IT HAPPEN?   |  59 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rather than sit idly by, however, consumer and health provider groups, led 
by Consumers Union and including the California Medical Association, 
sprang into action: 
 
 They submitted documents to the Department of Corpora-
tions challenging BCC’s interpretation of its strategy, arguing 
that BCC’s deal was a disguised conversion to for-profit status 
that should obligate it, under California nonprofit law, to turn 
over the full value of its assets to a charitable foundation or 
other charitable entity. 
 They developed a state-wide coalition around a relatively sim-
ple set of common demands. 
 They issued media statements to put pressure on the Depart-
ment of Corporations to exercise public oversight. 
 When the Department initially approved the proposed 
restructuring after 18 months of consideration and made no 
mention of any BCC charitable obligations, they filed an ad-
ministrative petition with the Department of Corporations to 
demand public hearings, transfer of BCC assets to a founda-
tion, and development of regulations to govern health plan 
conversions. 
 They conducted legal research and published a policy report 
to popularize the issue and the consumer coalition positions. 
 They worked with legislators to encourage investigations and 
additional clarifying legislation. 
 They organized a petition campaign and secured signatures 
from over 100 consumer, legal, community, and labor organi-
zations protesting the transfer of BCC assets to a for-profit 
company and urging BCC to comply with the law requiring 
them to turn over their assets to a foundation. 
 They mobilized coalition members to testify at administrative 
and legislative hearings. 
In the midst of this battle, a new commissioner who seemed more open to 
the citizen and civil society perspective took over the California Department 
of Corporations. Still, it took more than a year of wrangling for BCC to 
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concede, first, to create a separate foundation; second, to transfer all of its 
assets to it; and third, to withdraw a proposal to have its nonprofit board 
become the board of the new foundation. The consumer coalition also 
pressed BCC and regulators to accept the normal legal form that 
foundations take in the U.S. rather than a form proposed by BCC that would 
free the foundation from self-dealing and excess-holding regulations, normal 
foundation "payout" requirements, and requirements to report on 
compensation arrangements with executives, consultants, and others—all 
key protections provided in U.S. foundation law to foster transparency in 
foundation operations. The consumer and community groups also pushed 
for an independent board that would be diverse in gender, race, and 
ethnicity and accountable to the community. 
The upshot after another two years of back and forth was the creation of 
two foundations, endowed with over $3 billion in assets. The larger of the 
two (and the focus of our case study)—The California Endowment, a 
regular 501(3) foundation—after a complex series of transactions intended 
to avoid costly taxes, received an endowment of US$3.3 billion from the sale 
of 80 percent of the stock of BCC, making it one of the largest foundations in 
the U.S. The second foundation, the California HealthCare Foundation, was 
created as a 501(c)(4) organization, and was set up principally to handle the 
sale of the BCC stock without having to incur capital gains taxes, and then to 
pass 80 percent of the proceeds on to the California Endowment, retaining 
20 percent of the proceeds—$500 million in all—to fund its own separate 
health-related initiatives. 
Quite apart from its very large direct impact on the availability of charitable 
resources in California, the battle over the disposition of the Blue Cross of 
California created a template that other communities have used to handle 
the privatization not only of other nonprofit Blue Cross insurers, but also of 
a host of nonprofit hospitals as well. The result has been the eventual crea-
tion of approximately 200 health conversion foundations with total assets of 
$19.6 billion. More than that, this case illustrates the power that civil society 
groups can exercise when they focus their attention on privatization pro-
cesses and recognize the enormous stakes they have in the disposition of 
what are, in some sense, the people’s assets. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The factors and forces that led to the PtP outcomes examined here thus 
varied considerably. In part, this reflects the considerations driving the 
privatization process itself. For the early cases, such as the Volkswagen 
Foundation, privatization was driven by the peculiar circumstances of 
particular institutions. Later privatizations during the 1980s and 1990s 
were driven by broader ideological hostility to state ownership and 
particular popular revulsion against the poor performance of the Soviet 
economic experiment. Also at work were particular concerns about the 
often closed structure and under-capitalization of national financial 
systems and their resulting inability to accommodate the requirements of 
an increasingly globalized world economy. More recently, the driver of 
privatization has shifted to concerns about government debt. Each of 
these concerns has affected the focus of privatization efforts as well as 
the strength of the forces driving privatization forward. 
To these variations in the drivers of privatization, however, the philan-
thropication option added its own variations. For the early cases, this op-
tion was not truly an avowed objective so much as a convenient byprod-
uct. This was the case, for example, with the Volkswagen Foundation, 
where the creation of a foundation provided a way to solve a jurisdictional 
dispute between the national government and one of its states. So, too, in 
Italy, New Zealand, and the UK, the establishment of foundations was a 
byproduct of a strong push to restructure the financial system in a setting 
where one significant component of that system had a disputed owner-
ship structure that could not be solved any other way—though in each of 
these cases a more explicit goal to keep charitable assets under the con-
trol of private citizens and local communities figured prominently in the 
outcome. 
Another factor that figured strongly in the achievement of a PtP outcome 
was the greater assurance that philanthropication offered that the re-
sources generated through privatization would be devoted to legitimate 
public purposes, and would be so devoted permanently. This considera-
tion was certainly crucial in the cases of the Volkswagen Foundation and 
the Foundation for Polish Science, in both of which greater investment 
in science was the purpose to be protected; in the German 
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Environmental Foundation case, where it was environmental protection; 
in the Slovak Youth Foundation case, where it was offsetting the effects 
of a prior shift of resources into a corrupt governmental entity in order to 
improve the life chances for children; and in the Rheinland-Pfalz cases, 
where the purposes were, respectively, the promotion of innovation and of 
culture. Here we see, therefore, a first glimmer of recognition that founda-
tions and civil society are capable of being something more than conven-
ient facilitators of privatization, that they add a distinctive positive element 
in their own right, in this case serving as "lock boxes" for resources that 
could otherwise be diverted to other purposes. 
By the early 1990s, a stronger positive case for PtP surfaced with the new-
found interest in civil society and non-governmental organizations. Now it 
was possible to make a principled case for the philanthropication option, a 
case that rooted it in the positive role that foundations and civil society or-
ganizations can play in fostering democracy, building trust, and offering 
plural approaches to solving important social and economic problems. 
This view was articulated most explicitly, as we have seen, in the important 
case of the Czech Foundation Investment Fund. But it was powerfully 
present as well in the battle over the privatization of the Blue Cross of Cali-
fornia, where the virtues of charitable endowments were counter-posed to 
the greedy behavior of commercially oriented health insurance executives. 
Several implications flow from these findings for the future course of PtP: 
 The first is to underline the malleable nature of the privatiza-
tion process. This process does not follow a single, smooth, 
well-defined course everywhere. Rather it is situationally 
specific, full of fits and starts, and capable of unexpected 
sharp turns.  
 Second, this means that privatization outcomes are vulnera-
ble to outside pressures, and this can include pressures 
from citizens, particularly if those citizens can point to some 
feature of the asset being privatized that suggests it has 
some public-serving character, or can identify some press-
ing purpose for which the asset is needed that might be in 
jeopardy if all of the proceeds were placed under govern-
mental control or siphoned off by political actors.  
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 Finally, as we will see more fully in subsequent chapters, the 
success of these arguments will hinge heavily on the ability to 
make a credible case that the institutions so rewarded will use 
the resources wisely and responsively, features that figured 
heavily in both the California Endowment/California Health 
Care Foundation and Czech Foundation Investment Fund 
cases.  
With this analysis of the political and legal dynamics affecting the likelihood 
of a PtP transaction in view, we turn next to the characteristics of the deals 
through which this option has been executed and at the structure of the in-
stitutions created as a consequence in our search for clues about the factors 
likely to enhance the viability and value of the PtP option. 
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gimes there, see: John Nellis, "Leaps of Faith: Launching the Privatization Process in Transition," in Ira W. 
Lieberman and Daniel J. Kopf (eds.) Privatization in Transition Economies: The Ongoing Story, Contemporary Studies 
in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 90, (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2007), 81–136. 
27 Details about the actual transactions leading to the transfer of funds to the Foundation for Polish Science 
are somewhat unclear. It appears that the funds transferred to the Foundation were late payments of funds that 
various ministries in the Polish government had been mandated to supply to the Central Fund for Development 
of Science and Technology (CFD) but were not delivered until after the CFD had been formally disbanded. 
28 The other beneficiary was the country’s Industrial Development Agency, hardly a nonprofit entity. Gaining 
increased financial support for Polish science was also apparently a key motivation and the fact that a 
foundation was the vehicle chosen to accomplish this may have been an afterthought. 
29 Graham Scott, Community Trusts in New Zealand: Looking Back and Looking Forward. A Report for the Twelve 
Community Trusts. Wellington: Southern Cross International, Ltd., 2002. 
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Because the PtP process in the cases we examined took place before a concept 
of philanthropication thru privatization was even conceived, let alone fully 
articulated, most cases took place almost as an afterthought to the primary 
privatization processes to which they were attached. Decisions about the 
shape of the PtP transactions or even the structure of the resulting 
foundations thus tended to be driven by the needs of privatization or by 
prevailing practice in the structuring of foundations rather than considerations 
designed to maximize the philanthropication objective.  
This is potentially unfortunate for several reasons. First, national laws and 
policy treatment of foundations vary widely across the world. In England and 
Wales, for example, foundations can take any of 13 legal forms. In the U.S., by 
contrast, there was no legal definition of a foundation until 1969, while in 
Germany there can be not only civil law foundations, public law foundations, 
and church law foundations, but also limited companies that can be 
foundations and foundations that can own limited companies.
1
  
More seriously, the laws governing foundations may be ill-suited to handle the 
foundations created out of privatization transactions. As just one illustration, 
German laws impose no transparency requirements—at least on civil law foun-
dations—presumably on the assumption that as trusts established by donors 
to carry out purposes intended by their donors, such foundations have no 
obligation to report to the broader public about what they are doing with the 
donor’s money. German foundations have therefore resisted the imposition of 
such requirements. The absence of such provisions may not be suitable, 
however, for entities whose assets originate in the public sector, where 
expectations for open and accountable operations are more stringent, at least 
in democratic countries.  
Although the characteristics of the past PtP cases may not provide perfect 
models to be followed in any future PtP cases, however, they may still hold 
clues to structures and practices that can usefully guide such future 
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applications of the concept. It is to these lessons that we therefore now turn. 
More specifically, we focus here on three important aspects of the processes 
involved in the creation of our 21 PtP case-study foundations: first, the legal 
process that established the institutions; second, the structure of the 
transactions themselves; and third, the legal form and governance structure of 
the resulting institutions. With this as background, we can then turn in the 
subsequent chapter to the performance of these institutions over time. 
 
1) THE LEGAL DIMENSION  
As with so much about the 21 PtP foundations and 22 PtP transactions we 
examined, great variation existed in the legal processes used to create them 
and transfer resources to them. As analysed by lawyer Chuck Bell in a 
summary prepared for this Project, in 11 of the cases, a special law was 
passed to authorize the PtP transaction. Of these, 8 applied to entire classes 
of organizations while the remaining three applied only to particular organi-
zations. In the rest of the cases either no new law was required or the PtP 
option was covered in general privatization laws.
2
  
 
Special Sector-Wide Laws  
Sector-wide laws were most prevalent in the Type V PtP cases—those that 
involved quasi-public, private nonprofit, or mutual institutions that had pre-
viously benefitted from government assistance. In five of the six cases we 
examined the laws that were passed were sector-wide, applying to a large 
number of organizations—88 in the case of the Italian foundations of banking 
origin, 33 in the case of the Austrian savings banks, and 12 in the case of the 
New Zealand savings banks. In these cases, privatization was essentially 
blocked until a sector-wide law was passed to specifically enable it.  
A similar process was used in the case of the 13 Italian lyric operas, a Type II 
transaction (transfer of a government building or similar asset to a nonprofit 
foundation) exemplified by the Teatro alla Scala of Milan, though here an en-
tire new class of foundations was established for which the lyric operas were 
conceived as one example. 
A sector-wide special law can establish common rules of the road that can be 
applied by regulatory agencies and/or the courts to govern the PtP process 
and institutions. There seems a strong case that when there are many 
organizations in the field—such as the 88 foundations established in the 
Italian savings bank case—they should be guided and treated similarly by the 
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law. Disparate treatment of similar organizations could result in unfair 
competitive advantages for some organizations and regional disparities in 
services or resources. 
The case of the Czech Foundation Investment Fund seems especially 
noteworthy because of the very strong legal framework that the parliament 
established. This framework involved the creation of an Investment Fund to 
receive one percent of the shares of newly privatized state-owned compa-
nies to hold until the shares could be sold and the proceeds distributed to a 
set of eligible Czech foundations.
3
 The entire process was overseen by a 
Ministry of Privatization, which established a Fund for National Property to 
manage the process of preparing some 22,000 state-owned enterprises for 
sale through a combination of vouchers sold to the public and outright sales 
of enterprises. Some deputies, including Tomáš Ježek, the "father" of the 
idea of creating such an Investment Fund, favoured placing the resulting as-
sets in a single Czech National Foundation. However, it was ultimately de-
cided, in part at the urging of existing Czech foundations, to distribute the 
resources as endowments to existing Czech foundations that proved able to 
pass through a complicated vetting process, and even then only after a new 
law on foundations could be passed that would clarify the eligibility criteria 
for identification of foundations and crucial operating requirements to en-
sure the transparency and reliability of the resulting institutions.
4
 Ultimately, 
the distribution of the resulting funds to some 73 foundations was handled 
through a highly transparent application process developed by a joint 
government-civil society Council and engaging seven working groups made 
up of government and civil society leaders. 
This case stands in sharp contrast with that of the Polish Foundation for 
Science. Here, as noted earlier, a single foundation was selected to receive 
two percent of the shares of the country’s privatization sales with no oppor-
tunity for other foundations to apply. When the program was abruptly 
ended a few years later, few Polish nonprofits came forward to protest the 
decision, interpreting the decision as a judgment on only one already-well-
endowed organization rather that the termination of a process with enor-
mous potential promise for the entire embryonic Polish nonprofit sector.  
Special Laws for Particular Transactions  
In several cases, a special law was passed to guide a single transaction. This 
was the case for the Volkswagen Foundation, the German Environmental 
Foundation, and the Foundation for Polish Science (both in 1991 and 
The Czech  
Foundation  
Investment Fund 
case seems  
especially  
noteworthy. 
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2002). In these cases, a variety of unique circumstances had to be addressed 
and a wide array of contending perspectives accommodated. So it is not sur-
prising that a specific deal had to be fashioned that incorporated key fea-
tures of standard foundation law but added special features applicable to 
these particular institutions. Thus, for example, as indicated earlier, though a 
civil law foundation, the Volkswagen Foundation was subjected to audit by 
the Federal Audit Agency even though no such requirement applies to 
German civil-law foundations generally. 
In another case, the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation, the op-
erative legal instrument was a treaty between two sovereign nations cancel-
ling a "jumbo loan" that Poland owed to Germany, but obliging Poland to in-
vest an equivalent amount of Polish currency into this newly established 
foundation. 
While they are probably unavoidable, special laws focusing on single transac-
tions may have serious potential weaknesses. For one thing, given frequent 
electoral changes, they can lead to significant unevenness in prevailing rules 
and procedures for different institutions of the same type. For another, 
enormous delays can occur as politicians re-visit issues that may already 
have been addressed in prior cases. This can cause endless delays as shown 
in the cases of the Volkswagen Foundation and the Rheinland-Pfalz 
Foundation for Innovation, consideration of which stretched on for several 
years. Political bargaining can also produce sometimes strange compro-
mises that complicate the operation of the resulting foundations, such as 
overly complex and contentious governance structures. Special legislation 
also opens opportunities for special treatment of influential constituencies 
and can reduce the access and influence of citizen groups. 
Use of Existing Laws  
In the other cases examined here, existing laws were sufficient to handle the 
philanthropication action and provided a useful template into which the 
philanthropication could be fit. But even here special provisions or activities 
were sometimes still needed. In the case of the King Baudouin Foundation 
(KBF), the lottery that was tapped to channel funds into this foundation had 
been created decades before to help relieve the suffering caused by the 
Great Depression for citizens of Belgium’s Congo colony. All that was initially 
needed to make funding from the Belgian National Lottery available to the 
KBF was a Royal Decree in 1989 honouring the 60th birthday of King Bau-
douin and the 40th year of his reign by dedicating a portion of the revenues 
from the Belgian national lottery to the KBF. The Belgian legislature       
There are several 
serious potential 
weaknesses with  
special laws that 
guide a single 
transaction. 
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subsequently confirmed the principle of annual allocation of lottery 
revenues to the Foundation through modifications of the lottery law enacted 
in 1991 and then re-confirmed this in 2002 following some changes to the 
lottery structure. While these laws established the KBF’s entitlement to lot-
tery proceeds, however, they left the amounts up to royal decrees that had 
to be endorsed by the country’s Council of Ministers and renewed every five 
years, somewhat undermining the status of these annual contributions as a 
form of endowment.  
In the case of the California Endowment, concerns that tax laws would 
make the recipient foundation of the California Blue Cross’ assets liable for 
payment of federal income taxes on the transfer made it necessary to create 
a second nonprofit institution—the California HealthCare Foundation—
which was established to receive the assets and then transfer them to the 
grant-making California Endowment.
5
 
In two other cases, laws making provision for philanthropication of privat-
ized assets were on the books, but this was not sufficient to guarantee that 
the institutions in question would receive them. In the case of the Oranje 
Foundation, the Foundation’s access to the resources of the country’s larg-
est lottery ultimately came to depend on a protest lodged in 2004 by a num-
ber of Dutch charities against the company licensed by the government to 
manage this lottery. These charities charged that this company was retaining 
too much of its profits and not distributing them to a wide enough band of 
Dutch charities. Thanks in part to this protest, the Oranje Foundation was 
able to gain access to the revenues of this lottery two years later, thus guar-
anteeing it a 15 million euro annual flow of revenues. 
In the case of the California Endowment and its sister organization, the 
California HealthCare Foundation, as we have seen, notwithstanding the ex-
istence of clear legal provisions requiring that nonprofit organizations under-
going conversions to for-profit status must transfer their charitable assets to 
an organization pursuing the same charitable purpose, an intense five-year 
battle spearheaded by consumer advocacy organizations was required to 
achieve this result. 
Summary 
A key conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion of the varied legal 
structures used to establish PtP arrangements is the need to approach such 
arrangements strategically and coherently rather than in an ad hoc fashion. 
In two other  
cases, existing laws 
making provision for 
philanthropication 
of privatized assets 
were not sufficient 
to guarantee the  
PtP outcome. 
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What is more, there is now considerable international experience in how to 
structure such arrangements to provide the best long-term prospects for the 
emergence of effective and reliable institutions. Of the cases examined here, 
the Italian and Czech ones offer perhaps the most suitable models, though 
any model will need to be adapted to existing local law and particular pri-
vatization realities.  
 
 
2) THE DEALS 
At least as important as the structure of the legal provisions establishing the 
philanthropication process is, of course, the content of those provisions. Two 
features of this content are especially important, moreover: first, the structure 
of the "deal" that transfers the asset; and second, the structure of the entity 
receiving it. We take up the first of these features here and turn to the latter in 
the next section.  
Not surprisingly, given the multiple objectives being sought, each of the pri-
vatization deals under scrutiny here had its own characteristics. Nevertheless, 
two general features of these deals stand out as especially important. The first 
of these has to do with the sequence of actions through which the transfer 
was carried out. The second has to do with the form in which the proceeds 
were made available. 
 
One-Step vs. Two-Step Processes 
So far as the first issue is concerned, one significant difference among the 
various PtP cases we examined was whether the financial resources ultimately 
put into the hands of the PtP foundations reached them in one step or two. 
One-step lump-sum cash transfers. As noted in TABLE 5.1, in five of the 22 
transactions we examined, the financial assets that formed the heart of the 
philanthropication process reached the foundations in the form of cash. In 
three of these cases, the asset involved was sold by some third party, typically 
a government agency, and the resulting cash, or some part of it, was 
conveyed to the foundation.
6
 The way in which the privatization was handled 
differed among these three cases as well, with a sale of shares to a broad 
swath of the German public in the case of the Volkswagen Foundation and 
the purchase by a single outside entity in the cases of the Rheinland-Pfalz 
Foundation for Innovation and the German Environmental Foundation. 
In the Volkswagen case, the cash receipts likely grossly underestimated the 
true value of the asset being sold because the government set the initial price 
One significant  
difference among 
the various PtP 
cases was whether 
the financial  
resources reached 
the PtP foundations 
in one step or two. 
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TABLE 5.1  
Nature of PtP transactions 
 
TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
One step Two-step shares Two-step other asset Legally-mandated 
streams of revenue 
 
Volkswagen Foundation 
German Environmental 
Foundation 
Slovak Savings Bank  
Foundation 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation 
for Innovation 
Lombardy Foundation for the 
Environment 
 
ASB Community Trust 
Community Trust of 
Southland 
Cariplo Foundation 
Compagnia di San Paolo 
Fondazione CRT 
California Endowment 
Baden-Wurttemberg  
Foundation 
Czech Foundation Investment 
Fund 
Foundation for Polish Science 
ERSTE Foundation 
 
Slovak Youth Foundation 
Foundation for Polish Science 
La Scala Foundation 
 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for 
England and Wales 
Oranje Foundation 
King Baudouin Foundation 
Foundation for Polish-German 
Cooperation  
 
true value of the asset being sold because the government set the initial 
price of the Volkswagen Company shares sold to German citizens well 
below what turned out to be their actual market price once these shares 
began to be sold on the market.  
 
In the remaining one-step cases—the Slovak Savings Bank Foundation 
and the Lombardy Foundation for the Environment—the transferred as-
sets were already in cash form, a left-over philanthropic commitment made 
by the Erste Group when it purchased the Slovak Savings Bank, and part of 
the proceeds of a legal settlement against a chemical company implicated in 
an environmental disaster in the case of the Lombardy Foundation for the 
Environment. In all of these cases, however, the foundations received their 
assets in the form of cash. 
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Two step arrangements. Far different was the process involved in conveying 
assets to another 13 of these PtP foundations. Here a two-step process was 
utilized in which the foundations became direct owners of the privatized as-
sets that they later sold in whole or in part. In ten of these cases, the assets 
were shares in newly privatized joint-stock enterprises, or, in the California 
Endowment case, of an existing for-profit health insurance company.
7
 In the 
three remaining two-step cases, the assets in question were different—
hotels and other real estate holdings in the case of the Slovak Youth Foun-
dation, a Central Fund for Development of Sciences and Technology in the 
case of the first tranche of resources for the Foundation for Polish Science, 
and an opera company as well as free use of the La Scala opera house in the 
case of the La Scala Foundation. 
This two-step process turned out to involve important advantages both for 
the privatized companies and for the resulting PtP foundations. So far as the 
companies are concerned, analyses of privatization outcomes have shown 
that better outcomes are typically associated with concentrated ownership.
8
 
One virtue of vesting enterprise ownership, at least initially, in foundations 
instead of dispersing it through so-called "voucher privatization" sales or 
share give-aways to the general public, is that the assets remain under the 
control of boards accustomed to managing the enterprises. As we saw in the 
case of the Italian foundations of banking origin, many of these boards per-
formed quite well in their new role as owners of joint stock companies and 
undertook a string of largely successful mergers that strengthened the core 
institutions. This same pattern was evident in the New Zealand case. In the 
case of Austria, the retention of the shares of the Erste Bank in the pre-ex-
isting association that ran the Erste savings bank opened the door for the 
new joint-stock Erste Bank to undertake a series of strategic acquisitions 
throughout Central Europe in the years following the privatization. 
But this two-step process also brought benefits to the PtP foundations. As 
the value of the privatized companies began to increase—as it did in a num-
ber of cases—so too did the value of the shares held by the foundations. As a 
result, by the time the government of each country began urging the founda-
tions to diversify their holdings and reduce their investments in the privat-
ized companies, the value of these investments had appreciated substan-
tially, leaving the foundations with much larger assets than they would have 
had had they initially received the cash value of these shares at the time of      
privatization. 
The experience of the ASB Community Trust  is particularly revealing in this 
regard. The asset it received as the recipient of 100 percent of the shares of 
The two-step  
process involved 
important  
advantages. 
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While the  
stream-of-revenue 
route has some  
advantages,  
it also suffers  
from significant 
drawbacks. 
the Auckland Savings Bank (ASB) in 1988 was valued at NZ$100 million. 
Within several years, the Trust was approached by its savings bank with a re-
quest to consider a sale of a substantial portion of its shares to the Com-
monwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), which wanted to purchase ASB but in-
sisted on majority ownership. Ultimately, the Trust sold 75 percent of its 
shares in ASB for NZ$252 million, a gain of 2.25 times what they were origi-
nally estimated to be worth and leaving the Trust with a 25 percent share of 
a much larger institution. Several years later, the CBA approached the Trust 
about acquiring its remaining 25 percent share, leading in 2000 to the sale of 
these remaining shares for NZ$560 million. Within a little over a decade, the 
ASB Community Trust had thus parlayed its initial NZ$100 million endow-
ment into an asset base approaching NZ$1 billion.  
Contrast this with the experience of the Volkswagen Foundation, which, as 
noted above, received the proceeds of a broad-based sale of Volkswagen 
Company shares to the German public at prices that turned out to be heavily 
discounted by a factor of at least 7 to 1. What is more, under the terms of the 
privatization deal, the foundation then had to lend the money to the German 
Federal Republic for a period of 20 years and accept a return of only five per-
cent per year.  
Of course, not all of the foundations prospered as a result of two-step deals. 
Thus, some of the Italian foundations decided not to diversify their endow-
ments, concentrating all of it in the original bank shares. When the financial 
crisis hit the global banking sector, these foundations experienced bad times. 
This underscores the need for good and effective regulations dealing with 
asset diversification of PtP foundations. 
One-step arrangements involving annual flows of income. In the remaining 
four cases, the PtP foundations received something other than the cash 
value of stock in privatized companies or shares of the stock itself. They re-
ceived an annual flow of income. For the Lloyds TSB Foundation for England 
and Wales this took the form of an annual stream of income set at one per-
cent of the pre-tax profits of the Trustee Savings Bank for England and Wales 
(TSB).
9
 For both the Oranje and King Baudouin foundations it took the form 
of a share of the earnings from their respective country’s lotteries And in the 
case of the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation, it took the form of 
payments that the Polish Government initially owed to the German 
Government for repayment of an earlier Jumbo Loan, but paid to the Foun-
dation instead, in Polish zlotys instead of German marks or euros. 
While this route has some advantages (e.g. the Lloyds TSB Foundation for 
England and Wales made out well when TSB merged with the Lloyds 
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Banking Group because it gained access to one percent of a much larger net 
income), it also suffers from significant drawbacks. Thus, when the 2008 fiscal 
crisis hit, undermining the Lloyds Banking Group’s profits, the Lloyds TSB 
Foundation for England and Wales decided to switch, at least temporarily, to a 
fixed income instead. Similarly, the King Baudouin Foundation has to 
renegotiate its funding commitment with the national lottery every five years, 
and in two cases political and budgetary considerations led to year-long 
breaks in the stream of resources flowing to the Foundation. Finally, while the 
Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation received nearly US$270 million, 
this was shy of the US$384 million originally committed, and even then the 
Foundation had to wait ten years for the full amount to reach its coffers. 
The issue of the timing of receipt of committed funding also arose in the case 
of the Volkswagen Foundation, but in a way that may suggest an option for 
reconciling PtP with what is now one of the major drivers of privatization: the 
effort to reduce government indebtedness. Although we earlier classified the 
Volkswagen case as manifesting a one-step process because the foundation 
received cash instead of company shares, in truth it might more accurately be 
characterized as a "one-half step" process because, as noted above, instead of 
immediately transferring the cash generated by the government’s sale of 60 
percent of Volkswagen Company stock to the foundation, as originally agreed, 
the German Federal Government insisted that the new Foundation "lend" it 
these resources for a 20-year period, with the Government paying the Foun-
dation five percent interest on its "loan." This option removes the perceived 
conflict between PtP and the goal of using privatization proceeds to reduce 
government indebtedness, as is being pursued in heavily indebted countries 
such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. If privatization assets were to be commit-
ted to foundations in these settings but lent back to the governments as long-
term loans at interest rates lower than owed on outstanding debt, the coun-
tries could use the proceeds to pay down debt while getting their fiscal houses 
in order, making PtP consistent with reducing debt service costs and lowering 
country debt, particularly if the interest payments and ultimate principal pay-
ments to the foundations are made in local currency and the privatization 
proceeds paid in foreign exchange. 
The Volkswagen 
Foundation deal  
illustrates a way to 
reconcile the PtP 
option with the  
goal of using   
privatization to  
reduce government 
indebtedness. 
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 5: THE PtP PROCESS |  75 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE  
OF PtP FOUNDATIONS 
In addition to generating important resources for a variety of public or phil-
anthropic purposes, and frequently doing so in forms that allowed the foun-
dations to benefit from appreciation in the value of their new assets, the 
transactions that generated these resources also established new, or newly 
expanded or structured, charitable institutions. What was the nature of these 
institutions? And to what extent did they constitute meaningfully autono-
mous philanthropic foundations, or at least evolve into such? 
The answer to this question is complicated, of course, by the fact, noted ear-
lier, that no international consensus exists about what the defining charac-
teristics of a charitable foundation really are. In some countries grant-making 
is a defining criterion and in others it is not. In some countries, such as the 
United States and the UK, foundations are exempt from most taxes but in 
other countries, such as Italy and Austria, they are obliged to pay taxes like 
any commercial entity. 
Whatever the legal situation of foundations in general, what is of most con-
cern to us here is the extent to which the entities created through the PtP 
process have evolved into reasonably autonomous philanthropic institutions 
pursuing meaningful philanthropic purposes either by making grants or pur-
suing purposes and activities commonly regarded as philanthropic or chari-
table under the laws of their countries. Also of interest is how the institutions 
go about these tasks, and whether their operations are reasonably in accord 
with what have come to be considered basic norms of good behavior for 
charitable foundations. 
A first step toward answering these questions is to find out who really con-
trols these institutions. After all, previous research on privatization has 
shown that "governments are often reluctant to lose control of privatized 
firms," and have come up with a variety of "golden shares" to avoid this.
10
 Is 
it possible that something similar could be true of the foundations resulting 
from philanthropication thru privatization, especially given the suggestion 
noted earlier that governments in some instances seem to have viewed the 
creation of a foundation as a way to retain control of an important enterprise 
by putting the foundation in control of the enterprise and the state in control 
of the foundation. If this is a widespread practice it would cast a pall on the 
meaningfulness of the PtP concept.  
Of most concern  
is whether the  
entities created  
through the PtP 
process have 
evolved into  
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autonomous  
philanthropic  
institutions. 
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To examine this, we look here at two facets of the structure of these institu-
tions—their legal form and their governance structure. In the next chapter, 
we then examine the operations and performance of these foundations to 
determine if the governance structures, whatever their form, have negatively 
affected their operations and roles. 
The central conclusion that emerges from this examination is that the PtP 
foundations have, by and large, evolved into meaningfully autonomous chari-
table institutions operating in accord with emerging international standards 
of good behavior for such institutions and contributing positively to the 
quality of life in their countries or regions. Indeed, a number of them have 
become model institutions both in the way they go about their work and in 
the performance they have achieved. 
 
Legal Form11  
A first approximation of the control structure of any organization can be de-
termined from its legal form, which typically indicates what set of actors 
have rights to determine the organization’s actions. To be sure, this is not a 
perfect indicator, particularly for foundations, and especially when interna-
tional comparisons are involved since, as we have seen, such institutions op-
erate under widely varying legal regimes in different countries. What is 
more, even within given countries, entities organized under one type of legal 
form can simultaneously be covered by another, and the legal form can even 
be redefined by special laws applying to a single entity or a whole class of 
entities. Thus, for example, the Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innova-
tion was incorporated as a "public-law foundation," which would suggest 
significant public sector involvement in its operations. But the laws of 
Rheinland-Pfalz place public-law foundations also under the civil law gov-
erning private foundations, presumably protecting it from excessive state in-
trusion into its governance. But notwithstanding this provision, the law es-
tablishing this foundation stipulated that it would be governed by a Board of 
Directors comprised exclusively of four senior officials of the Rheinland-Pfalz 
Government.
12
 What is more, the staff of the foundation are actually em-
ployees of the state administration. So here we have a public law foundation 
subject to civil law rules but governed by four government ministers and run 
by employees of a government ministry—hardly a meaningfully autonomous 
institution. Similarly, the Volkswagen Foundation, chartered as a full-
fledged civil law foundation, suggesting it is a private institution, is never-
theless governed by a 14-person Board of Trustees whose members are ap-
pointed half by officials in Germany’s national government and half by offi-
cials in the state government of Lower Saxony. However, as we will see, 
PtP foundations 
have, by and  
large, evolved  
into meaningfully  
autonomous  
charitable  
institutions. 
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operating arrangements have been put in place that give the foundation a 
meaningful, arms-length relationship with the two governments that ulti-
mately control its Board composition. 
While clearly not determinative, however, the legal form of the PtP founda-
tions can at least provide hints as to the governance structures at work. 
More than that, as we will see, it can usefully tilt the ultimate outcome to-
wards a more or less autonomous pattern of operation. 
As TABLE 5.2 shows, the vast majority—19 out of 21—of these foundations 
have a legal form that suggests that they are private institutions operating 
under standard legal structures long used to denote private philanthropic 
institutions in their countries. Thus, ten are civil law foundations, one is a 
private nonprofit organization under U.S. tax law,
13 
and two are organized as 
"trusts," an ancient legal category signifying assets held in trust for an indi-
vidual or estate. Another five entities receiving PtP assets were organized 
under recent special foundation laws or laws passed specifically for these 
The vast majority of 
our case-study PtP 
foundations have 
the legal structure  
characteristic of 
private  
philanthropic  
institutions in  
their countries.
TABLE 5.2  
Legal forms of the PtP case study foundations 
 
LEGAL FORM FOUNDATIONS 
Civil law foundation (10) Volkswagen Foundation 
German Environmental Foundation 
Foundation for Polish Science 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation 
Lombardy Foundation for the Environment 
Oranje Foundation 
Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation 
ERSTE Foundation 
72 recipients of Czech Investment Fund Assets 
Slovak Youth Foundation 
Private nonprofit organization (1) California Endowment 
Private trust (2) ASB Community Trust 
Community Trust of Southland 
Private nonprofit foundation (5) King Baudouin Foundation 
La Scala Foundation 
Cariplo Foundation 
Compagnia di Sao Paolo 
Fondazione CRT 
Public law foundation (1)  Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation 
Limited company (2) Baden-Württemberg Foundation 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales 
 
Source: PtP Foundation Master List, Appendix A. 
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entities. Included here are the Italian foundations of banking origin, the King 
Baudouin Foundation (whose share of lottery proceeds is governed by a 
legal provision in the lottery law), La Scala Foundation, and the Slovak 
Youth Foundation.
14
  
The remaining three foundations took a somewhat more unusual structure 
either as public law foundations (allowed under German law) or limited 
companies (allowed under both U.K. and German law). In the German cases, 
these legal forms signaled a greater determination on the part of the rele-
vant governmental units, in this case the states of Rheinland-Pfalz and Ba-
den-Württemberg, to control the institutions. 
 
Governance Structure:  
Towards New Models of Public Problem-Solving 
As it turns out, however, these latter two were not the only PtP case study 
foundations in which government retained a significant managerial role. 
Rather, as shown in TABLE 5.3, in fully 14 of the 21 foundations we tracked, 
governments at various levels secured a significant—and in some cases a 
TABLE 5.3  
Government involvement in board selection, PtP case study foundations 
 
Appoints some  
or all members 
Board  
membership 
Foundations 
Yes Yes 
Volkswagen Foundation 
German Environmental Foundation 
Baden-Württemberg Foundation 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation 
Lombardy Foundation for the Environment 
Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation 
Foundation for Polish Science 
Slovak Youth Foundation  
La Scala Foundation 
Yes No 
ASB Community Trust 
Community Trust of Southland 
Cariplo Foundation 
Compagnia di Sao Paolo 
Fondazione CRT 
No Yes 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation 
King Baudouin Foundation 
No No 
Lloyds TSB Foundation ASB  
Oranje Foundation 
California Endowment 
72 Recipients of Czech Investment Fund Assets 
ERSTE Foundation 
 
Source:  PtP Foundation 
Master List, Appendix A 
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clearly dominant—role in selecting the governing boards, notwithstanding 
the private legal structure under which these organizations were registered. 
And in nine of the cases, government officials not only played a role in 
appointing the boards but also picked at least some government officials to 
serve on them. In another two of the cases, governments did not select 
members of the boards, but such officials ended up on the boards anyway. 
In one of these cases, the Slovak Savings Bank Foundation, a Slovak 
Ministry of Finance official was put on the board at the initiative of the Slovak 
Savings Bank to provide assurances that the Erste Bank, which had acquired 
the Slovak institution, was fulfilling the pledge it made in its purchase 
agreement to contribute a certain amount of money to charitable purposes 
in Slovakia.
15
 The other case was the decision of the founders of the King 
Baudouin Foundation to reserve two seats on the governing board of that 
institution for representatives of the King. This left only five cases out of 21 
in which government had no role in the selection of foundation board 
members. And in one of these, what became the Lloyds TSB Foundation 
for England and Wales, the original charter placed the power to select the 
Board of Trustees in the hands of the bank, making this, along with the 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation, structurally akin to a corporate 
foundation and therefore not truly an autonomous institution, at least at its 
founding.  
 
Evolving operational realities. Before jumping to the conclusion that most of 
the foundations emerging from PtP transactions are really sham facades 
behind which public authorities retain control of state enterprises or other 
resources, however, it is necessary to look a bit more closely at the actual 
operational realities and at how these realities evolved. To be sure, in two of 
the foundations in which governmental entities control board nominations 
and dominate the board positions—the Baden-Württemberg Foundation 
and the Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation—the foundations 
operate as virtual arms of the state government. In both cases, however, 
they operate according to a specific remit aimed at promoting and 
commercializing scientific advance, activities connected to the improvement 
of the economy in their respective regions and which require the kind of 
long-term perspective that annual government budgeting frequently makes 
difficult, but that endowed foundations are more adept at promoting. What 
is more, both of these foundations seem to operate on the up and up, pub-
lishing lists of grants and providing information on their board members and 
sources of revenue. In addition, in the case of the Baden-Württemberg 
Foundation, while all of the board members are government officials, nine 
Despite substantial 
formal government 
involvement,  
evolving  
operational  
realities suggest a 
different picture  
in most cases. 
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The concept of  
‘public law  
foundations’  
in Germany  
can give the  
appearance of  
privatizing  
an asset while still 
retaining state  
control.
come from the Parliament and specific provisions are included to ensure 
representation of opposition parties as well as members of the governing 
coalition, creating some degree of pluralism and representation of different 
viewpoints. 
Elsewhere, the actual governance structures have evolved in directions sug-
gested by the legal form, creating, in a number of cases, not only impressive in-
stitutions, but also innovative models for how important public issues might 
usefully be addressed. Thus, for example: 
 Volkswagen Foundation. As APPENDIX B shows, although all fourteen 
members of the Volkswagen Foundation governing board are 
chosen by government bodies, either federal or state, these entities 
have not restricted their selections to government officials. Rather, 
they have honored the Foundation’s commitment to scientific 
advance by filling at least half of the Board seats with scientists and 
including other members from industry and the Confederation of 
German Trade Unions. In addition, the Foundation has established 
rigorous peer-review decision processes and managed to secure a 
decision from the Federal Administrative Court that barred the 
federal Audit Office from dictating criteria for the Foundation’s 
funding strategies or grant-making activities. 
 German Environmenal Foundation. Similarly, the German 
Environmental Foundation has held true to its early mission to use 
the proceeds from the sale of the Saltzgitter steel factory to pro-
mote environmental improvement. This focus has been reinforced 
by traditions reserving seats on the board for scientists, the 
president of Germany’s leading environmental organization, and the 
president of a leading industrial organization focused on the 
environment. 
 New Zealand trusts. In the case of ASB Community Trust and 
Community Trust of Southland, while governments have been 
reluctant to surrender the useful political "perk" that appointment 
to the board of one of the New Zealand Community Trusts offers, 
they have been willing to consult the Trusts to seek advice about the 
types of individuals that would be helpful to their work. In addition, 
since 1998 the Minister of Finance, who has the responsibility for 
naming the new Trustees, has been under a rule to avoid appointing 
sitting members of Parliament or officials of local government to 
these boards.
16
  
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 5: THE PtP PROCESS |  81 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 California Endowment. At the other end of the spectrum, in a num-
ber of cases significant battles were fought precisely to ensure 
citizen influence on the boards of these quasi-public foundations. 
The most obvious example was the California Endowment case, 
where, as we have seen, advocates spent four years pushing, first, 
for adherence to an existing law mandating the preservation for a 
similar charitable purpose of the assets of a nonprofit organiza-
tion undergoing conversion to for-profit status; and then fending 
off efforts by the about-to-be converted nonprofit to retain control 
of the newly established foundation. Ultimately, legal provisions 
were established barring Board members of the for-profit from 
serving on the Endowment’s Board and creating conflict of interest 
and payout requirements to protect the integrity of the resulting 
Endowment as well. 
 Czech case. Given a chaotic muddle of provisions governing foun-
dations in the Czech Republic, a decision was made early on not to 
distribute the proposed one percent of shares of major privat-
ization transactions to Czech foundations until a proper new 
foundation law could be promulgated clarifying what a foundation 
is and what it is not. That law, ultimately passed in 1997, six years 
after the start of privatization, narrowed the definition of 
foundations to institutions with assets serving public purposes and 
making grants. The law further stipulated that such institutions had 
to operate transparently, with published grant guidelines, regular 
annual reports, disclosure of board members, and strong conflict 
of interest provisions—provisions that were often quite advanced 
compared to those in place in a number of other European coun-
tries. On top of this, an elaborate peer-review and rating process 
designed in cooperation with a Czech council of foundations was 
put in place for the ultimate distribution of the resources generated 
for foundations through the privatization process. 
 Slovak Youth Foundation. In neighboring Slovakia, a similar process 
unfolded in the case of the Slovak Youth Foundation. Here as 
well, the formation of this new foundation occurred concurrently 
with the development of a new law providing suitable protection 
for the assets and purposes this foundation was intended to serve. 
Burned by the malfeasance and asset-stripping that accompanied 
the management of the assets of the former Socialist Union of 
Youth under the Meciar regime, youth advocates were determined 
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to create an institution that would protect these assets. Accord-
ingly, they managed to have inserted into the resolution estab-
lishing the new foundation a provision explicitly guaranteeing 
strong control over the resulting assets "by representatives re-
flecting the beneficiaries of these assets—youth and children or-
ganizations." The resulting Board structure reflected this. While 
reserving three seats on the 9-person board of the resulting 
foundation for appointment by the Ministry of Education, the by-
laws simultaneously set aside three seats each for appointment 
by the nonprofit Youth Council of Slovakia and the University Stu-
dents Organization—the body that first began the push to create 
a Slovak Youth Foundation. 
 
Multi-stakeholder problem-solving: The special case of the Italian 
foundations of banking origin. Perhaps the most interesting example of the 
way in which the structuring of the PtP foundations protected principles of 
pluralism and openness, however, comes from Italy and the foundations of 
banking origin (FBOs); for, here the PtP process yielded its clearest example 
of a new institutional form that could well serve as a model for how societies 
should address complex social and economic problems into the future.
17
 
What this institutional form does is to bring together under one organiza-
tional roof most of the key stakeholders needed to gain traction on complex 
societal issues and endows them with significant enough resources to at 
least establish new directions for social action and to catalyze other actors to 
join in, creating a pattern of collaboration that this writer has elsewhere 
termed "the new governance."
18
  
Origins: Towards a new model of governance. This model did not, of course, 
spring full-blown from the heads of the authors of the Amato-Carli law. Ra-
ther, it evolved over a period of time, helped along by some key visionaries, 
such as Giuseppe Guzzetti, a prominent and highly respected Milanese at-
torney who became the president of the Cariplo Foundation and assumed 
the presidency of the Association of Savings Bank Foundations (ACRI) in 
2000, at what turned out to be a critical turning point for the Italian FBOs.  
What many people came to recognize was that the original solution to the 
problem of privatizing the Italian savings banks laid out in the Amato-Carli 
law was not tenable over the long run. For one thing, by making the new 
"conferring authorities," alias the foundations, the owners of all the stock of 
the banks, it limited the ability of the banks to raise capital and grow. For an-
other, by putting the boards of the foundations in control of the boards of 
In Italy, the PtP 
process yielded  
its clearest  
example of a new  
institutional model 
for how societies 
should address  
complex social  
and economic 
problems. 
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the banks, it limited the ability of the conferring entities to evolve into true, 
autonomous, charitable institutions. Between 1994 and 2000, therefore, a 
subtle but enormously significant metamorphosis took place among these 
new FBOs:  
 First, the foundations that had formerly been barred from selling 
their bank stock were strongly encouraged to begin doing so.  
 Second, "incompatibility constraints" were imposed on the 
foundations to eliminate overlapping memberships of the foun-
dation and bank boards. 
 Third, strong emphasis was placed on making the boards of the 
foundations representative of all the key interests at work in the 
fields in which the foundations were focusing, including partic-
ularly civil society and business and not just government. 
 Fourth, the foundations were encouraged to professionalize 
their operations, separating the governing functions from the 
executive ones, and splitting the management of the program-
matic operations from the management of the assets. 
These features, promoted informally by the foundations and formally by a 
series of government regulations, were given firmer legal sanction through 
the 1998 Ciampi law, which completed the transformation of the conferring 
entities into true, autonomous, private foundations exclusively focused on 
socially oriented and economic development activities primarily in their local 
areas and guided by three key principles: first, transparency; second, repre-
sentativeness; and third, professionalism and honorability.  
In pursuit of these principles, the law: 
 Barred the foundations from engaging in banking activities or 
financing for-profit entities (except those directly related to their 
missions).  
 Barred foundation board members from serving on the boards 
of the banks. 
 Discouraged the practice of involving local officials on the foun-
dation boards and instead encouraged the recruitment of rep-
resentatives of a broad swath of other relevant entities (e.g., civil 
society organizations). 
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 Stipulated that those named to the boards have professional qual-
ifications in the fields in which the foundations were working. 
 Established operational standards that included strong transpar-
ency and conflict of interest provisions. 
 
As one manifestation of the resulting metamorphosis, by 2000 nearly half of 
the members of the governing boards of the FBOs were broadly representa-
tive of civil society—including cultural institutions, human service organiza-
tions, academic institutions, and many more. The other half were a diverse 
array of representatives of the local territories in which the foundations op-
erated—the governments of communities, provinces, and regions, as well as 
Chambers of Commerce, health agencies, professional orders, and others—
in short, all the entities that would need to come together to address im-
portant community problems.  
Italy’s failed backlash. Not surprisingly, not everyone was overjoyed by this 
escape of such influential and well-endowed institutions from government 
control. In 2001, therefore, the newly elected government of right-leaning 
Silvio Berlusconi tried to turn the clock back by enacting amendments to the 
Ciampi law designed to bring the Italian FBOs again under firmer govern-
ment control. Rather than accept this verdict, however, the new Italian 
foundations fought back. Under the leadership of attorney Guzzetti—by this 
point serving as President of a newly revitalized ACRI—a suit was filed 
charging that the new provisions were unconstitutional because they failed 
to recognize the private character of the FBOs and unfairly proposed to treat 
these entities differently from other foundations.  
What emerged from this case was a solution that established a new type of 
charitable foundation, and one that just happened to embody the notions of 
collaborative public problem-solving advanced by some public administra-
tion thinkers as the key to gaining traction on complex public issues. In the 
first place, the Constitutional Court unequivocally declared that the FBOs 
were private, nonprofit, autonomous entities, functioning "among the or-
ganizational components of a free society." Additionally, the Court articu-
lated a principle of pluralism, declaring that the foundations needed to struc-
ture their governing boards so as to "assure an adequate presence of the en-
tities that are representative of local communities," that these needed to in-
clude "both public and private entities," and that no entity or type of entity 
should be prevalent. Finally, the Court declared unconstitutional the preva-
lence on governing boards of local or regional government officials, though 
former officials remained eligible. 
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The resulting "new governance" model. As a byproduct of this string of de-
cisions, the Italian FBOs have acquired governing boards that resemble mini-
legislatures, usefully representing most of the key stakeholders in their 
regions and fields of operation in line with the principle of pluralism, and 
selected through processes that are highly participatory. Milan’s Cariplo 
Foundation, for example, a US$9 billion institution, has 40 members on its 
governing Board, all of which are ultimately selected by the Foundation’s 
outgoing Board, but through an elaborate process that reserves seats for 
nominees identified by particular constituencies with a stake in the 
Foundation’s operations and seeks nominations for these seats from the 
constituencies themselves. Thus, fully half of the seats are reserved for 
nominees of different local authorities (the municipality of Milan, the 
Lombardy regional government, and various boards and commissions) each 
of which is entitled to submit three names from which the outgoing Board 
chooses one to take the designated seat. By common understanding, 
however, the representatives selected by the public authorities cannot 
themselves be government officials and must, like all Board members, meet 
relevant professional standards. 
In addition to the 20 Board seats reserved for nominees from various public 
bodies, the Cariplo Foundation reserves 12 seats for nominees of various 
civil society and nonprofit organizations, each of which also submits three 
candidates from which the outgoing Board chooses one. The outgoing Board 
is then permitted to fill the remaining seats freely from its own identified 
nominees. All Board members must meet professional standards appro-
priate for the fields in which the Foundation is operating, must satisfy certain 
"incompatibility" or conflict of interest constraints, and must agree to 
function as trustees of the Foundation rather than as representatives of the 
entities that happened to nominate them. 
Torino-based Compagnia di Sao Paolo—another nearly US$9 billion insti-
tution—has a similar governing Board structure and a similar set of require-
ments for Board members. Its 21 Governing Council members are chosen by 
constituencies similar to those tapped by the Cariplo Foundation, but 
directly by the constituencies rather than through the indirect nomination 
method described above. More specifically, the Compagnia Board is com-
posed of four members chosen by the outgoing Council from its own nom-
inees, five members selected by various units of local government such as 
the City of Torino, the Piedmont Regional Council, and the City of Genoa; and 
12 members chosen by various nonprofit and business groups. The same 
prohibition on selection of sitting government officials also applies, however. 
The Italian  
foundations of  
banking origin  
have acquired  
governing boards 
usefully  
representing  
most of the key 
stakeholders in their  
regions and fields  
of operation. 
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The upshot in both cases are governing boards that represent the key stake-
holders from all three sectors—government, business, and civil society—re-
quired to be engaged in addressing complex societal problems.
19 
While this 
yields somewhat unwieldy boards, procedures have been developed to break 
down the work into digestible chunks. The Cariplo Foundation, for example, 
works through a series of both functional and subject-matter committees. In 
the process, these institutions have created rare meeting grounds through 
which politically connected, community-based, and business leaders can find 
consensus approaches to addressing community problems and promoting 
the quality of community life. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Four important conclusions flow from this discussion of the structure of the 
deals and institutions that resulted from the PtP transactions profiled here: 
 First, PtP can yield foundations of quite substantial size, but the result-
ing scale can be significantly affected by the way in which the deals fi-
nancing these institutions are structured. Advocates of PtP should 
therefore pay close attention to such deal issues. 
• As a general rule, deals that provide an endowment are prefer-
able to deals that provide a stream of revenue. 
• Among deals that provide assets, two-step deals, i.e., deals that 
provide ownership stakes—in shares, real estate, or other 
items of value—are more valuable than one-step deals that 
provide outright cash. This is because the assets involved in 
privatization processes are often not ideally structured at the 
time of privatization and are therefore likely to appreciate in 
value over time. 
• The "privatization" involved in PtP transactions is not restricted 
to the sale or transfer of enterprises or property. It can also 
take the form of access to specialized streams of revenue avail-
able to governments—lottery sales, debt swaps, and proceeds 
from legal settlements can also be included. But so can pro-
ceeds from mineral rights or airwave licenses. In such cases it is 
wise to structure the deals so that they yield a share of pro-
ceeds rather than a lump sum such that the resulting founda-
tion can benefit from any growth that occurs. 
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 Second, legal and institutional structures of the beneficiary 
foundations are important. Care needs to be taken to use legal 
forms that most clearly stack the cards in favour of autonomous 
operation—even if early governance structures do not fully em-
body such autonomy. Similarly, care needs to be taken to incor-
porate operating rules emphasizing transparency and avoidance 
of conflicts of interest in order to build confidence in the result-
ing institutions. 
 Third, PtP creates important opportunities to fashion not only 
traditional grant-making foundations but also new models of 
public problem-solving institutions that engage multiple stake-
holders in the search for novel solutions to community 
challenges. For this to be possible, however, norms of pluralism 
and collaboration need to be built explicitly into governance 
structures at an early stage. 
 Finally, despite claims to the contrary, no necessary conflict ex-
ists between PtP and capturing resources from privatization 
transactions for debt reduction. As the Volkswagen Foundation 
deal demonstrated, PtP foundations can become the owners of 
significant privatized assets but loan them to governments for a 
period of time to reduce external debt or reduce further foreign 
borrowing. 
Against this background we can now turn to the performance of these case 
study foundations. 
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 The lower of these two estimates is presented in Bernardo Bortolotti and Domenico Siniscalco in 
The Challenges of Privatization: An International Analysis. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. v. 
The estimate draws on data from Privatization International and Securities Data Corporation and cover 
transactions involving "the transfer of ownership rights from the public to the private sector." The 
75,000 figure is presented in Nellis, "International Experience," 2012 and includes enterprises formerly 
owned by states that have been either divested or turned over to private management. 
2 Chuck Bell, "The How and Why of Philanthropication thru Privatization (PtP): The Legal and Political 
Context," Philanthropication thru Privatization Project  Working Paper No. 2, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Center for Civil Society Studies, 2014). 
3 The original plan was for this Fund to serve as the portfolio manager of these stock holdings and to 
distribute earnings to the foundation, but this was later changed, the shares sold, and the proceeds 
distributed as endowments to the foundations. 
4 The requirement for a new law to clarify the functions of foundations was pushed by then-Prime 
Minister, Václav Klaus, who sought assurances that the resources would be placed in the hands of 
legitimate institutions adhering to sound standards of transparency and governance. 
5 As explained above, the organizers of the California Endowment were warned by counsel that, as a 
501(c)(3) charitable organization, the Endowment would be subject to tax liabilities on the sale of the 
Blue Cross’ assets whereas a 501(c)(4) organization could sell these assets and transfer the proceeds to 
the Endowment without encountering a tax liability. 
6 The assets involved were industrial companies in the cases of the Volkswagen Foundation and the 
German Environmental Foundation  and a bank in the case of the Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for 
Innovation. 
7 In the New Zealand, Italian, Austrian, and California cases, the foundations received 100 percent of 
the stock of the privatized companies. In both the Czech and Polish cases, the foundations received 1 
and 2 percent, respectively, of stock resulting from the privatization of thousands of formerly state-
owned enterprises. In the Polish case, as already noted, this two-step approach was canceled after two 
years and replaced with a one-step approach before the entire program of sharing the proceeds of 
privatization sales with a foundation was shut down by a new Polish government.  
8 Simeon Djankov and Peter Murrell, The Determinants of enterprise restructuring in transition: An 
assessment of the evidence, (Washington: World Bank, 2000), cited in Nellis, "Leaps of Faith," Chapter 2 in 
Lieberman Kopf, eds. Privatization in Transition Economies, 2007, 119-120. 
9 This foundation received 5 percent of the shares of the original TSB. However, these were restricted 
shares that entitled the foundation to no voting rights, no dividends, and no opportunity for exit by 
selling the shares. The commitment to a share of pre-tax profits was thus a way for the Bank to provide 
the Foundation something of value out of the transformation without having to surrender control of 
the institution. 
10 Bortolotti and Siniscalo, Challenges of Privatization, 2004, 97.  
11 Preparation of this section benefited considerably from a summary prepared by Rupert Graf 
Strachwitz of key features of the governance of the PtP foundations reported in the Project’s case 
studies. See: Rupert Graf Strachwitz, "The Structure of Philanthropic Institutions Resulting from 
Privatization Deals," Philanthropication thru Privatization Project  Working Paper No. 3, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 2014). 
12 Included here are the Minister for Research and Science, the Minister of Economy, the Finance 
Minister, and the Head of the State Chancellery. 
13 U.S. charitable nonprofit organizations are typically granted a tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3) of the U.S. Tax Code, which typically covers foundations as well. However, in the case of the 
Blue Cross of California conversion, it was necessary, in order to avoid capital gains taxes on the sale of 
BCC shares, to place these shares first in a different category of tax-exempt entity, a 501(c)(4) 
organization created for this purpose. This entity, called the California HealthCare Foundation, then 
sold the shares on the market and transmitted the proceeds to the California Endowment, a regular 
foundation registered under Section 501(c)(3) of the tax code. Because the HealthCare Foundation was 
a byproduct of the larger transaction, it is not an explicit focus of this report, and is not included in the 
total of 21 case study foundations.  
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14 In the Czech case, the new law closed a number of loop-holes under which essentially service 
organizations seeking funds were able to register as foundations. Under the 1997 law, the key attrib-
utes of foundations are (1) that they are collections of property or assets; (2) that they serve "publicly 
beneficial" purposes; and (3) that they do so through support of third parties, i.e. that they are 
grantmakers. 
15 The Slovak Savings Bank Foundation is not otherwise a fully autonomous foundation, however. 
Rather, the appointment power in this case rests with the savings bank, With the discontinuance of the 
practice of governmental participation on the board beginning in 2011, moreover, all of the board 
members of this foundation are bank officials, making this a curious hybrid between an independent 
foundation and a corporate foundation. 
16 This has not kept various Ministers from appointing various political party officials who are not 
formally in office to these boards, however. Thus, for example, seven of the current 15 trustees of the 
ASB Community Trust fit this pattern. 
17 As before, the discussion of the governance structure of the Italian FBOs here, though not 
necessarily the interpretation put on them, draws heavily on the excellent case study on three of these 
foundations completed for this Project by Dr. Gianpaolo Barbetta of the Catholic University of Milan. 
18 Lester M. Salamon, "The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action," Chapter 1 in The Tools of 
Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited by Lester M. Salamon, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). See also: Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: Government: Nonprofit Relations in 
the Modern Welfare State, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
19 A similar pattern is also evident in the design of the governance structure of the Fondazione 
Teatro alla Scala. This foundation has no fewer than five governing bodies, each one representing one 
or more of the stakeholders of this revered institution. This includes an Assembly of Founders, a Board 
of Administration, a President, a Sovrintendante, and a Board of Auditors of Accounts. The Board of 
Administration includes three members chosen by the Assembly of Founders, five others chosen by 
public institutions (e.g., the Regional Government of Lombardy, the Province of Milano, and the 
Lombardy Chamber of Commerce), plus the Mayor of Milano, who is President of the Foundation. 
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Ultimately, the value of the PtP strategy must be judged not on the basis of 
the structure of the deals or the governance arrangements of the resulting 
foundations, but on the performance that these institutions achieve. Evalu-
ating that performance is no small task, however. Systematic evaluation of the 
performance of charitable foundations is still very much in its infancy.
1
 Even 
assessing the outcomes of individual programs is fraught with difficulties 
caused by external developments, limited time frames, and cost. Judging the 
entire body of work of entire institutions over what is often more than twenty 
years of existence, and doing so against some "control group" of similarly 
placed organizations, is therefore a fool’s errand that this project, whether for 
better or worse, was never equipped to take on.   
But it is possible to reach some tentative judgments about how these institu-
tions performed. Broadly speaking, two broad areas of performance can be 
examined: first, operational performance, the extent to which these institutions 
established operational procedures consistent with best practice in the 
foundation field internationally; and second, programmatic performance, the 
extent to which these foundations gave evidence of developing systematic, 
proactive approaches to the problems they were addressing rather than the 
more traditional, reactive, "whatever the postman brings" approach to phi-
lanthropy. In this chapter we review the record of performance along these 
two dimensions. 
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OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
In recent years a variety of "best practice" standards have developed within 
the foundation community to ensure that foundations operate in a fair and 
responsible manner and thereby retain the public’s trust. The most recent 
version of such standards formulated by the European Foundation Center 
(EFC) in its EFC Principles of Good Practice, for example, identifies four core 
"principles" of foundation operations: (1) independent governance, (2) sound 
management, (3) transparency, and (4) accountability. More specifically, the 
following summarizes some of the key attributes of well-functioning founda-
tions that the EFC identifies as flowing from these principles
2
:   
 The foundation has an identifiable and independent 
decision-making body which acts with high ethical 
standards and whose members are nominated in 
accordance with established principles and procedures.  
 The board sets out its strategic objectives and ensures that 
programmes, operations and finances are in line with 
these objectives. 
 The foundation holds transparency at the core of all 
activities and makes its statutes, by-laws, guidelines for 
funding activities, as well as board and staff lists, annual 
reports, grant lists, and finances publicly and readily 
available. Information on grant programmes and 
application procedures are publicly-available and user-
friendly.  
 Clear policies to address conflicts of interest exist for both 
board members and staff. 
 The foundation promotes effective and sustainable 
investment strategies. 
 Regular monitoring and evaluation of activities are a key 
part of the foundation’s operations. 
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How well do the PtP foundations we have examined adhere to these princi-
ples and practices? To answer these questions, we review six features of the 
operational performance of our 21 case-study foundations: 
1. The independence of their governance;  
2. The presence and clarity of their mission and program statements;  
3. The transparency of their operations;  
4. Their conflict of interest policies and procedures;  
5. The professionalization of their management; and  
6. Their handling of their investment responsibilities. 
 
In each case, we find that most of these foundations perform at what is likely 
the upper quadrant of charitable foundations globally, though this judgment 
is admittedly highly subjective given the absence of rigorous measurement 
of this aspect of foundation performance. 
 
1) Independent Governance 
As noted in Chapter 2 above, independent, or at least "meaningfully auton-
omous," operation is a core criterion for PtP foundations. As the previous 
chapter made clear, however, this is a difficult criterion to gauge in the case 
of PtP foundations because public sector institutions are their key founders 
and founder’s will is usually determinative of the fundamental purpose and 
direction of every charitable foundation. Leaving aside this fundamental de-
termination of basic purpose, which applies to all foundations, foundation 
boards typically have substantial latitude to determine the specific ways in 
which they will pursue these fundamental purposes. To what extent do they 
have a free hand to do so in the case of these foundations? 
Based on the discussion in the previous chapter, it appears that for most of 
the foundations we have examined, the answer to this question is "fairly 
extensively." What is more, this applies even in the cases, which are quite 
numerous, in which governmental bodies still play major roles in the nomi-
nation or selection of foundation board members, but where procedures 
have been developed to establish arms’ length relationships between the 
governments and the foundations.   
In five of our case-study cases, however, serious questions arise about the 
autonomy of these foundations. In the cases of both the Rheinland-Pfalz 
Foundation for Innovation and the Baden-Württemberg Foundation, 
public officials dominate the boards of directors. What is more, extensive 
staffing interconnections in the case of the former foundation, and extensive 
funding interaction in the case of the latter, continue to exist between the 
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foundations and their respective state governments. In the Baden-
Württemberg case, the foundation has been used to process privatization 
sales in order to avert federal taxation of the capital gains, and some of the 
proceeds have ended up in some of the State’s special projects. Whatever 
the virtues of these foundations and their programs, their governance 
structure thus does not accord with the latest thinking about appropriate 
foundation governance arrangements. 
In the case of the Slovak Savings Bank Foundation, it is the for-profit bank 
that infringes on the foundation’s autonomy, with bank board members and 
executives occupying four of the five seats on the foundation’s Supervisory 
Board, and the fifth seat vacant since the departure of the Ministry of 
Finance official from the Board in 2011. A similar situation existed with the 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales up through the mid-1990s 
but has since been significantly reduced.  
Finally, the case of the Lombardy Foundation for the Environment is a bit 
more complex. This Foundation started life in the mid-1980s with funding 
provided to the regional government of Lombardy by the Hoffman-La Roche 
chemical company to compensate for environmental damages caused by its 
Italian affiliate. While the earnings on these funds were initially sufficient to 
allow this foundation to operate as an autonomous research institution 
governed by a board consisting of Lombardy regional officials and 
representatives of three universities, by the second half of the nineties these 
resources were no longer sufficient to sustain a viable research program. 
Accordingly, the foundation turned to the Lombardy regional government 
for assistance, leading by 2006 to an agreement that fundamentally made it 
an "instrumental body" of the region committed to undertaking projects that 
can benefit the policy-making process of the regional authorities. 
2) Mission Statements 
Every one of the PtP case study foundations we examined has a "mission 
statement" of some type, typically reported on its website. Many of these 
were set in governing documents. For the most part, the purposes or objects 
of the foundations are framed fairly broadly, such as the King Baudouin 
Foundation’s catch-phrase: "Working together for a better society." The 
Italian FBOs are obliged to pursue "public benefit objectives" but have to 
focus on up to five themes from a list of 21 set in the legal act that created 
them—a list that includes everything from support of the arts to promotion 
of family and related values. A number of the foundations have more narrow 
remits, however. Most of the German PtP foundations have missions related 
Every one of the 
PtP case-study 
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to the promotion of science. The German Environmental Foundation, by 
contrast, retains its focus on the environment, though in its early years that 
focus was somewhat muted by a heavier emphasis on promoting small and 
mid-sized enterprises—an objective promoted by one of the Foundation's 
early supporters and enshrined in the founding legislation. The Oranje 
Foundation also has a quite specific focus on promoting participation in 
society through support for social cohesion and social integration projects.  
Quite apart from these general statements of purpose, a number of these 
foundations have begun generating much more concrete and strategic mis-
sion statements on a periodic basis tied to broader strategic planning exer-
cises. Of the foundations examined here, the Volkswagen Foundation was 
one of the earliest to pursue such a strategic approach. After operating in a 
purely reactive mode responding to proposals, the Foundation Board in 
1966 began a debate about the necessity to elaborate a coherent set of 
programs and a sustainable and focused strategy of funding. Out of this 
process came a funding framework emphasizing three themes—"reform," 
"building bridges," and "vital issues." Over the years, the Foundation has re-
fined its framework, elaborating on the "building bridges" theme with a 
theme of "crossing borders." As the "Crossing Borders 2010" priorities 
document put it: 
…The Foundation’s funding concept is not static. This makes it possi-
ble to shift focus, to take the initiative, to provide sustainable im-
pulses corresponding to the research needs and the challenges our 
societies face today….Those persons and ideas are especially wel-
come that dare to cross borders in more than one meaning of the 
phrase—borders between countries or continents, between disci-
plines or concepts of mind, between generations or societies. 
A similar effort to escape an earlier reactive mode of funding has prompted 
many of the other PtP foundations to move to a  more coherent and strate-
gic funding approach as well, often as a direct result of the added resources 
and visibility resulting from the PtP transaction and subsequent expansions 
of resources. The trigger in the case of New Zealand’s Community Trust of 
Southland was the acquisition of this Trust’s bank by a larger for-profit 
banking corporation, which tripled the Trust’s grant budget and prompted 
its trustees to formulate a "total framework" approach complete with elabo-
rated mission statement, key result areas, priorities, values, and vision. In 
the case of the ASB Community Trust the trigger came only a few years later 
when the then-general secretary, whose interest and experience focused on 
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investment management, was replaced by a new chief executive with a more 
strategic orientation, leading to the formulation of a strategic plan that em-
phasized managing to outcomes and viewing the Trust as the "venture capi-
tal of social change." 
The recipients of the proceeds of the Czech Foundation Investment Fund 
had to formulate such strategic mission statements from the start in order to 
be eligible for the Fund’s contributions to their endowments. The statutes of 
the King Baudouin Foundation similarly call on it to "be attentive to renew 
periodically its action programs," a task the Foundation has taken up on a 
regular 3-5 year sequence since 1977. The Foundation for Polish Science 
similarly issues an "FNP Strategy and Program" every few years. The Cariplo 
Foundation goes even further, generating an entire sequence of inter-
connected planning documents to ensure that all of its activities are 
consistent with the Foundation’s strategic objectives. These include a "Multi-
year Framework Plan" set to the six-year term of each governing board; 
medium term "Action Plans," 16 of which have been generated to date to 
outline specific strategies and priority objectives; "Annual Framework Plans" 
that translate the objectives set out in the Action Plans into concrete actions 
and associated budgets; and "Project Plans" outlining the steps and ultimate 
objectives of each of the foundations’ own projects. Similar sets of 
documents guide the work of the other major Italian FBOs as well.  
In short, the PtP foundations are hardly back-of-the-envelope, check-writing 
machines doling out resources to favoured friends of prominent local fig-
ures. Most of them have matured into serious funding organizations oper-
ating according to carefully conceived funding strategies aimed at maximiz-
ing the impact of the resources at their disposal.  
 
3) Transparency3  
As the EFC Principles of Good Practice demonstrate, transparency has be-
come an important norm in the foundation world. But it is also a controver-
sial one. Many foundations believe that their work is private and therefore 
need not be divulged publicly. But this causes suspicions and charges of mis-
use of power, particularly since foundations typically enjoy a variety of tax 
advantages that imbue them with some public character. 
In the case of PtP foundations, the pressures for transparency are particu-
larly intense because the assets financing the foundations’ work were at least 
partially quasi-public in either origin or subsequent evolution. 
Adherence to  
the norms of 
transparency 
is generally high 
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foundations 
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Perhaps because of this, adherence to the norms of transparency with regard to 
information activities, grant guidelines, governance, grants made, and so on is 
generally high among these foundations. Every foundation in this study has a 
website, and most, though not all, of the Foundations from non-English-speaking 
countries have English language versions of their websites. The one exception is 
the Czech Foundation Investment Fund, but various reports on the Fund and on 
the foundations it supports are on the Czech government website and most of the 
individual foundations supported by the Fund have their own websites (For a 
listing of the websites of the PtP foundations, see TABLE 6.1). 
TABLE 6.1  
PtP case-study foundation websites 
 
FOUNDATION WEBSITE 
ASB Community Trust asbcommunitytrust.org.nz 
Baden-Württemberg Foundation bwstiftung.de  
California Endowment calendow.org 
Cariplo Foundation fondazionecariplo.it 
Community Trust of Southland ctos.org.nz 
Compagnia di San Paolo compagnia.torino.it 
ERSTE Foundation erstestiftung.org 
Fondazione CRT fondazionecrt.it 
Foundation for Polish Science fnp.org.pl 
Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation de-pl.info 
German Environmental Foundation dbu.de 
King Baudouin Foundation kbs-frb.be 
La Scala Foundation teatroallascala.org/it/fondazione/fondazione.html 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales lloydstsbfoundations.org.uk 
Lombardy Foundation for the Environment flanet.org 
Oranje Foundation oranjefonds.nl 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation stiftung-innovation.rlp.de 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation  nadaciaslsp.sk 
Slovak Youth Foundation intenda.sk 
Volkswagen Foundation volkswagenstiftung.de 
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Information included on these websites typically includes the following: 
 Mission statements—included on all websites. 
 Grant guidelines—typically included, often in considerable detail and a few in 
more than one language. Where appropriate, application forms are down-
loadable. 
 Annual reports—available on nearly all websites. In many cases, several years of 
back reports are available, and in some cases these are also available from the 
public regulator. The annual reports often include financial accounts, or in 
some cases these are published separately. The La Scala Foundation does not 
publish an annual report of its own, nor does the Teatro itself, although the 
website is informative. The California Endowment does not publish an annual 
report, but does post the annual financial information form it is required to 
submit to the tax authorities on its website. 
 Lists of grantees—published by most PtP foundations. Some give information 
separately for each program, while others give a full alphabetical list. Some fo-
cus on examples to illustrate the nature of each program. Program-by-program 
lists do not of course guarantee that the lists are complete, as there may be 
exceptional grants outside the programs. Some lists are published separately 
but most are contained within annual reports. The California Endowment 
does not list its grants but such lists are available from its statutory returns, 
which are accessible on the website of the State Attorney General, who acts as 
regulator of foundations. 
 Statutes—statutes, bylaws, or constitutions (the terminology varies) are 
available on nearly all foundation websites. These are generally downloadable. 
Those foundations where the statutes are not available are: 
• Baden-Württemberg Foundation 
• Oranje Foundation (although much information about governance is 
available) 
• King Baudouin Foundation 
• ERSTE Foundation (original statutes from 1819 are available but not 
more recent updates) 
• Lloyds TSB Foundation for England & Wales (but much information 
about governance is available in the annual report, and the memoran-
dum and articles of association are available from the registrar of 
companies) 
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 Governance structure—available on most of our case study founda-
tions. All of them publish the names of their Board members. In most 
cases this is a legal requirement. Many foundations also publish a 
photograph and brief biography of each Board member. It is not al-
ways made clear on a foundation’s website how its Board members 
came to be appointed, though information about terms of office and 
external appointing bodies is usually made known. Particular exam-
ples of openness include the following: 
• The ASB Community Trust has a page of information 
on ‘how to become a trustee.’ 
• The California Endowment publishes the charter for its 
Nominating Committee. 
• The Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales says 
that its trustees are appointed through public advertising, 
following which the respondents are interviewed by a 
Foundation-appointed nominations committee whose 
recommendations are followed by the Foundation Board 
and then by the Bank Board. The latter remains the 
formal appointing body but by this mechanism it has 
effectively relinquished the appointing power. 
 Sources of funds—available for all but one foundation. In most cases 
the foundations are required to do so as part of their annual ac-
counts. A few (e.g., the Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for 
Innovation, the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation, and 
the ERSTE Foundation) publish multi-year records of investment 
performance. The foundations funded by the Czech Foundation 
Investment Fund have been the subject of detailed research 
reports. The California Endowment provides only the briefest 
description of its financial origins. 
 Other information practices. Annual reports and grant guidelines are 
supplemented in several cases by other communication media, 
such as newsletters, other publications, and social media, with all 
but four of the case-study foundations maintaining at least one 
social media account including Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, and 
Twitter. ASB Community Trust publishes in several local languages 
and encourages its specialist staff to join appropriate networks. The 
Community Trust of Southland holds meetings with potential 
applicants. 
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4) Conflict of Interest Provisions 
The PtP foundations we examined generally have standing policies and proce-
dures to avoid conflicts of interest. Such policies and procedures prohibit the 
award of grants to board members or to organizations with which board mem-
bers or staff are affiliated. Some have very strict formal policies. Others have no 
discoverable policy, but very strict practice. No information is available about 
policy or practice in the Slovak Savings Bank Foundation or the Foundation for 
Polish-German Cooperation. A sample of illustrative provisions in other founda-
tions includes: 
 The Foundation for Polish Science has a separate document detail-
ing its conflict of interest provisions. The Foundation cannot make 
grants or loans to Board members or employees or their relatives 
(with detailed definitions of what constitutes a relative). Nor may as-
sets be transferred to such people. Employees cannot belong to the 
Board. The statutes also contain a code of ethics. 
 Since 2002, the Oranje Foundation has conducted annual assess-
ments of each Board member for conflicts of interest, mainly about 
whether the Board member has ties to grant recipients or providers 
of capital and holds staff members to the same standards. 
 The King Baudouin Foundation has two internal censors (appointed 
by the Board) who monitor conflicts of interest over legacies and en-
sure that the wishes of donors are fulfilled. The Board does not make 
decisions on grants, which is done by an independent jury. 
 The law establishing the Italian foundations of banking origin provides 
rules to prevent and deal with conflicts of interest on the part of board 
members of the foundations. Beyond the legal rules, some foundations 
have also adopted conflict of interest policies within their respective 
codes of ethics. This is the case, for example, with the Cariplo Founda-
tion, whose code of ethics contains a conflict of interest policy binding 
all employees and Board members. Moreover, in 2012, ACRI approved 
the "Carta delle Fondazioni," a voluntary code of conduct (but compul-
sory for members of the Association), which deals with issues of gov-
ernance, accountability, transparency, asset management, and conflicts 
of interest. 
 The Volkswagen Foundation is potentially vulnerable to political influ-
ence through its Board of Trustees, but has taken steps to mitigate or 
counteract this. Board decisions are by two-thirds majority, so neither of 
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the appointing governments can predominate. A code of "twenty prin-
ciples of good practice," adopted in 2006, binds members of staff and the 
Board of Trustees, and ensures that nobody takes part in decisions which 
may involve any institution to which they are linked. Standard grant pro-
cedures provide for peer review of applications by experts, who are not 
allowed to apply for grants themselves or to assist applicants. 
 The New Zealand community trusts have rules written into each deed of 
trust to prevent conflicts of interest. These provide for disclosure of in-
terests by all Trustees and staff in relation to grant applications and con-
tracts. Disclosures at meetings are requested by the Chair and any dis-
closures are minuted. A Trustee with an "interest" must absent himself or 
herself not only from any votes but also from discussion or consideration 
of the matter on grounds that participation in the discussion could sub-
stantially influence the outcome. 
On the other hand, a handful of these organizations have confronted, or still con-
front, some conflict of interest issues. In particular: 
 The Baden-Württemberg Foundation has no conflict of interest 
policy, is not seen as independent of government, and often has its 
affairs discussed in the provincial Parliament. 
 The Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation is subject to an ‘ad-
ministrative procedures’ law which regulates conflicts of interest. In 
1999, it was criticized by the State Audit Office for breaches of this law 
by the Foundation’s chief executive, who, as noted previously, was a 
paid member of the staff of the Ministry of Science and sat on the 
Boards of other scientific institutions that benefited from Foundation 
grants—to the tune of €2.3 million. However, no personal advantages 
were alleged, and the Foundation changed its procedures to respond to 
the criticisms. 
 For the ERSTE Foundation, there is an inherent conflict of interest in 
the double mission of the Foundation, which is not only to invest in the 
common good, but also to safeguard the future of the Erste Group. The 
Employees Council and the Supervisory Board of the Erste Group are in 
effect represented on the Supervisory Board of the Foundation. The 
Chairman of the Management Board of Erste Group served until re-
cently as the Chairman of the Managing Board of the ERSTE 
Foundation. The conflict is handled in part by activity which serves 
both interests: e.g., the establishment of projects involving financial 
market instruments for the development of poorer regions or for 
heavily indebted people. 
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5) Professionalization 
In order to handle this set of management tasks, the PtP foundations have 
had to build administrative structures and recruit competent staff. This has 
been true even of the foundations that inherited charitable functions carried 
out by previously existing savings banks.  
In the case of the Italian FBOs, for example, the charitable departments of the 
pre-existing banks were fairly elementary in organizational terms, relying 
heavily on personnel in the banks, who either carried out many of the needed 
functions or were seconded to the foundations. Due to the changes intro-
duced by the privatization process, particularly after 2000, important modifica-
tions had to be made. For one thing, the foundations had to create internal 
rules and procedures for carrying out the functions mandated in their articles 
of confederation. 
Thus, for example, Compagnia di San Paolo drafted a series of operating 
rules, including: (1) criteria for the allocation of resources to institutional activi-
ties; (2) rules for the planning, approval, and management of grants; and (3) 
procedures for informing grant-seekers about its programs. The Cariplo 
Foundation similarly formulated a series of internal rules on investment pol-
icy, annual meetings, nomination and election of board members, cessation 
and suspension of officers, and accounting and control.  
Other foundations faced these same organizational development challenges. 
The ERSTE Foundation thus took two years between its founding and its first 
round of grants. During this period its newly hired executive director visited 
major foundations around the world to learn about best practices in founda-
tion management and set to work establishing a regulatory and organizational 
framework including new prototypes of grant-making contracts and review 
procedures. The Community Trust of Southland similarly formulated a "total 
framework" and a comprehensive grantmaking policy laying out specific crite-
ria, such as equity and community benefit, for assessing grant applications. 
Particularly as they moved from reactive to pro-active modes of operation, the 
foundations also had to recruit experts acquainted with the fields in which 
they were operating. In addition, different organizational units had to be cre-
ated to handle the growing array of functions that the foundations had to per-
form—grant-making, asset management, strategic planning, public relations, 
accounting, cash management, human services, and evaluation. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Cariplo Foundation now has ten different units handling these 
different functions.  
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While the staff of these foundations have necessarily grown as a conse-
quence (the employees of the Italian foundations of banking origin, for ex-
ample, more than doubled between 2000 and 2012, from 408 to 1014), these 
foundations remain fairly thinly staffed by international standards. Leaving 
aside the La Scala Foundation, which is really an operating foundation, only 
one of these PtP foundations (the German Environmental Foundation) has 
more than 100 employees. The others are considerably smaller. Thus, the 
Cariplo Foundation, with an asset base of US$9 billion, employs only 61 
people. Compagnia di San Paolo, another nearly US$9 billion institution, 
employs 89. By contrast, the Rockefeller Foundation in the U.S., a US$ 3.5 bil-
lion asset foundation, employs over 140 people, 120 of them in its New York 
headquarters. One reason for the smaller scale of these PtP foundation 
staffs is that these foundations have tended to hive off operational units as 
they develop, and to rely extensively on outsourced services. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Cariplo Foundation established a separate Social Housing Foun-
dation to take over the operation of its innovative social housing program 
once this program became fully operational. But the contrast in the scale of 
staffing is still striking. 
 
6) Investment Management 
In addition to the management of the foundation’s programs, a number—
but not all—of our PtP case study foundations have endowment assets to 
manage.
4
 Like the other functions described above, with a few notable ex-
ceptions considerable professionalization has taken place among these 
foundations in the management of their assets, though this has sometimes 
taken a while to be fully realized given the fact that the foundations started 
out owning only a single asset in the form of shares of the privatized com-
pany and were under some pressure to avoid diversifying too rapidly to 
avoid causing the stock price to fall. Nevertheless, most of the foundations, 
and certainly most of the larger ones, have taken steps consistent with wide-
spread practice in the foundation world more generally to establish profes-
sional asset management procedures. In particular:  
 In all but two cases, each a German Type I foundation, invest-
ment is controlled by the respective foundation’s board and 
overseen by a designated investment committee. 
 Most boards have adopted investment policies that look to the 
preservation of the value of the organizations’ assets in perpe-
tuity after taking account of their desired grant levels, which in 
the Italian case were stipulated in their founding law. This has 
Considerable  
professionalization 
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foundations in  
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usually meant the pursuit of diversified investments, though the 
PtP foundations seem to have been fairly conservative investors. 
 The board generally appoints external investment managers, 
normally through open competition, but subjects these manag-
ers to periodic review and supervision by a sub-committee of 
the board. 
 Details of diversified portfolios are visible through various forms 
of reporting, but typically include a spread of shares, bonds, de-
rivatives, and cash, though some of the foundations have oper-
ated under some constraints, such as the desire to remain con-
nected in part to their original banks.  
 Investment perf rma ces have not been unusual, that is to say 
they have provided for preservation of real capital values 
against inflation and an income sufficient to cover operating 
costs and provide for generally increasing levels of grantmaking. 
In the case of the Compagnia di San Paolo, for example, in addition to its 
holdings in Italy’s sizable banking company, IntesaSanPaolo, which was 
formed through the merger of the bank formerly belonging to the founda-
tion with several other banks—a holding that constitutes 42 percent of its 
assets—Compagnia holds a diversified portfolio of securities in investment 
funds managed by Fondaco SGR, a specialized company used by other foun-
dations as well and also directly manages a small private equity portfolio. 
The Cariplo Foundation manages its investments similarly but uses another 
management company, Polaris SA, which it created in cooperation with a 
group of nonprofits.  
The investment performance of the Italian foundations of banking origin as a 
group has been notably strong, in important part thanks to the second pri-
vatization law, which mandated diversification of the foundations’ holdings 
and sale of their controlling interests in the banks just before the banking 
crisis of the late 2000s hit. As a result of these rulings, 22 of these founda-
tions no longer have any direct investments in their originating banks. Fifty-
three have minority shareholdings, while the other 13—generally smaller, 
regional foundations permitted to keep their shares—have majority share-
holdings. Initially, the foundations did quite well with their bank shares since 
these shares escalated in value during the period when the foundations 
owned them. More recently, in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, re-
turns on the bank stock have lagged behind other investments. Thus, in year 
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 6: PtP FOUNDATION PERFORMANCE  |  105 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of 
‘public law  
foundations’  
in Germany  
can give the  
appearance of  
privatizing  
an asset while still 
retaining state  
control.
2012 the non-bank investments other than property have performed better 
than the bank shares, providing 70.9 percent of the income (before deduct-
ing portfolio management costs) from 60.4 percent of the assets, as against 
29.1 percent coming from the bank shares, which make up 39.6 percent of 
the assets.  
The investment performance of the ERSTE Foundation tells a somewhat dif-
ferent story. Very likely because of the early escalation of the share value of 
the Erste Group as it acquired a series of Central and Eastern European 
banks during the 1990s, the 25 percent ownership share that the Foundation 
has in the Erste Bank and Erste Group grew in value by 2.77 times between 
2003 and 2009, prior to the financial crisis—a good investment return. But 
since these shares still constitute 99 percent of the assets of the ERSTE 
Foundation it is likely that the financial crisis has slowed this growth 
considerably.  
Mergers and acquisitions of original bank holdings also boosted the asset 
growth of the New Zealand savings banks, and careful asset management 
has allowed them to grow after the sale of their bank stock. But some other 
PtP foundations did not fare quite so well, though not always due to 
ineffective investment management. Rather, governmental interference 
constrained foundation choices in a number of cases. For example: 
• For its first 20 years, as already noted, the Volkswagen 
Foundation was required to lend its funds to the German Federal 
State at a fixed 5 percent rate. This rate provided less income 
than could have been expected from normal investment and 
indeed the real value of the endowment fell. Moreover, the 
Foundation did not receive all the proceeds from the Federal 
Government’s shares in the Company. A solution was negotiated 
in 1989, and for the following eight years the Federal Government 
paid a notional dividend on the share value as it slowly made 
good on its pledge to deposit the proceeds from its share of the 
Volkswagen Company stock in the foundation. Since then, the 
Foundation has invested its capital normally, with a spread of 
securities, bonds and national/ international investments. 
• The investments of the German Environmental Foundation 
have been under the strong influence of the Federal Finance 
Ministry, which tapped the assets of this foundation to invest in 
FDR government bonds. As a result, the investments have  
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under-performed the market. Growth from 1997 to 2009 was only 
1.81 percent per year, less than inflation. Annual reports indicate 
that in 2009 equities comprised only 21.5 percent of the asset 
allocation and that derivatives were not used until at least 2007. 
• The investments of the Baden-Württemberg Foundation have 
similarly been controlled by the state Ministry of Finance. 
Investments, mainly in real estate, securities, stocks and bonds, 
have underperformed against inflation, reducing the value of the 
endowment. Also contributing to this result was the use of 
portions of the assets for grants and the claim of the State 
government to some of the returns on sales of companies that 
had been transferred to the foundation. This led to criticisms in 
2005 in the State Parliament and by the State Audit Officer. 
• The Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation for Innovation also has 
encountered difficulties due in part to pressures from the state 
government, which controls its Board. The foundation has rarely 
covered its asset record in its annual reports. Particularly notable 
was a decision in 1994 to buy a large quantity of State govern-
ment bonds. Questions in the State Parliament have met with 
the response from the relevant ministry that information about 
the Foundation’s investments is confidential. 
 
Mission-related investing. Increasingly in recent years, leading foundations 
around the world have come to recognize that achieving maximum financial 
returns may not be the sole or even principal goal of foundation investment 
policy. As institutions established to promote public-benefit objectives, foun-
dations may have a special obligation to avoid supporting with their invest-
ment programs companies that are acting in ways that undercut the goals of 
their grant programs—e.g., by paying starvation wages, endangering employ-
ees, fouling the environment, or producing unsafe products. What is more, a 
small group of foundations is recognizing the limitations of grants as a ve-
hicle to advance social and environmental objectives and have begun func-
tioning as virtual "philanthropic banks," or investment companies, utilizing 
other financial instruments such as loans, loan guarantees, bond guarantees 
and the like, often in conjunction with private investors, in an effort to lever-
age a greater flow of capital into social-purpose activities.
5
 Known generally 
as "mission-related investing," this activity takes two concrete forms: first, the 
application of social, environmental, and governance "screens" to foundation 
Increasingly in 
recent years, leading 
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the world have 
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maximum financial 
returns may not be 
the sole or even 
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foundation 
investment policy. 
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investment decisions; and second, social and environmental impact investing, 
which involves the use of multiple investment vehicles to support nonprofit 
organizations, social enterprises or social cooperatives that are using market-
type approaches to promote social or environmental purposes. 
 
While both of these developments are growing, they remain embryonic, at 
least within the foundation community. Thus, the Forum for Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment (US SIF), the affinity group that tracks the use of 
environmental, social, or governance (ESG) screens among institutional in-
vestors, was able to identify only 95 U.S. foundations out of the country’s 
76,545 such institutions—a mere 1/10th of 1 percent of the foundations—
that reported applying ESG criteria to their investments as of 2012.
6
 And only 
a handful of U.S. foundations are using either their grant budgets or their 
endowments to make pro-active social-impact investments. Even the most 
popular of the vehicles for such investments, so-called "program-related 
investments," or "PRIs," have never attracted even  3/10
ths
 of 1 percent of all 
U.S. foundations—less than 200 institutions in all—in even their peak year.7 
Set against this experience in the U.S., the record of the PtP foundations in 
utilizing these two innovative forms of mission investing, while far from uni-
versal, is extraordinarily robust. Focusing first on the application of invest-
ment screens, compared to the 1/10th of 1 percent of U.S. foundations that 
reported using such screens, a striking 29 percent of our PtP case study 
foundations (six of the 21 cases) were found to be applying such screens on 
their investments. Included here are: ASB Community Trust, Community 
Trust of Southland, Oranje Foundation, King Baudouin Foundation, 
Cariplo Foundation, and Fondazione CRT. The two New Zealand trusts, for 
example, have signed on to the United Nations Principles for Responsible In-
vestment and both are members of the Responsible Investment Association 
of Australasia. The ASB Community Trust is also a signatory of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project. The Oranje Foundation has careful screens on invest-
ment of its endowment to ensure that investments adhere to six principles 
set out in the foundation’s mission statement—i.e., "relevance, reputation, 
relaxation, results, risks, and returns." Of these, ‘reputation’ brings the great-
est imposition of constraints. The King Baudouin Foundation a focuses its 
screens a bit more narrowly on investments in companies producing land-
mines and cluster bombs. The Cariplo Foundation has perhaps the most 
far-reaching ESG screening approach, barring investments in companies that 
violate the main international conventions regarding human rights, the 
environment, and producing weapons of mass destruction. 
The record of the 
PtP foundations in 
utilizing innovative 
forms of mission 
investing, while  
far from universal, 
is extraordinarily 
robust. 
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With regard to social-impact investing, the record among PtP foundations is 
also quite impressive. At least four of the 21 PtP cases we examined (nearly 
20 percent) have already begun functioning as "philanthropic banks" in this 
fashion. One of the earliest to do so was the Community Trust of 
Southland, which in the late 1990s established a 50/50 joint venture called 
Invest South Ltd. with the Southland Building Society (now the SBS Bank) as 
a vehicle through which to provide equity support for promising local busi-
nesses. More recently, it assumed 100 percent ownership of Invest South, 
and now has $8 million of the trust's capital invested through that initiative.  
Another arly convert to this mode of operation was Fondazione CRT, one 
of the Italian foundations of banking origin, which created a separate entity, 
the Fondazione Sviluppo e Crescita (Foundation for Development and 
Growth) through which to channel equity investments into social ventures in 
the Torino region. The foundation has committed €220 million (US$286 
million) to this fund. As explained by then-Secretary General Angelo 
Miglietta, this marked "a new, significant change in the way [Fondazione CRT] 
allocates funds. Previous operational methods—non-refundable grants, 
development of own projects—are now accompanied by a quite innovative 
approach in the Italian philanthropic scenario…inspired by  'venture 
philanthropy' [involving] a comprehensive investment strategy."
8
 
Fondazione CRT was also one of the first Italian foundations to join the 
European Venture Philanthropy Association, a group of foundations and 
social investment funds promoting the concepts of high-engagement 
philanthropy and the use of a broad array of investment vehicles to advance 
social purposes. Also entering this social investment space has been the 
King Baudouin Foundation, which has committed €65 million of its 
endowment to mission-related investments and recently made a €250,000 
investment in an innovative UK Social Impact Bond initiative.  
Of all the PtP case study foundations, however, the one that has made the 
largest commitment to social-impact investing is the Cariplo Foundation. 
Cariplo started down this road as early as 1999 when it launched its Social 
Housing Project, which utilized a combination of loans and grants to stim-
ulate the development of low-cost housing for disadvantaged persons and 
help them achieve autonomy. From this start, the Foundation has developed 
a robust social-impact investment program operating in four areas—
domestic social housing, international microfinance, domestic venture capi-
tal, and domestic infrastructure. The Foundation has committed €510 million 
(US$665 million) to these activities and operates through an array of social-
With regard to 
social-impact 
investing,  
the record  
among PtP 
foundations  
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impressive. 
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institutions. 
impact investment funds such as the Fondo Immobiliare di Lombardia in the 
field of social housing, and TTVenture in the field of technology transfer.
9
 
Reflecting the involvement of the Cariplo Foundation and Fondazione CRT 
among others, mission-related investments now account for over 8 percent 
of the total assets of Italian FBOs, putting them among the global leaders in 
this new field of foundation operations. 
 
PROGRAMMATIC PERFORMANCE  
 
Ultimately, the most significant thing we would like to know about the PtP 
foundations is whether they were good stewards of the resources put in 
their hands, whether they have effectively promoted the public good, and 
whether they have done so better than would have occurred if the same re-
sources had simply been dumped into government budgets. But if this is the 
most significant question to answer, it is also the most difficult, though not 
because of any doubt about the existence of positive contributions. The 
problem is rather that the benefits are so extensive and diverse that it is 
hard to provide a comprehensive overview with a proper sense of scale. Two 
major challenges are that the foundations lack a common framework of cat-
egories of benefits and that the quality of reporting, though generally high, is 
not consistent. What is more, impact measurement methodology remains 
very much a "work in progress" due to the complexity of social interventions 
and the difficulties of assessing benefits even in single program areas, let 
alone across them.
10
 What is more, developing a methodology to compare 
the contributions of the PtP foundations to what would have been accom-
plished by governments with the same resources seems thoroughly unreal-
istic and certainly beyond the resources available for this project.  
What is possible, however, is to identify at least the main lines of work that 
these foundations have pursued and some features of the style they have 
brought to them. More specifically, we believe the evidence supports four 
general observations about the programmatic performance of our case 
study foundations. 
1) PtP Foundations Bring Important Resources into the Civil 
Society Communities in which They Operate 
With the exception of the La Scala Foundation, which is basically an oper-
ating foundation running a world-renowned opera company, all of the PtP 
foundations examined here are essentially grant-making foundations. What 
is more, except for the Baden-Württemberg Foundation, the grants issued 
Ultimately, the 
most significant 
thing we would like 
to know about the 
PtP foundations is 
whether they  
have effectively 
promoted the 
public good. 
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48 
The justification of the governmental bill, 
approved by the Parliament on May 5, 1992 under the 
#282/1992 that promulgated the provisions about the 
transfer of property for the purpose of support of 
foundations and amended the Act No. 171/1991 on 
the Authority of State Bodies of Czech Republic in 
the process of Transfer of Public Property. 
psp.cz/eknih/1990cnr/stenprot/036schuz/s036002.htm
. 
by these foundations generally flowed heavily to nonprofit, or civil society, or-
ganizations, though a significant portion of the research grants went to gov-
ernment research institutions. What is more, these grants have been substan-
tial—in many cases significantly transforming and strengthening local civil soci-
ety sectors. A preliminary rough and partial estimate of the grants made by 
these institutions over their lives totals at least US$32 billion; however, this in-
cludes all the Italian FBOs but not all of the U.S. conversion foundations, or all 
of the Austrian, New Zealand, or German cases.  
In addition to their dominant grant-making activities, moreover, many of these 
foundations have launched a variety of directly operated programs, some of 
which they have since hived off to newly established nonprofits, thus broaden-
ing the base of civil society capabilities. This reflects the determination of many 
of these institutions to be more than mere reactive check-writers, to be sources 
as well of positive change in their areas of work. Thus, the Campagnia di San 
Paolo complements its regular grantmaking through a number of operating 
bodies that include the Fondazione per la Scuola, the Ufficio Pio, the Collegio 
Carlo Alberto, and the Istituto Superiore sui Sistemi Territoriali per 
l’Innovazione. Similarly, the Fondazione CRT pursues cultural objectives 
through the Cittá e Catterdrali Project, education and scientific research 
through its "Reading Economics" and "Master dei Talenti" projects, and social 
welfare promoti n through the "Safety Vehicle Project." Likewise, the King 
Baudouin Foundation created a Centre for Philanthropy to promote giving in 
Belgium and to stimulate the establishment of donor advised funds; and the 
ERSTE Foundation established a new bank, the Zweite Sparkasse, to help disad-
vantaged people get out of debt and secure a favourable credit rating. 
2) PtP Foundations Tend to be Regionally Focused 
The importance of the sizable scale of the PtP foundations and of the grant-
making that they generate is magnified by the limited geographical areas in 
which they tend to focus their activities. Most of the PtP case study foundations 
are locally focused—serving regions, states within nations, or provinces (see 
FIGURE 6.1). A significant minority serve whole nations, though these tend to be 
in smaller countries. Where there are exceptions to this pattern, it is usually be-
cause the original ‘deal’ provided for some international grant-making. 
Thanks to this geographic focus, the PtP foundations have an outsized impact 
on the robustness of nonprofit life, and indeed on public problem-solving more 
generally, in their localities. At the high end of the scale, each German PtP 
foundation is the largest or second largest in its province.  
Thanks to their 
regional focus, the 
PtP foundations 
have an outsized 
impact on the 
robustness of 
nonprofit life, and 
indeed on public 
problem-solving. 
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FIGURE 6.1 
Most PtP foundations are locally focused 
 
 
The Volkswagen Foundation (with combined national/provincial funding and 
an endowment of €2.6bn) is highly significant in the context of Germany as a 
whole, but half of its funding is focused on the State of Lower Saxony, where 
the original Volkswagen Company factories were located. The Italian FBOs, 
with cumulative assets of over €42 billion (US$65 billion) as of 2012, are 
concentrated in the north of the country and focus heavily on their respective 
regions, though the larger of these have chosen to help fund a Foundation of 
the South to share the wealth with the lagging southern region of the country 
and also ventured into international work. The City of Torino alone has two 
huge foundations of banking origin, Campagnia di San Paolo and 
Fondazione CRT. While the equivalent value of the endowments of the two 
New Zealand foundations is many times smaller (around US$950 million 
together), each is highly significant in its region. The endowment of the 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation, though similarly small (about 1/100th of 
the size of the NZ cases), is still large enough to make this foundation a highly 
significant funder in Slovakia. And, of course, the Baden-Württemberg 
Foundation and the Rheinland-Pfalz for Innovation were created in 
important part to ensure that significant resources associated with state-
owned enterprises located in their respective states remained in the states. 
The one clear deviation from this pattern is the German Environmental 
Foundation, which claims to be the world’s largest environmental founda-
tion. But here, too, regional considerations have been at work in locating the 
foundation’s headquarters in the State of Lower Saxony where the original 
company, Salzgitter AG, was located. 
This regional focus is a natural byproduct of the origin of the assets whose 
privatization led to the creation of these foundations—for example savings 
banks with local or regional origins, regional health institutions, and regional 
energy companies. But, of course, most privatizations involve enterprises 
that have a regional or local footprint, making it possible for residents of 
these areas to encourage some degree of local focus to any foundations re-
sulting from privatization transactions, particularly where local politicians 
come forward to support the idea. The PtP concept may therefore be 
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eminently suited to the promotion of community foun-
dations or other community-based philanthropic enti-
ties, a point to which we will return in the next chapter. 
 
3) PtP Foundations Operate in a Broad Array  
of Areas, Many of which Reflect Classic 
Conceptions of the Special Contributions  
that Foundation Institutions Can Make 
Nearly all of our PtP case study foundations reflect, 
through their grant-making and operational programs, 
some or all of the general programmatic characteristics 
that make foundations so valuable, as outlined in BOX 
6.1. Not all foundations reflect all of these features at 
the same time, however. Indeed, among the PtP case 
study foundations it is possible to detect two broad pat-
terns of substantive activity. First, the majority of these 
foundations follow what might be termed a generalist 
pattern characterized by a broad mandate to pursue 
public purposes. But a sizable minority of the founda-
tions adhere to what might be termed a specialist pat-
tern, focusing on a specific field of activity.
11
 
This naturally reflects the origins of these institutions. 
As we have seen, the PtP option often gained traction in 
circumstances in which a persuasive individual saw a 
need to protect resources in order to promote a specific 
national or regional objective considered to be too im-
portant to be left to the whims of political decision-
making or strategically important in wooing potential 
voters. Such objectives included the promotion of sci-
ence in the cases of  the Volkswagen Foundation, the 
Baden-Württemberg Foundation, the Rheinland-
Pfalz Foundation for Innovation, and the Foundation 
for Polish Science; the protection of the environment 
in the case of the German Environmental Founda-
tion; and the promotion of health in the case of the 
California Endowment and the numerous other health 
conversion foundations in the U.S.  
 
BOX 6.1  
Why Do We Need  
Foundations? 
------------------------ 
 
Foundations provide funding that is independent of 
government or commerce, and is managed and directed 
by independent trustees. 
 
Foundations tend to fund at a level that is much smaller 
than government but is nonetheless very significant 
because it contributes to pluralistic approaches and 
pluralistic societies by supporting:   
 
1. Research, particularly ‘blue skies’ research that 
often requires freedom from short-term political 
and commercial constraints. 
2. Experimental programs involving risk-taking and 
often requiring long periods to test. 
3. Cultural activity and institutions that contribute to 
the vitality of community life. 
4. Minorities or disadvantaged groups that are often 
overlooked by large government programmes or 
pose new needs or live in remote areas. 
5. Citizen engagement and advocacy that nourishes 
democracy and gives voice to the voiceless. 
6. A vibrant third sector that keeps alive the special 
importance of volunteering and charitable giving, 
fosters bonds of trust, and nourishes the important 
value of private initiative for the common good. 
 
Adapted with permission from a summary prepared for 
the PtP Project by Nigel Siederer, Good Foundations 
Consultancy. 
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In other cases, the nature and origin of the assets had a 
bigger impact on the result, as seems to have been the 
case in the broad charitable objectives adopted by the 
foundations growing out of the privatization of the sav-
ings banks in New Zealand, Italy, Austria, and England and 
Wales, all of which maintained broad charitable remits fo-
cused on particular local areas, reminiscent of the chari-
table activities of the original banks. 
Not surprisingly, the fields of activity of these generalist 
foundations are consequently exceedingly diverse, though 
one of the critical tasks for any such foundation is to carve 
out a meaningful niche where it can make a difference. 
The Italian FBOs, for example, have the option to work in 
any of 21 different fields laid out in the law establishing 
them (see BOX 6.2). However, Italian lawmakers were 
prescient enough to stipulate that each foundation had to 
allocate at least 50% of its grants to no more than five of 
these fields, which can be changed every three years.   
Taken together, the grant-making pattern of these PtP 
foundations therefore presents a picture of considerable 
breadth and diversity, though gaining a clear overview of 
these funding patterns is extremely difficult since the 
foundations, having grown up independently of each 
other, have no common base for collecting statistics. What 
is more, not all report on their funding patterns and some 
that do report provide cumulative totals while others do 
not.  
Despite these challenges, it is possible to get a very pre-
liminary and partial view of the funding patterns of our 
PtP case study foundations by drawing on records kept by 
many of the individual foundations studied, and from a 
full survey of all the Italian FBOs completed in 2012. How-
ever, the Italian foundations account for 74.1% of all 
giving we have been able to track, so using their full 
results tends to distort the overview.
12
 Accordingly, TABLE 
6.2, which records the results of this analysis, reports 
these results with and without the Italian foundations of 
banking origin, though it cannot be known which group is 
 
BOX 6.2  
Permissible Fields of 
Activity of Italian 
Foundations of  
Banking Origin 
------------------------ 
 
1. Family and related values 
2. Youth training 
3. Education, learning, and training  
4. Volunteering, philanthropy, and charity 
5. Religion and spiritual development 
6. Assistance to the elderly 
7. Civil rights 
8. Crime prevention and safety 
9. Food safety and quality agriculture 
10. Local development and low income housing 
11. Consumer protection 
12. Civil protection 
13. Public health, preventive and rehabilitative 
medicine 
14. Sport activities 
15. Addiction prevention and recovery 
16. Psychic and mental pathologies and disorders 
17. Scientific and technological research 
18. Environmental protection and quality 
19. Art, cultural activities, and heritage 
20. Public or public utility works 
21. Infrastructures 
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TABLE 6.2  
Distribution of grants by PtP foundations* 
 
  All cases studied Excluding Italian foundations of banking origin (which gave 74.1% of the total) 
  Generalist foundations 
Specialist 
foundations All 
Generalist 
foundations 
Specialist 
foundations 
All 
% of all Foundations: 85.8% 14.2% 100% 45.4% 54.6% 100% 
Area of giving % of giving % of giving % of giving % of giving % of giving % of giving 
Culture 28.3 2.6 24.6 1.9 2.6 2.3 
Social responsibility and welfare 13.2 18.6 13.9 12.6 18.6 15.9 
Scientific research and education 12.6 20.3 13.7 12.5 20.3 16.8 
Education 15 0.4 12.9 12.6 0.4 5.9 
Nonprofit sector and philanthropic activity 11.1 0 9.5 1.2 0 1.1 
Community and civic projects 10.4 0 8.9 38.9 0 17.7 
Health 5.3 23.6 7.9 1.8 23.6 13. 7 
Environment 0.9 32.1 5.3 2.4 32.1 18.6 
Children, young people, and family 1.1 0.9 1.1 3.8 0.9 2.2 
Human rights / Holocaust victims 0.9 0 0.8 6.76 0 3.1 
Leisure and sport 0.7 0 0.6 1.02 0 0.5 
International 0.5 0 0.4 3.36 0 1.5 
Historic monuments 0 1.2 0.2 0.07 1.2 0.7 
In-house projects 0 0.3 0.04 0 0.3 0.2 
 
*Data reported here are somewhat inconsistent, covering the full life of individual PtP case study foundations where such data were provided but including  
all foundations of banking origin in the case of Italy. 
Source: Compiled by Nigel Siederer from PtP Project Field Guides. 
more typical of PtP foundations generally. We also differentiate the results 
for the generalist foundations from those for the specialist ones since these 
differed considerably in orientation.
13
  
Bearing in mind the caveats noted above, it seems possible to draw several 
observations from these data: 
 First, it is clear that the PtP foundations as a group support a 
broad span of fields, ranging from culture and education to social 
responsibility and general support for the third sector and 
philanthropy.   
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 Second, the specialist foundations, as expected, focus much 
more heavily on their particular areas of specialization, with 
one important exception. Thus, the specialist foundations as a 
group are much more heavily focused than the generalist 
foundations on scientific affairs, health, and the environment. 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, they are also at least slightly 
more focused than the generalist foundations on "social re-
sponsibility and welfare," though this may be an artifact of the 
categorization used for these data. 
 Third, some significant differences appear between the Italian 
FBOs and the other generalist foundations. In the first place, 
the Italian PtP foundations seem more heavily oriented to 
culture and the arts than are the other generalist foundations. 
This may reflect an historic commitment stretching back to the 
philanthropic activities of the former banks. On the other hand, 
they are more supportive of general nonprofit and 
philanthropic activity, though here again classification 
problems may be at work since the other foundations may 
have classified their support for the third sector under 
"community and civic projects." Finally, human rights activities 
seem to receive less focus on the part of the Italian founda-
tions than on the part of the other generalist foundations. 
 
4) The PtP Foundations have been Innovators  
One final observation that can usefully be made about the PtP case study 
foundations we have examined here is that they have an impressive track 
record of innovation. This is not to say that they have been more innova-
tive, or even as innovative, as other foundations. Data to support, or refute, 
such claims are simply unavailable. What is more, judgments about what is 
truly innovative are inevitably open to disagreements. The suggestion here, 
rather, is that there is enough evidence of interesting, off-the-beaten-path 
programming activity on the part of the PtP foundations we have examined 
to dispute any suggestion that they are merely check-writing operations 
passing out money to friends and relatives of influential politicians and 
board members. Interesting innovations surfaced in our research are: 
 The Volkswagen Foundation’s "Knowledge for Tomorrow" 
initiative aimed at African countries south of the Sahara;  
The PtP  
foundations  
that we have  
examined exhibit 
an impressive  
track record of 
innovation. 
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 The Baden-Württemberg Foundation's "Funding the 
Future" program; 
 The Foundation for Polish Science’s "PARENT/BRIDGE" 
program, which is designed to enable the best researchers 
who are raising young children to return to advanced 
research work; 
 The King Baudouin Foundation’s "BELvue" initiative de-
signed to bolster confidence in democracy and stimulate 
critical thinking on democracy’s big challenges; 
 The Cariplo Foundation’s "Etre project" designed to support 
young companies specializing in theatrical production, or its 
"EST project" aimed at kindling interest in science among 
elementary and middle school students; 
 The California Endowment’s "Building Healthy 
Communities" initiative, a 10-year initiative to help 14 pilot 
communities across the State of California become places 
where children and youth are "healthy, safe, and ready to 
learn;" and 
 The Community Trust of Southland’s "community-led devel-
opment" initiative intended to engage a range of community 
stakeholders in comprehensive community development 
efforts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The PtP foundations that we have examined thus exhibit an impressive track 
record of achievement. With just a few exceptions, these organizations have 
matured as institutions and have incorporated some of the leading-edge 
concepts about how to operate a modern foundation. Thus, they have de-
veloped respectable transparency procedures, solid conflict of interest pro-
tections, and internal guidance systems organized around coherent and reg-
ularly updated mission statements. In their investment activities as well 
these foundations have created reliable, if somewhat conservative, proce-
dures and policies, and an impressively sizable proportion of them have 
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moved to the head of the foundation community globally in experimenting 
with ways to leverage their resources through the use of non-grant forms of 
assistance. Finally, they have contributed significant resources to their local 
regions and fields of activity, remaining true to their founding missions but 
finding often-innovative and proactive ways to promote them. While it is im-
possible to say whether their impact has been greater than might have been 
achieved by putting the resources they gained into the hands of governmen-
tal bodies, their record seems to be sufficiently strong to make this at least a 
plausible conclusion. 
1
 For example, see: Paul Brest and Hal Harvey, Money Well Spent: A Strategic Plan for Smart 
Philanthropy, (New York: Bloomberg Press, 2008). 
2 European Foundation Center, "EFC Principles of Good Practice,"  (accessed 1 September 
2013.) Some of the language has been summarized here for space reasons. 
3 This section draws on material compiled by Nigel Siederer from the PtP case studies 
prepared by Project Associates. See: Nigel Siederer, "Operations and Activities of Charitable 
Institutions Created by PtP," Philanthropication thru Privatization Project Working Paper No.1, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 2014). 
4 The PtP case study foundations that do not have asset management responsibilities include 
the ERSTE Foundation, which is obliged to retain, and not sell, its shares in the Erste Bank, 
which constitutes its entire corpus; and Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales, which 
holds 5 percent of the shares of the Lloyds TSB but is forbidden from selling them. The two 
cases involving lotteries receive their PtP-related funds in the form of annual revenue rather 
than a lump-sum endowment, but both of the foundations involved have other assets that 
they manage. 
5 For an analysis of this mode of foundation behavior, see: Lester M. Salamon and William 
Burckart, "Foundations as Philanthropic Banks," Chapter 5 in New Frontiers of Philanthropy: The 
New Actors and Tools Reshaping Global Philanthropy and Social Investment, edited by Lester M. 
Salamon, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). For a more general introduction to such 
approaches, see: Lester M. Salamon, Leverage for Good: An Introduction to the New Frontiers of 
Philanthropy and Social Investing, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
6 Meg Voorhes, Joshua Humphries, and Ann Solomon, Report on Sustainable and Responsible 
Investing Trends in the United States, (Washington, DC: US SIF Foundation, 2012), 11. 
7 Steven Lawrence and Reina Mukai, Key Facts on Mission Investing, (New York: The Foundation 
Center, 2011).  
8 Angelo Miglietta "New ideas and experiences in granting and supporting social investment: 
the ‘strange’ case of Fondazione CRT and its network," Unpublished paper, n.d. 
9 "Mission Connected Investments: Fondazione Cariplo’s Experience," PowerPoint 
Presentation. (Milano: Fondazione Cariplo, February 2013). 
10 On the challenges of social impact assessment, see: Brian Trelstad, "The Elusive Quest for 
Impact: The Evolving Practice of Social Impact Measurement," Chapter 22 in New Frontiers of 
Philanthropy: The New Actors and Tools Reshaping Global Philanthropy and Social Investing, edited 
by Lester M. Salamon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
11 I am indebted to Nigel Siederer for identifying this distinction and analyzing our case study 
foundations in terms of it. See: Siederer, "Operations and Activities of Charitable Institutions 
Created by PtP," 2014. 
12 Also included were the results of a similar survey of all foundations funded by the Czech 
Foundation Investment Fund, but their data (1.91% of giving by value) do not distort the 
results. 
13 Based on analysis offered by Siederer, "Operations and Activities of Charitable Institutions 
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? 
The fact that a significant number of foundations have been formed or 
strengthened as a result of philanthropication thru privatization transactions 
and that these institutions have amassed a quite respectable record of both 
procedural and substantive performance is still no guarantee that this option 
can operate in the future. For one thing, there is a widespread belief that pri-
vatization is a thing of the past and that the major wave of privatization is be-
hind us. This view is amplified by the growing evidence of popular resistance 
to privatization visible throughout the world, resistance fueled by convictions 
that privatization has not "worked." Finally, foundations remain, at best, 
poorly understood and, at worst, objects of suspicion in many locales. 
Convincing people to put substantial resources into charitable foundations 
can therefore be a hard sell. 
Notwithstanding these reasonable arguments, there remain some compelling 
reasons for believing that PtP not only has a future, but a dramatically ex-
panded one, in the years ahead. But this expanded future will not arrive auto-
matically; rather, it will require concerted action on the part of all of those with 
a stake in its further development. And, as noted below, this paradoxically in-
cludes not only civil society activists and promoters of charitable giving, but 
also businesses and governments contemplating or engaged in privatization 
activities. 
 
THE CASE FOR PtP’s FUTURE  
What, then, are the reasons for believing in a potentially robust future for PtP? 
Fundamentally, there are five. 
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1) The Myth of the End of Privatization 
In the first place, the widespread belief that privatization is somehow "over" ig-
nores a number of crucial developments and realities. 
 
 The wave of privatization of state-owned enterprises that swept the 
world in the 1980s and 1990s did not come close to exhausting the 
range of such enterprises in existence. To quote again from the 1995 
World Bank report cited earlier, "[d]espite more than a decade of 
divestiture efforts and the growing consensus that government 
performs less well than the private sector in a host of activities, 
state-owned enterprises account for nearly as large a share of de-
veloping economies today as twenty years ago."
1
 Returning to this 
same topic nearly a decade later, in 2004, Bartolotti and Siniscalo 
reached a similar conclusion, noting that "The privatization process 
has been partial and incomplete…. According to available research 
there are a huge number of companies to be privatized….The les-
sons of history have, therefore, plenty of room for application."
2 
 
 Far from diminishing, the range of state-owned companies expanded 
during the recent economic crisis as governments "bulked up" on 
private companies in crucial industries—from financial services to 
auto manufacturing—that were viewed as "too big to fail" and 
therefore in need of government take-over or bail-outs. It seems 
likely that governments will begin to unload the assets they ac-
quired during this process as economic conditions improve, as has 
already begun to happen. 
 The heavy indebtedness that is dragging down economies in Europe and 
elsewhere has added a new rationale to the privatization argument. 
What is more, it has added new external pressures on countries to 
bite the privatization bullet as the so-called "troika" of the IMF, the 
European Central Bank, and the EU have made continued bail-outs 
and loans to troubled countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal,  
and Ireland contingent on active decoupling of country budgets 
from inefficient and capital-starved, state-owned enterprises. 
 Developing countries as well face continuing debt problems and are un-
der pressure to entice outside investment into their economies. Sales of 
partial or full ownership shares of publicly owned and operated 
electricity grids, banks, cell phone franchises, mineral deposits, and 
other under-performing assets thus provide attractive targets. 
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FIGURE 7.1  
Worldwide revenues from privatizations, 1988-1H2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: William Megginson,  "Privatization Trends," in The PB Report 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There continues to be widespread belief among economists and fi-
nance experts that privatization makes good economic sense and that 
countries with heavy layers of state-owned businesses cannot 
prosper in the new global economy. One recent weighing of the 
vast literature that has surfaced about privatization acknowledges 
the distributional problems that privatization often creates but 
nevertheless concludes that "privatization contributes to aggre-
gate welfare, meaning that the process does contribute to gains in 
total available economic resources in a society."
3
  
Reflecting these and other considerations, privatization has recently spiked up-
ward again. Indeed, recently released data reveal that 2012 was the third high-
est year for privatization deals since data began to be assembled in the late 
1980s. In particular, as shown in FIGURE 7.1, global privatization deals in 2012 
totaled close to US$187 billion—behind only 2009’s $265 billion and 2010’s 
nearly $214 billion, but well ahead of the $140-$160 billion levels in the sup-
posed heydays of privatization in the late 1990s.
4
  
One reason for this was the beginning of the unwinding of government owner-
ship of bailed-out firms, propelling the United States into the lead among pri-
vatizers in 2012 as it unloaded its enormous investments in the AIG company 
and in General Motors. But other leading countries included China, Brazil, and 
Portugal, suggesting the shift in privatization activity away from Europe and to-
ward the Far East and the BRIC countries. 
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What is more, data from the first half of 2013 already suggest that this trend 
is likely to continue, especially given announcements of major privatization 
plans in countries as diverse as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal Romania, 
Ukraine, Sweden, Slovenia, the U.K., New Zealand, Brazil, Korea, Japan, Tuni-
sia, Russia, India, and Japan.
5
 As summarized by privatization expert Dr. 
William Megginson, "[t]he large number...and value…of privatizations exe-
cuted during the first half of 2013, coupled with several massive planned sale 
announcements, suggests that a major new global privatization wave may 
be forming."
6
 [Emphasis added] 
 
2) The Paradox of Popular Opposition to Privatization 
In addition to the evidence of continued and even accelerating growth of pri-
vatization, a second reason for believing that PtP may have a bright future 
arises, paradoxically enough, from the growing evidence of significant oppo-
sition to privatization. As one observer has put it: "After 2000, some of the 
bloom came off the privatization rose….Privatization everywhere remains a 
very hard political sell."
97
 One recent survey in Central and Eastern Europe, 
for example, revealed that 80 percent of respondents opposed the status 
quo achieved through privatization and wanted to change it in some way. In-
terestingly, only 29 percent favored returning the assets to government con-
trol, suggesting that respondents favour private ownership if they can see 
some more tangible benefit from the transactions that lead to it.
8
 Surveys 
carried out by Latinobarometer covering 19,000 people in 18 Latin American 
countries found that the percentage of respondents who disagree or disa-
gree strongly with the statement that "privatization of state enterprise has 
been beneficial for the country" rose from 54 percent in 1978 to 78 percent 
in 2003 and stayed close to 65 percent in four surveys taken since then.
9
 
But scientific research is not needed to demonstrate the push-back on pri-
vatization. Citizens have increasingly taken to the streets to demonstrate it. 
The original deal for Ukraine’s Kryvorizhstal steel plant, for example, helped 
generate Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Such protests have even penetrated 
China, as one Chinese provincial government was forced to halt the privatiza-
tion of a state-owned steel mill in mid-2010 after thousands of workers took 
to the streets, this on the heels of another protest three weeks earlier in an-
other Chinese province that led to the beating death of an executive over-
seeing the sale of another state-owned steel company.
10
 
These protests and negative sentiments have made privatization politically 
treacherous. The fall-out is not only political, however. The consequences 
can also be economic. Thus, there were a significant number of failed,  
Philanthropication thru Privatization | CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: Does PtP Have a Future?  |  123  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
withdrawn, or cancelled privatization sales in 2012, following an even more 
dismal record in 2010. Such events can be highly disruptive to the affected 
investors and highly damaging to country reputations, discouraging future 
investors from committing and lowering prospective prices on tendered 
assets.  
To the extent that PtP provides a way to respond to this citizen push-back it 
can thus create enormous win-win possibilities for communities, govern-
ments, and investors alike. But what makes us think philanthropication thru 
privatization can achieve this result? 
Several students of privatization have suggested at least a part of the answer 
to this question. According to these observers, the dilemma of privatization 
is not that it does not deliver real benefits to countries. Rather, the dilemma 
is that the benefits are upside-down. As one observer points out: "the societal 
benefits of privatization, while cumulatively significant, are individually 
small." What is more, the small winners—consumers and taxpayers—only 
gain in the medium to long term, whereas those potentially or actually im-
pacted negatively—typically those employed by, or living in close proximity 
to, the privatized firms—are affected almost immediately.11 
The solution to this dilemma, several other students of the topic have con-
cluded, is "to give to the population at large a stake in the success of the pol-
icy itself."
12
 
But this is precisely what PtP can accomplish: it gives the population a stake 
in the success of privatization by creating permanent tangible benefits for 
them from the process. What is more, it does so more visibly, and more reli-
ably, than dumping the same quantity of resources into government budg-
ets, where they often disappear without a trace. 
 
As the discussion above has demonstrated, PtP foundations can easily be 
structured to target their benefits on particular locales, such as the locales 
where the firms being privatized are located, thus cancelling the upside-
down effects of privatization by delivering the greatest benefits to the citi-
zens at greatest risk of being adversely affected. What is more, such founda-
tions can be reliably dedicated to purposes most likely to be useful to these 
populations, such as worker retraining or economic revitalization, purposes 
that the existing PtP foundations have demonstrated a capability to pursue 
fairly effectively. Further, these outcomes can be more confidently 
guaranteed by designing the governance structures of the resulting institu-
There were a  
significant number 
of failed, withdrawn, 
or cancelled 
privatization sales in 
2012, following an 
even more dismal 
record in 2010. 
The dilemma of 
privatization is not 
that it does not  
deliver real benefits 
to countries. 
Rather, the  
dilemma is that  
the benefits are 
upside-down. 
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tions in ways that guarantee citizens and their organizations meaningful 
voices in the management and operations of the foundations, something that 
a number of the PtP foundations have also found ways to achieve. 
The positive effects such strategies can achieve were already evident in the 
case studies examined earlier. In each of the PtP cases we examined, the suc-
cess of the privatization initiative was critically dependent on the direct link 
that the PtP option made it possible to draw between the privatization process 
and tangible benefits for citizens. This was the case for: 
 
 The dedication of one percent of all privatized company shares 
to a Foundation Investment Fund in the Czech Republic and the 
ultimate distribution of the proceeds of these shares to 73 
foundations. 
 The similar initial commitment of two percent of the shares of 
privatized companies in Poland to a foundation dedicated to 
scientific advance. 
 The creation of a private foundation to safeguard the remaining 
assets of the Socialist Union of Youth in Slovakia. 
 The dedication of the proceeds of the sale of the Salzgitter com-
plex to environmental improvement and of the Volkswagen 
Company sale to the promotion of science in Germany. 
 The creation of two huge foundations dedicated to the health of 
California citizens as the price of allowing Blue Cross of Cali-
fornia to convert into a for-profit company. 
 
All of these achieved win-win results for those interested in the transfor-
mation of important industries as well as those determined to protect the 
achievement of important, people-oriented benefits, not only on a temporary 
basis, but over the long term.  
Evidence of the positive impact such linkages can produce have been visible as 
well in such examples as the decision of the recent Sarkozy government in 
France to pledge the €3.7 billion in proceeds from its 2007 sale of Electricité de 
France to capital investments in the country's aged university facilities as a 
way to silence opposition to the sale.
13
 One wonders if this result would have 
been more believable to the French population had it been accompanied by a 
plan to vest the resources in a foundation with this as its chartered purpose. 
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3) Assets in Line for Privatization that Seem Particularly 
Appropriate for PtP  
As the discussion of prior PtP cases above suggests, one factor facilitating PtP 
transactions are assets in line for privatization that have some peculiar char-
acter to them that legitimizes citizen claims for putting at least a share of the 
proceeds from their sale into a private institution governed by private citizens. 
The local character, historically private control, and philanthropic traditions of 
the savings banks in Italy, New Zealand, Austria, and the UK; the image of the 
Volkswagen Company as a "peoples" factory producing the peoples’ cars; the 
character of the assets of the Socialist Union of Youth as belonging to the 
youth of Slovakia; the nonprofit legal structure and history of public subsidy in 
the case of Blue Cross of California—all of these strengthened the case for 
establishing private foundations to manage the assets resulting from the 
privatization or conversion of these entities. To what extent do similar 
situations exist in current privatization activity? 
The answer, it seems is "to a considerable extent." In some sense, of course, a 
case could be made about any state-owned enterprise or other asset. These 
assets belong, in some fundamental sense, to the people of the country in 
which they are located. It is their sweat and toil that built the enterprises and 
their taxes that helped finance them. It seems only right that they should 
share in the proceeds and do so in some rough proportion to whatever pain 
the privatization process inflicts. As noted above, charitable foundations are 
one way to achieve this reliably, and to target the benefits on those most 
affected, provided, of course, that the governance mechanisms are designed 
in such a way as to facilitate and ensure this. 
But beyond this general case, there are a number of more specific circum-
stances that seem ideally suited for PtP outcomes. Included here are: 
Mineral rights. A fierce battle is under way over mineral rights in numerous 
places throughout the world, from Central Asia through much of Africa. In 
Africa, for example, in order to facilitate mineral exploration and extraction 
and the resulting mineral rights payments, countries have been laying claim to 
ownership of land—or at least the minerals that lie beneath it—challenging 
long-standing traditional tribal rights to the lands. In the Republic of Zambia, 
for example, land is held by customary tenure, and although the government 
has encouraged citizens to take formal legal title to their land, many are 
unaware of the need to do so and the state has appropriated to itself the 
authority to revoke any untitled land awarded by traditional rulers and lease it 
to prospectors. Reports of prospectors forcing farmers off their land have 
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thus become commonplace in Luapula Province of Zambia, a region rich in 
copper and other minerals. Although mineral excavation has enriched 
government coffers and a privileged few, almost none of the benefits have 
flowed down to the rural poor, most of whom subsist on less than US$1 per 
day.
14
  
Similar disputes have broken out in South Africa leading to a major legal 
case over that country's Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002, 
which similarly deprived landowners of the ownership of unexplored min-
eral and petroleum products and proclaimed such resources to be "the 
common heritage of all the people of South Africa" with the State as the cus-
todian and "old order" rights required to be converted into "new order" 
rights within radical time constraints that few poor farmers could meet.
15
 Alt-
hough a Constitutional Court decision in April of 2013 rejected a challenge by 
a group of South African farmers, it seems likely that this issue will not 
quickly go away. And other countries are facing similar disputes.
16
  
Here seems to be an ideal setting to press a Type III PtP solution to ensure 
that the proceeds of any mineral rights licenses or extraction fees extended 
by governments would flow to a legitimate, private foundation dedicated to 
improving the economic and social prospects of the people most affected ra-
ther than being absorbed without a trace into government budgets.  
 
Public airwaves. Another arena that seems ready-made for a PtP solution is 
the sale of licenses for use of a country’s air waves. As use of cell phones be-
comes the dominant form of communication, particularly in developing re-
gions, the need for expanded access to a country’s air waves has become in-
tense. In the U.S., legislation has recently been passed to give mobile phone 
operators access to airwave frequencies formerly allocated for television 
broadcasts. Such spectrum frequencies are sold at auctions with the pro-
ceeds flowing to the government. But what if foundations dedicated to im-
proving literacy and installing telecommunication capabilities in schools 
were to receive all or a significant portion of the proceeds instead? After all, 
what do citizens have a clearer right to than the air?  
If there has become a way to monetize the air, why not create privately run 
public-benefit organizations to receive and use for public benefit some of 
the resulting proceeds? We are talking here, moreover, about substantial re-
sources. The spectrum auctions authorized by the new U.S. law are expected 
to yield an impressive $25 billion in proceeds, enough to create another Bill 
and Melinda Gates-sized charitable foundation, with similar, though likely 
smaller scale, entities possible in many other countries around the world.
17
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A fourth reason  
to be modestly  
bullish about the 
prospects for  
further PtP  
transactions  
derives from the 
present project  
and its explicit  
conceptualization  
of the PtP concept. 
Public utilities. Much of the new privatization action taking place around 
the world at the present time is focused on what can reasonably be thought 
of as public utilities. Included here are ports, airports, postal services, water 
systems, as well as financial service institutions. These are frequently institu-
tions built with citizen resources and serving broad public purposes. Here, as 
well, citizen claims to a portion of the resources flowing from the privatiza-
tion of these facilities and their use to seed charitable endowments dedi-
cated to various public-benefit purposes seem especially strong. Imagine if 
the sale of the Royal Mail in the U.K. had gone to finance a foundation dedi-
cated to bringing high-speed internet to remote rural regions, a task that has 
long been on the government’s agenda but that has made far too little 
progress. 
 
4) The Presence of the PtP Concept 
A fourth reason to be modestly bullish about the prospects for further PtP 
transactions derives, immodestly enough, from the present project and its 
explicit conceptualization of the PtP concept and documentation of the re-
spectable outcome of previous PtP transactions around the world. In the ab-
sence of such a conceptualization, it has been all too easy to overlook this 
possibility for seeding significant charitable endowments out of the pro-
ceeds of privatization transactions and achieving valid public purposes in the 
process. What the formulation of the PtP concept and the documentation of 
its consequences does is to crystalize a seemingly disconnected series of 
random transactions into a coherent strategy for substantially buttressing 
the philanthropic landscape of countries and further legitimize the process 
by documenting the generally positive outcomes it has achieved to date. 
But taking advantage of this conceptual breakthrough will not occur auto-
matically. Creating the concept and disseminating the concept are two quite 
different things. To move from one to the other, moreover, it will be neces-
sary to articulate the case that needs to be made to the various stakeholders 
involved. It is to this question that we therefore now turn. 
 
5) PtP: A Win-Win Proposition for Key Stakeholders 
For the PtP concept to have a future it will have to do more than make sense, 
of course. It will also have to meet the needs, and serve the interests, of key 
stakeholders. As the previous discussion makes clear, however, there is 
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strong reason to believe that PtP offers unique "win-win" possibilities for all 
of the key stakeholders. This is perhaps the best argument for PtP’s future. 
But what are those "win-win" possibilities. 
PtP’s benefits for investors. One key set of stakeholders in privatization 
transactions is obviously potential investors in privatized assets and those 
who advise them. Privatization deals are enormously complex with great un-
certainties for investors. Layering PtP on top of the other challenges of fash-
ioning a privatization deal will therefore not necessarily be welcome by inves-
tors. How might they be persuaded not only to go along but to help sell the 
idea? Several powerful answers seem available to this question. 
 Assurance of community support and consequent avoidance of failed 
or delayed sales. One important part of this answer goes back to 
the earlier discussion of popular opposition. Time is money in 
the business world and few investors will jump into deals in the 
face of potential opposition that might stretch the decision pro-
cess out forever and leave the business with a bad reputation 
and consequent inability to operate successfully. PtP can pro-
vide businesses a license to acquire by providing concrete evi-
dence of the short- and medium-term benefits communities can 
secure as a consequence of privatization deals. 
 Resulting advantages in the bidding process.  Investors may also 
find that their bids to acquire assets in line for privatization can 
be enhanced by including explicit PtP pledges in their bids, as 
the Erste Bank Group found in its bids for a number of Central 
European banks.  
 Early good will with employees, potential customers, and suppliers.  
Investors are naturally interested not only in the acquisition of 
potentially valuable assets, but also in the ability to operate the 
resulting businesses after they are acquired. PtP can facilitate 
this by promoting a more promising business climate for the 
privatized firm or extractive industry. Firms will come on the 
scene as partners of communities not as unwanted invaders.  
 Positive international reputation. Investors have to be concerned 
not only about their local reputations in the communities and 
countries in which they establish operations, but also about 
their international reputations. PtP offers important potential 
benefits here as well. A strong Advisory Panel for the PtP Project 
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benefits to  
governments.
has been formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Wilhelm Krull, 
Secretary General of the Volkswagen Foundation and a leading 
figure in European philanthropic circles. This Panel has 
committed itself to publicizing the PtP concept and highlighting 
efforts to apply it around the world. Already, the Economist 
magazine has taken notice of the idea and endorsed it in a recent 
article. Implementers of the PtP concept can thus be assured of 
positive international publicity for their efforts at no cost to 
themselves. See APPENDIX D for a list of founding Advisory 
Committee members.  
PtP’s benefits for governments. Investors are not the only stakeholders that 
can gain important benefits from philanthropication thru privatization. Cash-
strapped governments can also benefit substantially. Several features of the 
PtP option account for such benefits: 
 Improved ability to attract investors. Investors have naturally grown 
wary of making substantial investments in countries where the in-
vestment climate is hostile and popular sentiment not supportive. 
Support for PtP is a way for governments to signal a cooperative 
investment climate and a partnership approach both with busi-
nesses and local communities. As such, government encourage-
ment of PtP arrangements as part of major investment deals can 
help give confidence to potential investors. 
 Avoidance of failed sales. Privatization officials are well aware that 
privatization transactions are far from sure things. A number of 
governments have had the embarrassment of having to cancel 
announced privatizations because investors did not show interest 
or did not bid high enough. In fact, a full quarter of announced 
privatization sales had to be cancelled in 2011 and, while the fig-
ure was lower in 2012, it was far from zero.
18
 PtP provides a way to 
get "ahead of the curve" on one of the common causes of failed or 
delayed sales: citizen opposition or the opposition of key political 
figures. As such, PtP offers one way to reduce the chances of a 
failed sale.  
 Guaranteed support for long-term priorities. Beyond this, it is not 
unlikely that some government officials with particular subject-
matter interests can see in the PtP option a way to capture long-
term resources for particular policy purposes—particularly those 
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that require sustained attention and deliver results only over the 
long run and therefore often get shoved aside in immediate budget 
battles. Included here are purposes such as fostering scientific 
advance, extending internet access, promoting social innovation, 
encouraging high-tech development, improving the environment, or 
investing in education. Policy entrepreneurs with vision can 
therefore find in PtP unique opportunities to plant seeds with 
substantial long-term benefits for their societies. 
 Reducing burdens on government. More generally, governments might 
welcome the possibility of gaining important partners that can share 
the burden of dealing with a wide variety of national or local prob-
lems, such as urban regeneration, economic development in lagging 
regions, educating disadvantaged citizens, or overcoming recidivism. 
Not incidentally, moreover, politicians can gain important visibility 
and credibility with voters in return for taking innovative steps to set 
aside resources clearly devoted to such purposes.  
 Improved international reputation for probity and innovativeness. 
Companies are not the only entities with a need to maintain a 
positive international reputation. In the current globalized world, 
countries eager to attract investors and retain talented workers 
must do so as well. PtP offers a way to signal a different style of 
privatization—one that is respectful of citizen needs and carried out 
in an open and responsible fashion. 
 Reconciling PtP with government debt reduction. Finally, there are 
ways, as the Volkswagen case examined here revealed, for 
governments to combine a PtP transaction with partial debt relief 
by holding the privatization proceeds at least temporarily on its 
own books, paying off higher cost foreign loans, and paying a lower 
interest rate to the PtP foundation for the use of its money. 
 
PtP’s benefits for communities and citizens. Citizens and their communities 
also stand to gain from PtP. For them, PtP means: 
 Tangible and immediate benefits from privatization. As noted, communi-
ties are often impacted negatively in the short term from privatization 
activity but rarely see the concrete benefits that privatization can 
often bring when the proceeds are simply absorbed into government 
budgets. PtP reverses this upside-down impact of privatization by 
Citizens and their 
communities also 
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from PtP.
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capturing at least some of these proceeds in community-oriented 
charitable endowments dedicated to particular communities or 
common-good purposes. 
 New resources for community problem-solving. PtP foundations can 
channel important resources of talent and money into solving 
community problems. What is more, the resources are available 
over the long run since PtP establishes secure endowments or en-
dowment-like flows of revenue. 
 New opportunities for participation in community problem-solving. PtP 
establishes new community-based, citizen-controlled institutions 
that can play a role in the shaping of public policy, the development 
of new approaches, and the identification of community needs. 
PtP’s benefits for civil society. Finally, PtP also offers significant benefits to 
civil society organizations. These benefits, too, take a variety of forms: 
 Liberation from sole dependence on external funding. A key advantage 
of PtP from the point of view of civil society is the establishment of 
an independent, indigenous source of funding for it. This is im-
portant to free civil society from sole dependence on external 
sources and allow it to perform its important social accountability 
functions. 
 Broadened promotion of charitable giving and philanthropy. As private 
charitable institutions, PtP foundations will have a stake in pro-
moting charitable giving and accessing the new streams of social-
impact capital as a way to increase the pool of private resources 
dedicated to advancing their missions. Such promotion often re-
quires a secure institutional base, and PtP foundations can provide 
that base of talent, energy, and time. This will further strengthen 
civil society and bring more resources to bear on societal prob-
lems. This has certainly been the case of the existing PtP founda-
tions examined for this report.  
 Improved public image. By helping to root civil society more fully in 
indigenous sources of support, PtP can also improve civil society’s 
image among local citizens and government officials, who, in 
countries lacking indigenous philanthropic resources, sometimes 
view civil society as too beholden to external sources. 
PtP also offers 
significant 
benefits to  
civil society 
organizations. 
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 Improved access to policy decision-making. The presence of a finan-
cially secure, autonomously governed PtP foundation can also be an 
asset in opening channels of communication more generally 
between civil society and government. This can lead to important 
policy partnerships and improved understanding on both sides. 
 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE  
PtP TRANSACTIONS 
For PtP to deliver the benefits of which it is capable—for citizens, govern-
ments, and investors alike—great care must be taken in the design and 
operation of PtP foundations, as well as in the selection of privatization 
transactions to which it can appropriately be attached. Otherwise, this 
promising strategy for "win-win" outcomes can come to be seen as merely a 
fig leaf covering up unsavoury back-room surrenders of important public 
property. Details on the guiding principles that should apply will likely need to 
be worked out in consultation among parties active in the privatization arena. 
But the cases examined here suggest at least a starting list of the 
considerations that should be brought to bear, both for the privatization deals 
themselves and for the foundations or other philanthropic institutions that 
result in whole or in part from them. 
 
Key Criteria for Deciding Which Privatizations are Suitable for PtP 
Transactions  
No ready guide to the appropriate design of privatization processes has been 
formally agreed to by stakeholders involved in this type of transaction, at least 
that we have been able to identify. Some useful advice is available, however, in 
a Legal Guidelines for Privatization Programs document available from the 
World Bank.
19
 From this and other sources,
20
 four key recommendations seem 
to emerge for good practice in privatization transactions that advocates of PtP 
could usefully insist on: 
A coherent and explicit legal and organizational structure. Privatization is a 
complex process with billions of dollars often at stake and significant dangers 
of corruption present. To deal with the complexities, and avoid the dangers, 
explicit and officially sanctioned processes must be in place. This includes the 
clear designation of an official body with responsibility for privatization, 
professional staffing of that body, establishment of a framework of law to 
guide the process, and protection of the due process of all participants in 
carrying it out, including access to the courts in case of conflicts. 
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Open and transparent procedures. Full and complete transparency is crucial for any 
privatization process that hopes to secure public trust and support. The PtP process 
cannot achieve the benefits it seeks, therefore, without such transparency. Trans-
parency here includes a variety of procedural and operational features: 
• Clear public disclosure of the agencies with responsibility for pri-
vatization decisions, the basis on which those decisions will be 
made, and the timetable and schedule for those decisions; 
• Competitive bidding open to all potential bidders; 
• Full disclosure of all details of proposed sales to all potential in-
terested parties, including timetables and criteria for decision; 
• Full disclosure of winning bidders or purchasers and the basis of 
the resulting decisions; and 
• Clear explanation of proposed uses of funds secured through 
privatization transactions. 
Attention to market conditions or structures that might lead to negative outcomes. 
Included here are features such as: 
• Protections against monopoly behavior on the part of privatized firms; 
• Establishment of regulatory structures in cases of public utilities en-
joying natural monopolies; 
• Removal of trade or other barriers that might impede competition; and 
• Protections against "asset stripping." 
Inclusion of a "social package." This would include: 
• Clarification of expectations for environmental protections, invest-
ment commitments, and pay and other benefits for employees; 
• Employee maintenance arrangements as well as guarantees for 
severance and other benefits for workers let go; 
• Prohibition on unfair trade practices; and 
• Provisions for channeling all or a share of the resources generated 
into activities that benefit citizens, preferably through creation of 
one or more meaningfully autonomous PtP charitable 
endowments. 
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Key Features Desired in PtP Foundations 
If the success of PtP depends heavily on the character of the privatization 
process to which it is attached, it depends at least equally on the structure 
and operation of the PtP foundations themselves. Several rules or princi-
ples of good practice have emerged in the international foundation com-
munity to guide foundations in their operations, though not all of these 
are embodied in law or practice. Indeed, there is not complete consensus 
within the foundation community over what principles should apply.  
Some argue, for example, that foundations, as private sector organiza-
tions created to carry out the will of a donor, have no obligation to report 
publicly—and certainly no obligation to report to government—on their 
activities. Others point out that foundations often enjoy tax and other 
privileges that ultimately depend on public trust and support. Without 
some transparency and openness about their operations, foundations 
can dissipate that trust and become vulnerable to more severe re-
strictions than those relating to transparency.
21
  
Whatever the case for applying strong principles of good practice to foun-
dations in general, an even stronger case exists for applying such princi-
ples to PtP foundations. This is so because the assets used to seed PtP 
endowments are in origin often publicly owned or at least publicly subsi-
dized. As such, they have a special claim on protections from secretive or 
special-interest uses. What is more, since the decision to place such re-
sources into private foundations instead of into governmental institutions 
is based on a certain desire for diversity in approaches and reliability 
about the uses to which such assets will be put, special care has to be 
taken to ensure the autonomy of these institutions vis-à-vis governmental 
influence or control. Under these circumstances, establishing a clear set 
of principles to guide the creation of PtP foundations acquires special im-
portance. But what should these principles be? 
A useful starting point can be found in the "Principles of Good Practice" 
for foundations formulated by the European Foundation Centre, as 
discussed earlier.
22
 While acknowledging the diversity of foundations and 
of foundation laws, the EFC nevertheless recommends adherence by all 
foundations to four major principles: 
Independent governance. PtP foundations must be structured in a way 
that guarantees "arm’s length" relationships with both the privatized 
company and governmental authorities. To be sure, given the public-
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sector origins of PtP assets, we can expect a larger role for government 
officials or their proxies in the governance of PtP foundations, at least in 
their early years, than in foundations more generally. But government 
officials should not dominate the boards. This can be minimized, however, 
by limiting the board involvement of both government and company 
officials and guaranteeing, through nomination procedures and by-laws, 
that board members, however chosen, understand that their primary 
orientation must be to the care and protection of the foundations and not 
to the care or support of the interests of any organization that may have 
nominated them. Several examples of how existing PtP foundations have 
striven to achieve such autonomy are found in the case studies reported on 
in this report. 
Professional management. PtP foundations must develop the systems and 
personnel to operate in a professional fashion. This will require the articula-
tion of clear strategic objectives and the development of programs and op-
erations in line with these objectives; recruitment of personnel with relevant 
expertise and experience both for the programmatic and investment com-
ponents of the foundation’s operations; and clear engagement of the board 
in setting strategic directions and monitoring progress toward achieving 
them.  
Transparency. To retain public trust, PtP foundations must operate with 
complete transparency, making their statutes, by-laws, guidelines for fund-
ing activities, information on grant programs, application procedures, board 
and staff lists, annual reports, grant lists, and finances publicly and readily 
available and accessible. "Sunlight," it has been said, "is the ultimate disin-
fectant," and PtP foundations need to be seen as "squeaky clean." Also re-
quired will be strict conflict of interest provisions written into foundation by-
laws and operating rules to ensure that members of governing boards and 
staffs do not use these positions to further their personal interests. 
Accountability. As a corollary to their commitment to transparency, PtP 
foundations are wise to be proactive in assessing what they are 
accomplishing on a regular basis and reporting on this to their various 
stakeholders. Regular review of activities and reassessment of strategies 
should be an on-going function to offer regular feedback to those who stand 
to benefit from foundation activities.  
In addition to these principles articulated by the European Foundation 
Center for foundations in general, two additional principles can usefully be 
applied to PtP foundations given their particular origins: 
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Representativeness. The governance structures of PtP foundations not only 
need to be meaningfully autonomous vis-à-vis government and privatized 
firms; they also need to be meaningfully representative of the constituencies 
they are designed to serve. As the case studies examined here have shown, 
this can be achieved by giving particular constituencies the privilege of nomi-
nating candidate representatives to the boards or simply by establishing by-
law provisions requiring the inclusion of representatives of key constituencies 
or competencies on governing bodies. Also important will be strict terms of 
office for governing body members and regular turnover. These steps will 
help protect these foundations from being perceived as closed shops con-
trolled by narrow bands of insiders. 
Grantmaking. Finally, one rationale for channeling all or part of the resources 
from privatization transactions into charitable foundations instead of into 
government budgets is the impact this can potentially have on strengthening 
the civil society sector by providing indigenous sources of support for local 
not-for-profit organizations. Such organizations have been found to contrib-
ute to democratic governance and, because of their contribution to "social 
capital," to building the climate of trust that successful market systems re-
quire. The experience of several of the PtP foundations examined in this re-
port suggests that such foundations can play an important role in fostering ef-
fective civil society organizations and sectors—which in turn can boost chari-
table giving, promote volunteering, and strengthen bonds of trust among 
people. For this to be possible, however, PtP foundations must operate at 
least in substantial part through grant programs open to nonprofit 
organizations. 
 
NEXT STEPS FOR PtP 
Even if these criteria for promoting PtP are all accepted, however, it is unlikely 
that the potential win-win outcomes will occur on their own. For the PtP con-
cept to gain traction, a number of key steps will be necessary, some of which 
are already under way. Included here are the following: 
 Active online dissemination of this report and its Executive Summary; 
 Preparation of shorter information pieces on the concept;  
 Presentations and discussion of the PtP concept at gatherings of 
foundations, civil society organizations, and industries actively involved 
in PtP transactions, including both investors as well as advisors and 
those structuring the deals; 
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 Development of a series of initial pilot implementation projects 
to put the PtP concept pro-actively to work; 
 Formation of a PtP Implementation Advisory Team to assist 
countries and communities interested in applying the PtP 
concept with the technical requirements involved; 
 Development of a book analysing key facets of the PtP phe-
nomenon to further legitimize the PtP concept and introduce it 
to the academic community and to students of the third sector, 
philanthropy, and privatization; 
 Development of training and guidance materials to equip local 
PtP champions to promote the concept and to actualize PtP 
outcomes; 
 Continued development of the PtP website (p-t-p.org) to track 
progress, post examples of interesting innovations being 
pursued by existing PtP foundations, and provide a central 
repository for guidance, training, and scholarly materials re-
lating to the PtP concept; and 
 Identification of funding sources to support these activities. 
 
Most importantly, however, PtP will need local champions willing to 
promote the concept and able to point out the potential benefits to the 
various stakeholders. One important source of such champions, as 
noted earlier, may be policy entrepreneurs from within governments, 
who come to see in PtP an opportunity to advance particular policy 
priorities. The Volkswagen Foundation, German Environmental 
Foundation, and Foundation for Polish Science cases provide important 
illustrations of this phenomenon.  
Another source of such champions may be enlightened investors 
interested in securing a firm basis for operating their newly privatized 
businesses. The cases of the Slovak and Czech Savings Bank 
Foundations provide revealing examples of this route spearheaded by 
the progressive chairman of the acquiring Erste Bank Group. 
Ultimately, however, in many settings, the role of making the case for 
PtP and ensuring that the PtP option is implemented responsibly and 
effectively will fall to civil society. This was the example highlighted in 
this report by the case of the California Blue Cross, where the nonprofit 
Consumers Union spearheaded the campaign that led to the creation of 
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a major PtP foundation and set the pattern, in the process, for an entire 
string of "conversion foundations" in the United States. 
The obvious dilemma here, however, is that few civil society leaders or or-
ganizations have historically been at all involved in privatization transactions, 
except, perhaps, after-the-fact in leading protests to stop the privatization 
process. Such organizations will face a steep learning curve, therefore, in 
gaining the knowledge and experience to operate effectively in the highly 
charged privatization arena. They will also require resources to engage ac-
tively in privatization debates and reach out for the help they will need. 
A key question for the future of the concept, therefore, is where the re-
sources of both knowledge and finances will come from to support these 
champions as they penetrate the privatization processes in their countries 
and press the case for consideration of the PtP option. One source, at least 
of knowledge, will be the associates that have been assembled through this 
project, and an advisory capacity is being developed to achieve this.  
But another source of potential talent and resources is the set of existing PtP 
institutions whose histories and achievements will be validated by the future 
spread of the PtP idea. These institutions certainly have the legitimacy to 
help disseminate the PtP concept. More than that, their experience building 
successful institutions through the PtP process is one of the most valuable 
assets they can bring to bear to assist civil society and philanthropic sectors 
in regions where such institutions are still struggling to establish themselves 
sustainably. In a real sense, they have found ways to turn base privatization 
into charitable gold. A key question is how fully they will be willing to share 
this resource with others, as a number of them have already begun to do 
through this project. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The current efforts to build community foundations and other community-
based philanthropic endowments in less developed regions of the world hold 
enormous promise for unleashing new energies for social problem-solving. 
But these efforts could end up generating deep frustration if meaningful 
sources of capital do not become available to sustain them. While some of 
this capital needs to come from local citizens and corporations, it seems 
clear that relying on these sources alone may well consign these fledgling in-
stitutions to a long path toward viability and effectiveness. 
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This is all the more frustrating in view of the fact that side-by-side with these ef-
forts in many of these same countries enormous privatization sales are being pur-
sued with the potential of transferring billions of dollars of the peoples’ assets into 
private hands and generating significant proceeds for governments in the process. 
But these efforts, too, are encountering challenges as citizen support for privatiza-
tion has become increasingly problematic.  
PtP offers a unique win-win solution to both of these challenges, allowing coun-
tries to benefit from needed investment while ensuring that significant shares of 
the resources resulting from such investments are permanently dedicated to im-
proving the life-chances of citizens and strengthening indigenous civil society.  
The existing PtP foundations examined here have, by their example, opened our 
eyes to the feasibility of just such an approach. By documenting the numerous 
past cases of such Philanthropication thru Privatization, disseminating these expe-
riences broadly, carefully generating materials showing how this option can be ap-
plied, and undertaking a series of pilot implementation efforts, it is our hope that 
the initiative undertaken here, inspired by the experiences of the existing PtP 
foundations, will significantly increase the chances that this option for building in-
dependent charitable endowments will receive a reasonable hearing wherever pri-
vatization activity occurs in the future.  
To be sure, there is nothing automatic about such an outcome. Convincing gov-
ernments to part with even a fraction of the proceeds of privatization sales may 
be a difficult sales job. But the privatization juggernaut has hit enough bumps in 
the road around the world to open the minds of even the most resistant govern-
ments to the need for new approaches, and the option of accompanying future 
sales with the creation of sizable charitable endowments targeted on the needs of 
local citizens could help soothe some of the hostility that privatization has engen-
dered. This, at any rate, is the hope that this project is projecting. With billions of 
privatization deals in play, and enormous problems confronting the very countries 
where many of these deals are going forward, it surely seems an option worth 
putting to the test. 
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NAME OF FOUNDATION PTP TYPE/ # OF CASES 
YEAR 
ESTABLISHED 
ASSETS (US$)  
(JULY 31, 2013) 
ASSET 
YEAR  
SOURCE OF  
ASSETS FOCUS OF ACTIVITY 
 
AUSTRIA 
Erste Foundation V 2003 $4,699,314,536   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung der Sparkasse Innsbruck Hall, Tiroler Sparkasse V 2004 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Karntner Sparkasse V 1999 $72,000,854   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Lienzer Sparkasse V 2003 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Bludenz V 2004 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Frankenmarkt V 2000 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Hainfeld V 2001 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Krems V 1999 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Kremstal-Pyhrn V 2001 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Mittersill V 2003 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Neuhofen V 2001 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Niederosterreich V 2000 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Pollau V 2003 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Rattenberg V 1999 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Reutte V 2007 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Sparkasse Voitsberg-Koflach V 2003 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung Weinviertler Sparkasse V 2002 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Privatstiftung zur Verwaltung von Anteilsrechten V 2001 $54,823,257   Financial Science 
Sparkasse Bad Ischl Privatstiftung V 2002 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse der Stadt GroB-Siegharts Privatstiftung V 2003 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse der Stadt Knittelfeld Privatstiftung V 1999 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Eggenburg Privatstiftung V 2001 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Gfohl Privatstiftung V 2000 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse GroB-Gerungs Privatstiftung V 2000 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Hainburg Privatstiftung V 1999 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Imst Privatstiftung V 2006 $56,804,179 2012 Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Korneuburg Privatstiftung V 2008 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Poysdorf Privatstiftung V 2002 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Pregarten-Unterweissenbach Privatstiftung V 2003 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Ravelsbach Privatstiftung V 2000 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Scheibbs Privatstiftung V 2002 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Waldviertel-Mitte Privatstiftung V 1999 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
Sparkasse Weitra Privatstiftung V 2005 N.A.   Financial Culture; Environment; Science 
SUBTOTAL, Austria 33   $4,882,942,825       
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BELGIUM 
King Baudouin Foundation* III 1976 $408,157,050 2012 Lottery General public benefit 
SUBTOTAL, Belgium 1   $408,157,050       
BOLIVIA 
Fundacion Jisunu   1994 N.A.       
SUBTOTAL, Bolivia 1   $0       
BRAZIL 
Fundação Banco do Brasil** II 1998 $881,467,408 2007 Financial General public benefit 
Fundação Telefônica** I 1999     Public Utility   
Vale do Rio Doce** I 1997 $1,661,333,191 2007 Public Utility Education; Environment 
SUBTOTAL, Brazil 3   $2,542,800,600       
CANADA 
Change Foundation V 1996 $52,979,413 2012 Health Inst. Education; Health; Science 
SUBTOTAL, Canada 1   $52,979,413       
CHILE 
Fundacion Chile** I 1976 N.A.   Public Utility   
SUBTOTAL, Chile 1   $0       
700 years of city Plzeň Foundation I 1993 $2,438,182 2012 Various SOEs General public benefit 
ADRA Foundation I 1992 $2,383,231 2011 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Bone Marrow Transplant Foundation I 1992 $6,445,279 2012 Various SOEs Health 
Čapík Foundation in Putima I     - Various SOEs Environment 
Civil Society Development Foundation I 1993 $6,393,352 2012 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Czech Foundation Investment Fund I 1997 $206,748,270 2012 Various SOEs General public benefit 
F-foundation I 1994 $2,174,193 2011 Various SOEs Culture; Education 
Foundation "CS CABOT" I 1997 $1,401,969 2012 Various SOEs Education 
Foundation "Talent of Josef, Maria and Zdeňka Hlávek" I 1904 $18,857,990 2012 Various SOEs Education 
Foundation ARBOR VITAE I     - Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation Art for Health I 1991   - Various SOEs Culture; Health 
Foundation Bohemiae I 1992   - Various SOEs   
Foundation BONA I 1992 $2,401,377 2012 Various SOEs Health 
Foundation Cardiocenter České Budějovice I 1992 $1,228,548 2011 Various SOEs Health 
Foundation CERGE-IE I 1991 $2,016,773 2012 Various SOEs Economic development; Education 
Foundation Children's Brain I 1992 $2,865,353 2011 Various SOEs Health 
Foundation Czech Literary Fund II 1994 $8,304,017 2011 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Foundation Czech Music Fund II 1994 $12,395,129 2012 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Foundation Czech Visual Arts Fund II 1994   - Cultural Inst. Culture 
Foundation EURONISA I 1995 $2,517,276 2012 Various SOEs Culture; Social welfare 
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Foundation for Animal Protection I   $1,249,001 2012 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Foundation for Building a Centre for Youth in Brno-Líšeň I 1990 $1,815,834 2012 Various SOEs   
Foundation for Children with Infantile Paralysis I 1991   - Various SOEs Health; Social welfare 
Foundation for Contemporary Arts I 1999 $1,853,408 2012 Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation for development in the area of artificial nurture, metabolism 
and gerontology 
I 1994 $1,305,540 2012 Various SOEs Health 
Foundation for Health Development I 1999 $2,187,931 2011 Various SOEs Health 
Foundation for Saving and Revitalising Jizera Mountains I 1993 $2,447,370 2012 Various SOEs Environment 
Foundation for Support of Firefighting Movement in CR  I   $1,461,287 2009 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Foundation Hospital in Jablonec nad Nisou I 1993 $1,056,981 2012 Various SOEs Health 
Foundation International Needs I 1995 $1,534,724 2012 Various SOEs   
Foundation Javorník I 1997   - Various SOEs Environment 
Foundation Life of an Artist I 1992   - Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation Mariastar Humanity I 1990   - Various SOEs Social welfare 
Foundation of Baroque Theatre in Český Krumlov Castle I 1992 $1,889,956 2009 Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation of Charter 77 I 1978 $8,689,134 2012 Various SOEs Health; Social welfare 
Foundation of Czech Architecture I 1997 $4,446,754 2012 Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation of Letovice City I 1995   - Various SOEs   
Foundation of Orienteering I 1994 $1,490,795 2012 Various SOEs Sports 
Foundation of Prague Philharmonia I 1994 $466,210 2012 Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation of Rudolf Löwy and Plzeň's jews I 1994   - Various SOEs Culture 
Foundation of Soccer Internationalists I 1993   - Various SOEs Sports 
Foundation of st. Fransis of Assisi I 1993 $755,356 2012 Various SOEs Economic development; Health 
Foundation of Vyškov Grammar school I 1994 $1,180,415 2012 Various SOEs Culture; Education; Social welfare 
Foundation Pangea I 1991 $896,537 2011 Various SOEs Culture; Education; Social welfare 
Foundation Partnership I 1991 $16,520,380 2012 Various SOEs Environment 
Foundation Patriae I 1993   - Various SOEs Culture; Education; Social welfare 
Foundation Preciosa I 1993 $14,414,004 2012 Various SOEs General public benefit 
Foundation Safe Olomouc I 1994 $964,303 2008 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Foundation Universitas Masarykiana I 1993   - Various SOEs Education; Science 
Foundation VERONICA I 1992 $1,959,588 2011 Various SOEs Environment 
Foundation VIA I 1997 $2,977,010 2012 Various SOEs Education; Social welfare 
Foundation VISION 97 I 1997 $8,398,746 2011 Various SOEs General public benefit 
Good Work of Sisters of Ch. Borromeo Foundation I 1993   - Various SOEs   
Health for Moravia Foundation I   $1,866,223 2011 Various SOEs Health 
Jan Hus Educational Foundation I 1990 $4,289,591 2011 Various SOEs Education; Social welfare 
Jedlicek Sanatorium Foundation I 1990 $4,743,908 2012 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Karel Pavlik's Foundation I 1992 N.A. - Various SOEs Health 
Landek Ostrava Foundation I 1994 N.A. - Various SOEs Culture 
Náchoda Cultural and Sports Foundation I   N.A. - Various SOEs Culture; Sports 
Olive's Foundation I 1896 $2,273,842 2012 Various SOEs Health; Social welfare 
Open Society Fund Praha Foundation I 1992 $8,702,051 2012 Various SOEs Social welfare 
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Our Child Foundation I 1993 $3,913,086 2012 Various SOEs Social welfare 
Professor Vejdovský Foundation I 1992 $1,748,069 2010 Various SOEs Science 
Purkyn's Foundation I 1992 $3,775,812 2011 Various SOEs Culture 
Tereza Max Foundation I 1997 $734,992 2012 Various SOEs Health, Social welfare 
The Association of Czech Republic Libraries Foundation I 1998 $78,069 2011 Various SOEs Education 
The Civic Forum Foundation I 1990 $3,495,573 2011 Various SOEs Culture 
The Crossroad Foundation I 1995   - Various SOEs Health 
The ICN Foundation I 1992 $442,784 2012 Various SOEs General public benefit 
The Sporting Youth Foundation I 1993 $1,899,593 2012 Various SOEs Sports 
The Thomas Bata Foundation I   $4,575,314 2011 Various SOEs Culture; Education 
The Ústí Community Foundation I 1993 $2,109,304 2012 Various SOEs Social welfare 
VDV - Olga Havel's Foundation I 1992 $8,615,730 2012 Various SOEs Health; Social welfare 
Wild Geese Foundation I 1997 $1,700,397 2012 Various SOEs General public benefit 
SUBTOTAL, Czech Republic 74   $413,496,541       
GERMANY  
Baden-Wurttemberg Stiftung I 2000 $3,304,970,413     Education; Science; Social welfare 
Bayerische Forschungsstiftung I 1999 $457,251,644 2008 Public Utility Science 
Bayerische Landesstiftung V 1972 $1,094,771,449 2012 Financial Culture 
Bayerischer Naturschutzfonds III 1982 $22,721,672 2012 Lottery Environment 
Behring-Röntgen-Stiftung I 2006 $137,052,992 2012 Health Inst. Health; Science 
Berchtesgadener Landesstiftung II 1960 N.A.   Cultural Inst. Culture 
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der freien Wohlfahrtspflege III 1976 N.A. 2011 Cultural Inst. Social welfare 
Contergan Stiftung für behinderte Menschen II 1971 $112,105,809 2011 Lottery Social welfare 
DEFA-STIFTUNG  II 1996 N.A.   Cultural Inst. Culture 
Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt I 1991 $2,891,849,111 2012 Various SOEs Environment 
Deutsche Stiftung Denkmalschutz III 1991 $116,876,269 2011 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund III 1972 N.A.   Cultural Inst. Sports 
Erchtesgadener State Foundation   1960 N.A.   Cultural Inst. Education; Health 
Flutopfer-Stiftung von 1962 II 1962 N.A.   Financial Social welfare 
Gemeinnützige Sparkassenstiftung zu Lübeck V 2004 $267,237,842 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Hessenstiftung Familie hat Zukunft I 2001 $19,262,225 2001 Real Estate Social welfare 
Kulturstiftung des Freistaates Sachsen III 1993 $26,700,340 2012 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Kulturstiftung Haus Europa II 1990 N.A. 1996 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Landesstiftung Baden-Württemberg I 2000 $3,304,970,413 2012 Various SOEs General public benefit 
Niedersächsische Bingostiftung für Umwelt und Entwicklung III 1989 $25,282,509 2013 Lottery Environment 
Stiftung Deutsches Hygienemuseum II 1999 N.A.   Cultural Inst. Culture; Education; Science 
Stiftung Industrie- und Alltagskultur II 1990 N.A.   Public Utility Culture 
Stiftung Industrieforschung V 1974 N.A.   Financial Economic development 
Stiftung Innovation (Rheinland-Pfalz) I 1991 $141,612,965 2009 Various SOEs Economic development 
Stiftung Kultur I 1991 $249,606,287 1996 Various SOEs Culture 
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Stiftung Neue Kultur II 1990 $698,898 1996 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Stiftung Preußische Seehandlung V 1983 $48,062,981 1983 Financial Culture; Education; Science 
Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz II 1957 N.A.   Cultural Inst. Culture 
Volkswagen Stiftung I 1961 $3,451,084,000  2012 Various SOEs Science 
SUBTOTAL, Germany   29   $15,672,117,818       
HUNGARY  
Transfer of property of communist youth organization II 1995 N.A.   Real Estate   
SUBTOTAL, Hungary 1   $0     
 
ITALY 
Compagnia di San Paolo V 1991 $8,625,533,324  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze V 1991 $2,033,327,485  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Accademia Nazionale di Santa Cecilia II 1998 $90,011,052  2010 Cultural Inst. General public benefit 
Fondazione Agostino De Mari - Cassa di Risparmio di Savona V 1991 $256,606,574  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Arena di Verona Spettacoli Lirici II 1998 $59,553,919  2010 Cultural Inst. General public benefit 
Fondazione Banca del Monte di Lombardia V 1991 $1,173,904,187  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banca del Monte di Lucca V 1991 $119,567,432  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banca del Monte di Rovigo V 1991 $9,896,341  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banca del Monte Domenico Siniscalco Ceci di Foggia V 1990 $46,020,122  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banca del Monte e Cassa di Risparmio Faenza V 1991 $26,602,491  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banca Nazionale delle Comunicazioni V 1991 $140,722,597  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banco di Sardegna V 1991 $1,285,735,404  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Banco di Sicilia V 1991 $228,043,313  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Carivit V 1991 $60,915,187  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa dei Risparmi di Forli V 1991 $629,993,584  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmi di Livorno V 1991 $307,268,224  2012 Financial Culture 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia dell'Aquila V 1991 $198,123,871  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti V 1991 $133,840,361  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Macerata V 1991 $368,404,185  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Teramo V 1991 $244,868,532  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio della Spezia V 1991 $2,907,553,958  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde (Cariplo) V 1991 $9,749,756,798  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Alessandria V 1991 $530,196,928  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Ascoli Piceno V 1991 $294,591,539  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Asti V 1991 $294,517,162  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Biella V 1991 $328,652,110  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano V 1991 $1,069,748,561  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Bra V 1991 $35,787,204  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Calabria e di Lucania V 1991 $106,550,389  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Carpi V 1991 $459,642,079  2012 Financial General public benefit 
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Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Carrara V 1991 $184,295,963  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Cento V 1991 $86,459,476  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena V 1991 $178,212,630  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Citta di Castello V 1991 $38,365,798  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Civitavecchia V 1991 $73,105,539  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Cuneo V 1991 $1,978,779,460  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Fabriano e Cupramontana V 1991 $121,782,690  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Fano V 1991 $255,291,820  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Fermo V 1991 $129,324,751  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara V 1991 $292,715,463  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Foligno V 1991 $127,401,755  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Fossano V 1991 $74,337,451  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia V 1991 $1,938,020,389  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Gorizia V 1991 $244,699,512  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Imola V 1991 $334,401,395  2012 Financial Culture; Economic development 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Jesi V 1991 $168,044,618  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Loreto V 1991 $42,280,410  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Lucca V 1991 $1,944,058,361  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Mirandola V 1991 $177,931,202  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Modena V 1991 $1,294,911,283  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Orvieto V 1991 $98,563,333  2012 Financial Culture 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Padova e Rovigo V 1991 $3,023,339,675  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e M.C.P. di Busseto V 1991 $1,323,764,188  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Perugia V 1991 $876,627,899  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Pesaro V 1991 $402,258,430  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Pisa V 1991 $896,141,364  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Pistoia e Pescia V 1991 $584,402,994  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Prato V 1991 $133,793,603  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Puglia V 1991 $186,570,450  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Ravenna V 1991 $243,111,526  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Reggio Emilia - Pietro Manodori V 1991 $261,099,333  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Rimini V 1991 $224,258,318  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Salernitana V 1991 $55,359,682  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Saluzzo V 1991 $62,110,361  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato V 1991 $234,180,537  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Savigliano V 1991 $49,995,331  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Spoleto V 1991 $103,770,367  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Terni e Narni V 1991 $279,141,904  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino V 1991 $3,717,127,537  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Tortona V 1991 $308,567,917  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Trento e Rovereto V 1991 $538,710,077  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Trieste V 1991 $650,468,562  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Udine e Pordenone V 1991 $361,356,588  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Vercelli V 1991 $160,658,335  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Verona Vicenza Belluno e Ancona V 1991 $4,637,774,552  2012 Financial General public benefit 
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Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Vignola V 1991 $133,176,484  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Volterra V 1991 $225,946,648  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio e Banca del Monte di Lugo V 1991 $53,692,146  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio in Bologna V 1991 $1,764,920,892  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Cassamarca V 1991 $1,387,144,331  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione del Monte di Bologna e Ravenna V 1991 $359,344,199  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione di Piacenza e Vigevano V 1991 $561,015,565  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione di Venezia V 1991 $456,137,590  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Lombardia per l’ambiente II N.A N.A N.A 
Min. Rights / 
Damage Set. 
Environment 
Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena V 1995 $1,702,696,901  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Monte di Parma V 1991 $178,835,746  2012 Financial Culture 
Fondazione Monte di Pieta di Vicenza V 1991 $2,461,825  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Pescarabruzzo V 1991 $334,212,115  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Roma V 1991 $2,371,676,030  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Fondazione Teatro alla Scala (La Scala) II 1997 $266,395,050  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Carlo Felice II   $85,116,298  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Comunale di Bologna II 2005 $89,610,420  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Comunale Giuseppe Verdi II 1999 $53,168,159  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro dell'Opera di Roma II 1998 $84,123,423  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro La Fenice di Venezia II 1999 $106,088,288  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Lirico di Caglinari II   $47,566,904  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Massimo II   $124,276,084  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Petruzzelli e Teatri di Bari II 2003 $10,942,571  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro Regio - Torino II   $115,528,834  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Teatro San Carlo di Napoli II   $192,878,418  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
Fondazione Varrone Cassa di Risparmio di Rieti V 1991 $153,269,242  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Istituto Banco di Napoli Fondazione V 1991 $168,876,602  2012 Financial General public benefit 
Teatro del Maggio Musicale Fiorentino - Fondazione I   $79,285,446  2010 Cultural Inst. Culture 
SUBTOTAL, Italy 103   $72,021,893,957       
MOROCCO  
Hussan II Foundation I   N.A.       
SUBTOTAL, Morocco 1   $0       
NETHERLANDS  
Oranje Foundation* III 2002 $497,752,500   Lottery Social welfare 
SUBTOTAL, Netherlands 1   $497,752,500       
NEW ZEALAND 
ASB Community Trust V 1988 $822,415,800   Financial General public benefit 
Auckland Energy Consumer Trust V 1993 $1,693,209,000   Public Utility General public benefit 
BayTrust V 1988 $120,137,210   Financial General public benefit 
Buller Energy Trust V 1993 $16,932,090   Public Utility   
Canterbury Community Trust V 1988 $410,401,610   Financial General public benefit 
Central Hawkes Bay Consumer Power Trust V 1993 $39,508,210   Public Utility General public benefit 
Community Trust of Southland V 1988 $133,844,140   Financial General public benefit 
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Community Trust, Wellington V 1988 $37,089,340   Financial General public benefit 
Counties Power Trust V 1993 $141,907,040   Public Utility General public benefit 
Eastern and Central Community Trust, Inc. V 1988 $110,461,730   Financial General public benefit 
Eastern Bay Energy Trust V 1993 $53,215,140   Public Utility General public benefit 
Eastland Community Trust V 1988 $185,446,700   Financial General public benefit 
Electra Trust V 1993 $105,623,990   Public Utility General public benefit 
Hawkes Bay Power Trust V 1993 $246,724,740   Public Utility General public benefit 
King Country Electricity Power Trust V 1993 $28,220,150   Public Utility General public benefit 
Line Trust South Canterbury V 1993 $34,670,470   Public Utility General public benefit 
Mainpower Trust V 1993 $160,451,710   Public Utility General public benefit 
Marlborough V 1993 $193,509,600   Public Utility General public benefit 
Network Tasman V 1993 $129,006,400   Public Utility General public benefit 
Northpower Trust V 1993 $204,797,660   Public Utility General public benefit 
Otago Community Trust V 1988 $170,933,480   Financial General public benefit 
Rotorua Energy Charitable Trust V 1993 $105,623,990   Public Utility General public benefit 
Scanpower Trust V 1993 $22,172,975   Public Utility General public benefit 
Southland V 1993 N.A.   Public Utility   
Southland Community Trust V 1989 $111,268,020   Financial General public benefit 
Tauranga Energy Consumers Trust V 1993 $623,262,170   Public Utility General public benefit 
Top Energy Trust V 1993 $78,774,533   Public Utility General public benefit 
Trust Waikato V 1988 $211,247,980   Financial General public benefit 
TSB Community Trust V 1988 $371,377,174   Financial General public benefit 
Waipa Trust V 1993 N.A   Public Utility General public benefit 
Waitaki V 1993 $55,230,865   Public Utility General public benefit 
Waitomo V 1993 N.A   Public Utility General public benefit 
WEL V 1993 $331,707,706   Public Utility General public benefit 
West Coast V 1993 $93,529,640   Public Utility General public benefit 
West Coast Community Trust V 1988 $4,434,595   Financial General public benefit 
Whanganui Community Foundation V 1988 $26,607,570   Financial General public benefit 
SUBTOTAL, New Zealand 36   $7,073,743,428       
NORWAY  
Cultiva I 2011 $281,791,920 2008 Public Utility   
Freedom of Expression Foundation V 1974 N.A.   Public Utility Culture; Education; Social welfare 
Savings Bank Foundation DnB NOR 8 V 2002 N.A.   Financial   
SUBTOTAL, Norway 3   $281,791,920       
PERU 
Proinversion II   N.A.   Various SOEs   
SUBTOTAL,Peru 1   $0       
POLAND 
Foundation for Polish Science (Transaction I) II 1991 $118,421,344 
2012 
State Fund Science 
Foundation for Polish Science I 2004   Various SOEs Science 
Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation IV 1991 $131,612,535 2012 Debt Swap General public benefit 
Polish-American Freedom Foundation II 1990 $261,250,180 2011 Public Utility Education; Social welfare 
SUBTOTAL, Poland 4   $511,284,058       
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SLOVAKIA 
Slovak Savings Bank Foundation (Nadácia Slovenskej sporitel’ne) I 2004 $10,260,800 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Youth Foundation (Nadacia mla deze) II 2002 $14,457,700 2011 Real Estate Culture; Social welfare 
SUBTOTAL, Slovakia 2   $24,718,500       
SWEDEN 
Almundsryds Sparbanksstiftelse V 2007 $19,491,613 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Göteryds Sparbanksstiftelse V 2007 $4,076,884 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Långasjö Sockens Sparbanksstiftelse V 2007 $12,598,076 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Skatelövs och Västra Torsås Sparbanksstiftelse V 2007 $13,551,540 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen ALFA V 1991 $197,740,688 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Bergslagen V 2000 $34,426,617 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Dalarna V 1991 $7,674,015 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Farstorp V 2008 $2,956,874 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Färs och Frosta V 1999 $83,517,293 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Första V 1991 $2,406,956 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Glimåkra V 2008 $12,869,738 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Gripen V 2003 $60,021,551 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Jämtlands län V 1991 $7,407,812 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Kronan V 1991 $66,713,100 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Lidköping V 2000 $63,896,720 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Norrbotten V 1991 $3,433,454 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Norrland V 1991 $16,079,433 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Nya V 1991 $34,073,585 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Rekarne V 1996 $18,544,088 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Röke V 2008 $3,869,934 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Skaraborg V 2000 $80,876,270 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Skåne V 1991 $36,700,703 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Söderhamn V 2000 $22,049,159 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Tjustbygden V 2001 $59,343,675 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Upland V 1991 $3,621,480 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Varberg V 2000 $114,154,797 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Vimmerby V 2001 $9,973,237 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Vinslöv V 2008 $29,371,874 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Väst V 1991 $5,875,790 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Öland V 1998 $10,660,388 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Öresund - sydvästra Skåne V 2010 $349,220,985 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Stiftelsen FöreningsSparbanken Sjuhärad V 1995 $76,870,085 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Åryds Sparbanksstiftelse V 2007 $3,172,779 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Älmeboda Sparbanksstiftelse V 2007 $11,293,332 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Sparbanksstiftelsen Alingsås V 2001 $262,502 2012 Financial General public benefit 
SUBTOTAL, Sweden 35   $1,478,797,019       
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UNITED KINGDOM 
Anglian Water Trust Fund I 1996 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
Bank of Scotland Foundation V 2002 $0 2012 Financial General public benefit 
British Gas Energy Trust I 2004 $0 2012 Public Utility Economic development; Social welfare 
EDF Energy Trust I 2003 $0 2012 Public Utility Economic development; Social welfare 
EOS Foundation I 2003 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
Friends Provident Foundation* V 2001 $59,185,665 2012 Min. Rights / Damage Set. Economic development 
HBOS Foundation V 2002 $0 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for England & Wales* V 1986 $968,492,700 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for Northern Ireland* V 1986 $109,548,322 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for Scotland* V 1986 $403,501,730 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for the Channel Islands* V 1986 $62,835,161 2012 Financial General public benefit 
Nationwide Foundation V 1998 $42,411,541 2012 Financial Economic development; Social welfare 
Northern Rock Foundation V 1997 $877,177,674 2012 Financial Social welfare 
Santander UK Charitable Foundation V 1990 $26,595,117 2012 Financial Economic development; Education 
Severn Trent Water Trust Fund I 1997 $0 2012 Public Utility Economic development; Social welfare 
Shetland Charitable Trust III 1976 $620,911,431 2012 Public Utility General public benefit 
South Staffordshire Water Trust Fund I 1993 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
Southern Water Charitable Trust Fund I 2007 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
Thames Water Trust Fund I 2008 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
United Utilities Trust Fund I 2005 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
Yorkshire Water Community Trust I 1995 $0 2012 Public Utility Social welfare 
SUBTOTAL, United Kingdom 21   $3,170,659,340       
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Allegany Franciscan Ministries, Inc. IV 1998 $115,350,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Alliance Healthcare Foundation V 1988 $65,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Andalusia Health Services, Inc. V 1981 $2,478,976 2006 Health Inst. Education 
Annie Penn Community Trust V 2001 $24,265,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Anthem Foundation of Ohio V 1995 $29,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Archstone Foundation V 1985 $86,551,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Asbury Foundation of Hattiesburg, Inc. V 1997 $36,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Austin-Bailey Health and Wellness Foundation V 1996 $6,575,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Baptist Community Ministries V 1924 $190,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Baptist Healing Trust V 2002 $100,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Baptist Health Foundation of San Antonio V 2004 $109,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Barberton Community Foundation V 1996 $94,391,950 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health; Sports 
Bedford Community Health Foundation V 1984 $3,714,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Bernardine Franciscan Sisters Foundation, Inc. V 1996 $12,105,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
BHHS Legacy Foundation V 2001 $96,172,604 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Birmingham Foundation V 1996 $17,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Brandywine Health Foundation V 2001 $25,400,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Calhoun County Community Foundation V 1997 $21,500,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
California HealthCare Foundation V 1996 $640,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
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Cape Fear Memorial Foundation V 1996 $63,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Care Foundation V 1999 $117,343,877  2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Caring for Colorado Foundation V 1999 $125,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Carlisle Area Health & Wellnes Foundation V 2001 $79,545,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Central Florida Healthcare Development Foundation V 1997 $126,750,308 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Central Susquehanna Community Foundation V 1998 $28,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Chester Healthcare Foundation V 2004 $17,039,861 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Chestnut Hill Health Care Foundation V 2005 $26,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Children's Fund of Connecticut V 1992 $24,962,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Christy-Houston Foundation V 1986 $71,367,397 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Colorado Springs Osteopathic Foundation V 1984 $11,497,701 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Columbus Medical Association Foundation V 1958 $74,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Community First Foundation V 1975 $44,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Community Foundation of Calhoun County V 1995 $20,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Community Foundation of South Lake County V 1995 $10,000,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
Community Health Endowment of Lincoln V 1997 $50,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Community Health Foundation V 1999 $5,896,965 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Community Health Foundation of Western and Central New York V 2002 $85,400,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Community Health Partnership V 1997 $1,359,024 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Community Memorial Foundation V 1995 $73,113,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
CommunityCare Foundation, Inc. V 1998 $134,500,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Con Alma Health Foundation, Inc. V 2001 $28,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Connecticut Health Foundation V 1999 $95,483,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Consumer Health Foundation V 1994 $30,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Dakota Medical Foundation V 1996 $90,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Danville Regional Foundation V 2005 $150,081,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
Daughters of Charity Foundation of St. Louis V 1995 $2,395,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Deaconess Community Foundation V 1994 $35,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Social welfare 
Deaconess Foundation V 1972 $90,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Social welfare 
Desert Healthcare District V 1998 $2,193,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Dr. John T. Macdonald Foundation, Inc. V 1992 $23,500,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Drs. Burce and Lee Foundation V 1995 $160,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Duneland Health Council V 1997 $7,891,348 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Endowment for Health V 1999 $73,260,000 2008 Health Inst. Economic development; Health; Social welfare 
EyeSight Foundation of Alabama V 1997 $55,778,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
First Hospital Foundation V 1997 $30,275,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
FISA Foundation V 1996 $31,179,266 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Foundation for a Health Kentucky V 2002 $44,500,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Foundation for Community Health V 2003 $17,289,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Foundation for Seacoast Health V 1984 $54,122,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Foundations Community Partnership V 2007 $17,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Four County Community Foundation V 1987 $6,200,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
Franklin Benevolent Corporation (Metta Fund) V 1957 $64,431,586 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Galesburg Community Foundation V 2004 $16,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Georgia Baptist Health Care Ministry Foundation V 1993 $214,078,504 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Good Samaritan Foundation, Inc. V 1995 $1,794,408 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health; Science 
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Grant Healthcare Foundation V 1996 $16,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Greater Saint Louis Health Foundation V 1987 $4,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Green Tree Community Health Foundation V 2004 $26,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Grotta Fund for Senior Care V 1993 $6,394,642 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Gulf Coast Community Foundation of Venice V 1995 $200,000,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
Gulf Coast Medical Foundation V 1983 $18,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Health Care Foundation of Greater Kansas City V 2003 $381,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Health Foundation of South Florida V 1993 $115,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Healthcare Foundation of Northern Lake County V 2006 $33,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Healthcare Georgia Foundation, Inc. V 1999 $93,901,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Helena Health Foundation V 2002 $9,860,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Hillcrest Foundation, Inc. V 1984 $29,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Culture; Education; Health 
Hilton Head Island Foundation V 1994 $34,552,307 2006 Health Inst. General public benefit 
HNHfoundation V 1997 $17,839,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Illini Community Health V 1948 $1,096,258 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Incarnate Word Foundation V 1997 $22,091,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Institue for Health Care Advancement V 1993 $19,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Irvine Health Foundation V 1985 $24,700,000 2007 Health Inst. Health 
J. Marion Sims Foundation, Inc. V 1995 $55,644,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Jewish Healthcare Foundation V 1990 $98,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
John Randolph Foundation V 1995 $34,600,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
John Rex Endowment V 2000 $60,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
K21 Health Foundation V 1999 $55,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Kansas Health Foundation V 1985 $382,885,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Lancaster Osteopathic Health Foundation V 1999 $8,346,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
LMC Community Foundation V 1975 $48,000,000 2006 Health Inst. General public benefit 
Lower Pearl River Valley Foundation V 1998 $13,005,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Lutheran Foundation of St. Louis V 1984 $70,964,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
MacNeal Health Foundation V 1999 $88,560,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health; Science 
Maine Health Access Foundation V 2000 $90,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Mary Black Foundation V 1996 $53,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Mat-Sue Health Foundation V 1952 $70,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
McAuley Ministries V 2008 $43,200,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Menorah Legacy Foundation V 2003 $22,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Methodist Healthcare Ministries of South Texas, Inc. V 1995 $433,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
MetroWest Community Health Care Foundation V 1999 $71,846,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Michael Reese Health Trust V 1997 $92,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Mid-Iowa Health Foundation V 1984 $16,034,180 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Missouri Foundation for Health V 2000 $827,400,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Moses Cone-Wesley Long Community Health Foundation V 1997 $90,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Mount Zion Health Fund V 1990 $35,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Mountainside Health Foundation V 1990 $23,900,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
New York State Health Foundation V 2006 $293,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
North Penn Community Health Foundation V 2002 $32,962,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Northwest Health Foundation V 1997 $98,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Northwest Osteopathic Medical Foundation V 1984 $4,500,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
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Northern Virginia Health Foundation V 2005 $30,939,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Obici Healthcare Foundation V 2006 $31,875,720 2006 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Osteopathic Founders Foundation V 1996 $11,114,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Osteopathic Heritage Foundations V 1960 $192,664,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Science 
Osteopathic Institute of the South V 1986 $2,235,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Pajaro Valley Community Health Trust V 1998 $10,752,153 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Palm Healthcare Foundation, Inc. V 2001 $70,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Paso del Norte Health Foundation V 1995 $133,207,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
Phoenixville Community Health Foundation V 1997 $49,800,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Portsmouth General Hospital Foundation V 1988 $11,297,388 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Pottstown Area Health & Wellness Foundation V 2003 $67,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Presbyterian Health Foundation V 1985 $180,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Science 
Prime Health Foundation V 1989 $6,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
Quad City Osteopathic Foundation V 1984 $4,200,000 2006 Health Inst. Education 
Quantum Foundation V 1995 $119,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
QueensCare V 1998 $399,125,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Ravenswood Health Care Foundation V 1999 $17,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
REACH Community Health Foundation V 1998 $116,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
REACH Healthcare Foundation V 2004 $142,600,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Riverside Community Health Foundation V 1973 $68,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Roanoke-Chowan Foundation, Inc. V 1998 $10,700,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Rose Community Foundation V 1995 $219,097,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Saint Luke's Foundation of Cleveland, Ohio V 1997 $156,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Salem Health & Wellness Foundation V 2002 $48,756,342 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
San Angelo Health Foundation V 1995 $44,867,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
SHARE Foundation V 1996 $80,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Sierra Health Foundation V 1984 $127,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Sisters of Charity Fondation of South Carolina V 1996 $88,800,000 2006 Health Inst. Economic development; Education; Social welfare 
Sisters of Charity Foundation of Canton V 1996 $79,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Economic dev.; Health; Social welfare 
Sisters of Charity Foundation of Cleveland V 1996 $82,038,678 2006 Health Inst. Economic development; Health; Social welfare 
Sisters of Mercy of North Carolina Foundation, Inc. V 1995 $239,106,484 2006 Health Inst. Economic development; Social welfare 
Sisters of St. Joseph Charitable Fund V 1996 $21,020,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
South Lake County Community Foundation V 1995 $9,128,910 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Spalding Health Care Trust V 1984 $28,271,546 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
St. David's Community Health Foundation Initiatives V 1996 $1,230,346 2008 Health Inst. Health 
St. Joseph Community Health Foundation V 1998 $22,706,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
St. Joseph's Community Health Foundation V 1998 $7,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
St. Joseph's Health Ministries Foundation V 2000 $6,231,575 2006 Health Inst. Health 
St. Luke's Foundation V 1983 $9,040,101 2006 Health Inst. Health 
St. Luke's Health Initiatives V 1995 $80,382,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Sunflower Foundation: Health Care for Kansas V 2000 $83,594,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Taylor Community Foundation V 1997 $8,600,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
The Alleghany Foundation V 1995 $52,158,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
The Arthur Foundation V 1999 $100,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Science 
The Assisi Foundation of Memphis, Inc. V 1994 $244,328,720 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
The Blowitz-Ridgeway Foundation V 1984 $19,375,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
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The Brentwood Foundation V 1994 $23,700,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health; Science 
The Byerly Foundation V 1995 $17,100,000 2008 Health Inst. Economic development; Education; Social welfare 
The California Endowment V 1996 $3,547,672,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
The California Wellness Foundation V 1996 $679,900,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Environment; Health 
The Cameron Foundation V 2003 $89,883,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
The Colorado Health Foundation V 1995 $950,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
The Colorado Trust V 1985 $337,239,618 2008 Health Inst. Health 
The Georgia Health Foundation V 1985 $9,045,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
The Greater Rochester Health Foundation V 2006 $200,000,000 2007 Health Inst. Health 
The Harvest Foundation V 2002 $202,601,000 2007 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
The Health Foundation of Central Massachusetts, Inc. V 1999 $49,499,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
The Health Foundation of Greater Cincinnati V 1978 $181,300,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
The Health Foundation of Greater Indianapolis, Inc. V 1985 $23,110,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
The Health Trust V 1996 $89,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
The HealthCare Foundation for Orange County V 1996 $13,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
The Healthcare Foundation of New Jersey V 1996 $114,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
The Horizon Foundation V 1998 $91,000,000 2007 Health Inst. Health 
The Jackson Foundation, Inc. V 1995 $76,609,673 2006 Health Inst. Education 
The Jenkins Foundation V 1995 $42,000,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
The Jewish Foundation of Cincinnati V 1995 $60,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
The Memorial Foundation V 1994 $170,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
The Mt. Sinai Health Care Foundation V 1996 $102,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Science 
The Patron Saints Foundation V 1986 $9,823,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
The Rapides Foundation V 1994 $9,823,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
The Valley Foundation V 1984 $55,342,624 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
Truman Heartland Community Foundation V 1994 $26,000,000 2006 Health Inst. General public benefit 
Tucson Osteopathic Medical Foundation V 1986 $7,437,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Tuscora Park Health and Wellness Foundation V 1996 $4,206,417 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Two Rivers Health & Wellness Foundation V 2001 $8,800,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
UniHealth Foundation V 1998 $233,952,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Union Labor Health Foundation V 1997 $4,442,000 2006 Health Inst. Health 
United Methodist Health Ministry Fund V 1986 $52,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Universal Health Care Foundation of Connecticut, Inc. V 2000 $29,492,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Valley Care Association V 1999 $7,928,073 2006 Health Inst. Health 
Washington Square Health Foundation, Inc. V 1985 $16,993,667 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Welborn Baptist Foundation, Inc. V 1998 $82,000,000 2008 Health Inst. General public benefit 
Westlake Health Foundation V 1999 $80,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Williamsburg Community Health Foundation V 1996 $104,800,000 2008 Health Inst. Health; Social welfare 
Winter Park Health Foundation V 1994 $93,000,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Woodruff Health Foundation V 1986 $9,259,000 2008 Health Inst. Health 
Wyandotte Health Foundation V 1997 $47,095,000 2006 Health Inst. Education; Health 
Wythe-Bland Community Foundation V 2005 $40,175,000 2008 Health Inst. Education; Health; Social welfare 
SUBTOTAL, United States 199   $19,988,479,197       
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URUGUAY 
Fundacion ACAC**         Financial   
SUBTOTAL, Uruguay 1   $0       
       
TOTAL, OVERALL 539   $134,760,796,946 
 
    
 
*Estimated asset equivalent of stream of resources from annual lottery or covenanted proceeds.  
**PtP-type transaction not confirmed 
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NAME, 
AFFILIATION HOME COUNTRY REGION COVERED 
Feliz Bikman, 
Sanbanci Foundation Turkey Aegean Region (Turkey, Greece) 
Faith Kisinga Kenya English-speaking Africa Region 
Jeanne Elone, 
TrustAfrica Senegal French-Speaking Africa Region 
Gabriel Berger,  
Univesidad de San Andres Argentina Spanish-Speaking Latin America  
Marcos Kisil, 
Instituto para o Desenvolviment Brazil Brazil 
Pooran Pandey, 
Times of India Foundation India South Asia Region 
Juree Vichit-Vadakan Thailand 
Southeast Asia (Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia 
Mark Lyons, 
Australian Technical University Australia Asia Pacific Rim (China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Australia) 
Gian Paolo Barbetta, 
Catholic University of Milano  Italy Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, France) 
Rupert Strachwitz, 
Maecenata Institute Germany 
Northern Europe (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden 
Nigel Siederer, 
Good Foundations United Kingdom United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada 
Boris Strecansky, 
Centre of Philanthropy Slovakia Central and Eastern Europe  
Amani Kandil, 
Arab Network for NGOs Egypt Middle East Region  
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Board 
Size Selection Members 
Volkswagen Foundation I 14 100% 50% 14 100% 36% 7 Board members chosen by GFR/7 by State of Lower Saxony; 5 
scientists at founding/ 7 more recently. 
German Environmental 
Foundation 
I 14 100% 57% 14 100% 57% 5 leaders of GFR + 3 state secretaries+ reps of labor, business, German 
League for Nature+ 2 scientists. 
Baden-Würtemberg 
Foundation 
I 18 100% 100% 18 100% 100% 9 reps of B-W government+ 9 from B-W Parliament; Minister of Finance 
is Vice Manager. 
Rheinland-Pfalz Foundation 
for Innovation 
I 4 100% 100% 4 100% 100% 3 state Government  Ministers + State Chancellor comprise   Board of 
Directors. 
ASB Community Trust V 15 100% 0% 15 100% 0%  Minister of Finance selects all Board members. 
Community Trust of 
Southland 
V 10 100% 0% 10 100% 0%  Minister of Finance selects all Board members. 
Foundation for Polish 
Science 
I 7 100% 43% 7 100% 43% 
Council members must be professors. Appointed by Polish Minister of 
Science. 3 from  government Council for Science; 2 from prior Council, 
rest from lists developed by outgoing Council.  
Foundation for Polish-
German Cooperation 
IV 8 100% 100% 10 100% 20% German and Polish gov'ts each select 1 co-chair and 3 Board members. 
La Scala Foundation II 9 62.5% 11% 9 62.5% 11% 5 governing bodies. 6 of 9 on Board of Admins are governmental 
nominees. Mayor of Milan is President of Board. 
Lombardy Foundation for 
the Environment 
II 12 58% 58% 12 58% 58% Lombard Government appoints 7; +5 university  rectors. 
Cariplo Foundation V 40 50% 0% 40 50% 0% 
Governing Board chooses 20 members from lists of 3 names each 
provided by various local authorities and chambers of commerce +  12  
experts from lists of 3 each pro-vided by civil society orgs; 7 selected 
freely by Board. 
Fondazione CRT V 24 62.5% 0% 24 62.5% 0% 
12 representatives of local authorities + 2 representatives of Chambers 
of Commerce+1 member of Regional Coordination Committee of 
Universities.  
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Slovak Youth Foundation II 9 33% 33% 9 33% 33% 9 board members—3 each from 3 Founding entities: Ministry of 
Education, University Student Org, Youth Council. 
Compagnia di San Paolo V 21 57% 0% 21 57% 0% 
5 representatives of local and regional governments,+ rep  of  Pres. of 
EU Commission,  6 reps of Chambers of Commerce,+1 rep of National 
Commission on Equal Opportunities, 1 rep of Regional Council for 
Voluntary Work+2 Academy reps  +4 Board choices. 
King Baudouin Foundation 
 
III 
 
20 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
20 
 
10% 
 
10% 
Two board members reserved for King. Others are selected by 2/3 vote 
of existing Board of Governors 
Oranje Foundation III 10 0% 0% 10 0% 0% Board of Governors, self-perpetuating. Board recruits new members 
when vacancies occur. 
Erste Foundation V 9 0% 0% 9 0% 0% Board members selected by pre-existing Savings Bank Association. 
Lloyds TSB Foundation for 
England and Wales 
V 12 0% 0% 12 0% 0% Lloyds TSB Bank selected trustees of foundation until 1999. Effectively 
transferred  function to foundation. 
California Endowment V 15 0% 0% 15 0% 0% 
Original board selected by BCC and stakeholders from lists prepared by 
a search firm. California Department of Corporations reviewed and 
approved 7 of original  18 had some affiliation with BCC. 
Czech Investment Fund 
Foundations I 3+ 0% 0% 3+ 0% 0% No government involvement. Conflict of interest law. 
Slovak Savings Bank 
Foundation I 8 0% 13% 8 0% 13% 
Bank officials + 1 Ministry of Finance official. 2 Boards: Board of 
Directors, Supervisory Board. 
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Wilhelm Krull,  Chairman General –Secretary Volkswagen Foundation Germany 
Gerry Salole Executive Director, European Foundation Centre Belgium 
Jenny Hodgson Director, Global Fund for Community Foundations South Africa 
Johan Schotte Principal, Johan Schotte Foundation Switzerland 
Pier Mario Vello (deceased) Secretary General Fondazione Cariplo Italy 
Marcos Kisil President, Instituto  para o Desenvolviment Brazil 
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